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This thesis examines stabilizing mechanisms in social security retirement systems 
(“SSRS”), especially those purporting to be automatic balancing mechanisms (“ABM”). 
It develops a consistent approach to identifying whether an ABM is robust, partial or 
transitory and establishes a terminology to classify balancing mechanisms.  Both 
financial and equitable balances are considered in assessing whether an ABM achieves 
balance.  Families of definitions of equity are presented and a benchmark by which to 
measure equitable balance is defined and applied.  The balancing mechanisms of Canada, 
Germany, Japan and Sweden are described, evaluated and classified.  None of these 
mechanisms are found to be robust. 
 
     This thesis provides a critical analysis of an approach referred to as integration to 
financial markets and the approach is found to be deficient.  In analyzing the Swedish 
SSRS a critical error in the way assets are calculated is identified and a suitable 
correction is proposed.  A further weakness in the application of the Swedish ABM is 
identified that means that once an imbalance occurs, balance is unlikely to be restored.  
The thesis also discusses some of the unusual characteristics of the steady-state 
contribution rate calculation for the Canadian SSRS and shows that although it has 
limited application and does not appear to depend on any actuarial principle, the steady-
state contribution rate calculation creates a tension between the near and distant future, 
which is a factor in achieving financial balance over a seventy-five year horizon.  With 
respect to the balancing mechanism in the Canadian SSRS, the thesis proposes a change 
in how the mechanism is defined so that the mechanism would be robust, within certain 
ranges.  
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1.0 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter presents an overview of this thesis.  It enumerates important characteristics 
of social security retirement systems (“SSRS”). The automatic balancing mechanism 
(“ABM”) in the Swedish SSRS is one that most people refer to when discussing ABM.  It 
is described. 
 
     This thesis assesses ABM with respect to whether they are automatic and whether they 
achieve financial balance and/or equitable balance.  A review of the literature regarding 
the financial and equitable balance of the Swedish ABM is presented. 
 
     This chapter lists the important contributions that this research makes to the study of 




1.1    Introduction  
 
     It is inherent to SSRS that some guarantees will be imbedded.  In this thesis, guarantee 
is being used in the sense of contractual undertaking or implied promise. It is recognized 
that even that which is guaranteed may not be delivered as originally promised and that 
governments may have reserved the right to revise or change the terms, the tax and 
benefit structures.  
 
 For example, in a traditional defined benefit (“DB”) partially funded SSRS, such as 
exists in Canada, a benefit based on an established formula is guaranteed to be paid for a 
retiring participant’s life. Moreover, the pension is adjusted to offset the erosion of 
purchasing power due to inflation, which is another type of guarantee. There may also be 
guaranteed death benefits both before and after retirement.  The contribution schedule 
may be presented as fixed or guaranteed.  Or, for example, in a fully funded defined 
contribution (“DC”) SSRS, such as exists in Chile, there are guarantees in that the 
accumulated contribution balances at retirement are converted to income, which is 
guaranteed to be paid for the retiring participant’s remaining lifetime.    These are just 
examples of a few of the guarantees that may exist.  Guarantees will be discussed more 
fully later. 
 
     SSRS are long-term undertakings.  In the most limited form, there is a commitment to 
the generation of participants able to work for whatever is defined to be the period of full 
service that such participants, when they retire, will receive benefits determined in some 
stated manner for the rest of their lives.  For some participants such an undertaking may 
last at least seventy years, e.g., forty years during the service period establishing full 
benefit entitlement and thirty years during the period when benefits are received.  For 
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other participants of this generation such an undertaking may be shorter or longer.  But 
typically the establishment of an SSRS is not merely a commitment to current 
generations; it is viewed as an undertaking to future generations as well.  As such an 
SSRS is a long-term undertaking, potentially with an indefinite horizon. 
 
     There are many factors that may impact the ability of an SSRS to deliver on its 
guarantees over a long horizon.  Increasing longevity has been an important factor 
affecting the cost of lifetime pension guarantees.  The rate of inflation impacts the cost of 
providing inflation-adjusted (referred to as “indexed”) pensions.  Investment returns are a 
factor in partially funded schemes and whenever an interest rate is assumed in 
determining the value of a guarantee or the amount to be guaranteed.  Within an SSRS 
with guarantees, each individual participant cannot be responsible for fully backing or 
supporting his or her own guarantee, some pooling or insurance will apply.  The 
participant may pay some risk premium that is more or less than the actual value of the 
participant’s guarantee but each participant does not pay only the exact value of his or her 
guarantee, there is some pooling of risk associated with providing guarantees.  As such, 
demographic factors and changes to those demographic factors will affect the ability of 
the system to deliver on the guarantees.  Depending on what benefits the SSRS includes, 
there may be other factors affecting the ability to deliver on guarantees such as:  
incidence of disability and rates of recovery (if disability guarantees exist); family 
composition and survivor mortality (if survivorship guarantees exist); participation rates 
and work history (if there is not a one-to-one link between benefits and work history).  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the assumptions made in establishing the SSRS 
will affect its ability to deliver on its guarantees.  If the contribution schedule is unlikely 
to support the generous level of benefits guaranteed, except in the most optimistic 
scenarios, the ability of the SSRS to deliver on its guarantees is more likely to be 
challenged than if the contribution schedule and benefit levels have been set using 
realistic assumptions. 
 
     Due to: 
 the existence of guarantees, 
 the long-term horizon of the SSRS, and 
 the many factors which may affect the guarantees, all of which may change in the 
long term, 
it is likely that all SSRS will experience stress at some time.  This stress may manifest 
itself in different ways, or observers, especially if they are not impartial, may identify the 
stress more strongly in relation to certain components.  For example, the stress may be 
stated as a funding deficiency, or as a need to increase contribution rates, or as a 
requirement to cut benefits, or as a need to raise the retirement age to be eligible for full 
benefits.  Reforms that address the stress by changing some parameter, such as the 
contribution rate or retirement age, are referred to as parametric reforms.  But structural 
reform may also be the response to stress.  In a structural reform, the structure of the 
SSRS is changed.  For example, in 1981 Chile replaced its DB SSRS by a system of fully 
funded DC accounts (“FDC”).  Or, for example in 1999, Sweden replaced its DB SSRS 
by a combined system of notional defined contribution accounts (“NDC”) and FDC 
accounts.  These are both examples of structural reform. 
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     Because SSRS are likely to require adjustment, at some point, to respond to the stress 
experienced, it is reasonable to attempt to describe the characteristics that the most 
acceptable adjustments to an SSRS should have. These characteristics will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 2.  Certain SSRS have adopted automatic balancing mechanisms in 
order to respond to the stresses and maintain balance. 
 
     Automatic balancing mechanisms are relatively scarce, perhaps non-existent, as will 
be discussed.  However, there is an immediate appeal to an effective balancing 
mechanism that makes the necessary adjustments in response to stresses that have 
occurred.  The focus of this thesis is automatic balancing mechanisms (“ABM”).  The 
most famous example of an ABM occurs in the Swedish SSRS.  Accordingly, this ABM 
will be described in this chapter and the literature regarding this ABM reviewed.  In the 
body of this thesis, mechanisms used by SSRS in four countries (Sweden, Japan, 
Germany, Canada) that might, at least at first glance, be considered ABM are reviewed 
and critiqued and an assessment made whether the mechanism can be truly considered an 
ABM.  In preparation for such an assessment, there are several preliminary steps.   
 
     The first step is to develop terminology that may be used to classify ABM depending 
on whether or not they are automatic and on how well they succeed in achieving balance.  
This is done in Chapter 2.  The next step is to describe more fully the concept of balance 
among and within cohorts.  In Chapter 4, the literature on generational accounting and 
intergenerational equity is reviewed and the relevant aspects for making an assessment of 
balance are identified.  In Chapter 5, various families of definitions of equity are 
discussed and an approach is specified that can be used to determine how well equitable 
balance is achieved among and within cohorts. Vidal-Melia et al. (2008) state that the 
existence of an ABM goes hand in hand with the prior calculation of a financial solvency 
indicator or sustainability indicator. The objective is to assess whether the adjustment 
mechanism succeeds in achieving balance only in specified circumstances, such as the 
expected demographics for a specified horizon for a particular country, or whether the 
adjustment mechanism is robust, i.e., able to adjust to stresses regardless of the 
demographics or economics or however remote the likelihood of occurrence of the 
demographic or economic stress may be.  This standard of robustness is very high and 
this thesis finds that none of the ABM are robust, according to this definition.  In the 
penultimate chapter, the results of the analysis, modeling and assessment of adjustment 
mechanisms are summarized and observations made regarding the types of controls that a 
robust ABM might include.  The final chapter identifies fields outside of SRSS to which 
this research might be applied and suggests areas for future related research.    
 
1.2    Literature Review Regarding the ABM in the Swedish NDC  
 
1.2.1  Description of the ABM 
 
The most famous of SSRS that has an ABM is Sweden, so it will be described and 
discussed in this opening chapter. The Swedish SSRS is a complex system with many 
components, most of which have been commented on in the literature.  This subsection 
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briefly outlines the Swedish system identifying components to be included in any 
subsequent analysis. 
 
The Swedish SSRS requires an aggregate contribution from the employee and on 
behalf of the employee by the employer of 18.5% of the employee’s pay.  Of this 
contribution 16% is allocated to the NDC part of the system and the remaining 2.5% is 
allocated to the FDC part of the system.  The FDC part will be excluded from further 
discussion and analysis.  An important characteristic of the NDC part is that the 
contribution rate is, and will remain, fixed. 
 
Within the SRSS there is a guaranteed minimum pension.  The excess of the 
guaranteed minimum pension over the pension provided by the NDC is paid for through 
general taxes and hence is outside the fixed-contribution NDC component.  As such, it 
will be excluded from further discussion and analysis.  (Although it will enter the 
analysis of whether the ABM is successful in achieving balance). 
 
There are also certain disability and survivors’ benefits within the SSRS that are paid 
for through general taxes.  As such they will be excluded from further discussion and 
analysis. 
 
Within the NDC, the contributions are credited notionally to the account of the 
contributor.  The credit is notional because benefits paid to pensioners are financed using 
contribution income and any contribution income that exceeds pension payments is 
deposited in a buffer fund which is invested.  However, the actual investment earnings on 
the buffer fund are not credited to the contributors’ accounts.  Annually, the notional 
balances in the contributors’ accounts are credited (notionally) with “interest” at the rate 
of growth in average wage or income of the population over the past year, calculated on a 
per capita basis, based on a three-year moving average. 
 
 At retirement, the contributor’s notional account balance is used to purchase the 
contributor’s initial pension.  The pension is calculated using an annuity factor that 
incorporates a 1.6% per annum discount (interest) rate and a mortality factor that is 
reflective of the mortality improvement by cohort.  Table 1 from Settergren (2003) shows 
the projected annuity factors at age 65.  This table also shows the projected increase in 
life expectancy at age 65.  The postponement of the age of full benefit entitlement to 
reflect increases in life expectancy is one component of the mechanism to achieve 
balance.  An alternative to having one’s pension be less than the pension at age 65 of 
someone in the 1940 birth cohort with an equivalent notional balance at age 65 would be 
to postpone retirement beyond age 65.  The table also shows the period of postponement 
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Table 1:  Effect of Projected Life Expectancy on Annuity Factor, Pension Levels  
           or Retirement Age 
 
  Age 65 Reduction In Retirement Age Remaining 
Birth  Projected Pension Due to To Neutralize Life 
Cohort Year Annuity Increased Life Increased Life Expectancy 
Born Reaches 65 Factor Expectancy Expectancy At Age 65 
1940 2005 15.7 0% Age 65 18 years & 6 months 
1945 2010 16.1 2% +   4 months +   6 months 
1950 2015 16.4 4% +   7 months + 11 months 
1955 2020 16.7 6% + 10 months + 16 months 
1960 2025 17.0 7% + 13 months + 20 months 
1965 2030 17.2 9% + 16 months + 24 months 
1970 2035 17.4 10% + 18 months + 28 months 
1975 2040 17.7 11% + 21 months + 32 months 
1980 2045 17.9 12% + 23 months + 35 months 
1985 2050 18.0 13% + 25 months + 38 months 
1990 2055 18.2 14% + 26 months + 41 months 
 
 
Once pensions commence they are adjusted annually by the increase in the average 
wage per capita, the same rate that is used to adjust the notional accounts of contributors 
(taking into account the 1.6% discount factor already incorporated in the pension 
calculation).  Hence, if the increase in the average wage per capita exceeds the rate of 
inflation by 1.6% then the pensioner’s pension is adjusted to fully reflect the rate of 
inflation.  If the increase in the average wage per capita less the rate of inflation is more 
(less) than 1.6% then the pensioner’s pension is adjusted by more (less) than the rate of 
inflation. 
 
The changing annuity factor by birth cohort to reflect increased cohort life expectancy 
is a component of the balancing mechanism.  There is another component of the system 
referred to as the automatic balance mechanism.  To understand how this mechanism 
works it is necessary to understand how the system calculates its financial balance. 
 
Two weighted average ages are calculated.   The expected income-weighted age of 
income earners represents the single age of income earners (contributors), such that if all 
earnings (contributions) were made at that age, it would be equivalent to the income-
weighted age of income earners.  The expected pension-weighted age of pensioners 
represents the single age of pensioners, such that if all pension payments were made at 
that age, it would be equivalent to the pension-weighted age of pensioners.  The absolute 
value of the number of years’ difference between these two ages is called the expected 
turnover duration. 
 
Expected turnover duration will be analyzed critically in Section 6.1.3. A very 
simplistic explanation of this concept of expected turnover duration is the following. If 
the population of contributors and pensioners were in a steady state, then the expected 
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income-weighted age of the contributors represents the age at which a single contribution 
equivalent to the contribution for all other ages (weighted by income) would be made and 
the expected pension-weighted age of the pensioners represents the age that a lump sum 
pension equivalent to the pensions at all other ages (weighted by pension) would be paid.  
Then the period between the two ages represents the time between receipt of the single 
contribution and payment of the lump sum pension, i.e., the expected turnover duration. 
 
The contribution asset is defined as one year’s contributions multiplied by the 
expected turnover duration.  The total assets equal the contribution asset plus any assets 
in the buffer fund. 
 
The total pension liabilities of the NDC component are defined as the accumulated 
notional account balances of non-pensioners plus the sum over all pensioners of the 
product of their current pension times their remaining life expectancy.  The liability in 
respect of non-pensioners is consistent with how an actuary would define the liability in a 
DC plan.  The liability in respect of pensioners is only consistent with how an actuary 
would define the liability if the future (interest) discount rate were zero percent. 
 
To determine if there is financial balance, a balance ratio is calculated.  The balance 
ratio is total assets divided by total pension liabilities. When the balance ratio is less than 
1 then the automatic balance mechanism is triggered, affecting the next and subsequent 
years until financial balance is restored.  Pensions are no longer increased by the rate of 
increase in the average income.  Instead they are increased by the rate of increase in 
average income multiplied by the balance ratio.  Similarly, the interest rate credited to 
notional accounts is no longer the rate of increase in the average income; rather it is the 
rate of increase in the average income multiplied by the balance ratio.  To summarize, 
when the total assets are less than the total pension liabilities, there is no change to the 
contribution rate but the rate at which notional accounts are credited is reduced (from the 
level that would have applied if the balance mechanism had not been triggered) and the 
rate of indexing of pensions is reduced below the rate of increase in the average income. 
 
It is expected that the application of the automatic balance mechanism will rectify the 
financial balance over time.  After the automatic balance mechanism has been triggered 
and it is subsequently determined that the balance ratio exceeds 1 then indexing of 
pensions and crediting of (notional) interest to notional accounts continues at the product 
of the balance ratio and the rate of increase in average income until the pension liability 
attains the level it would have been at if indexing had been (continuously) at the rate of 
increase in the average income. 
 
 
1.2.2  Critique of the ABM Based on Financial Balance 
 
Valdes Prieto (2000) uses relatively simple models to derive formulae to analyze the 
financial stability of various ways that notional account pension systems could operate.  
He concludes that where the contribution rate is constant forever, the notional interest 
rate credited is based on the growth rate of the average covered wage and the pensions 
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paid are increased by the growth of the average wage, all aspects which characterize the 
Swedish NDC (except that the pension is calculated using a 1.6% discount rate), then the 
system does not exhibit automatic financial stability unless the number of contributors 
remains constant forever.  To show this, he defines tN  to represent the number of 
contributors at time t , Rt  to represent Revenue at time t , where Rt Yt
i
i
 and  is the 
contribution rate (a constant) and Yt
i represents the income of individual i  at time t .  He 
defines Expenditure at time t , E t , as 
j
j
tt PE  where Pt
j  represents the pension at 
time t  of pensioner j  and Pt
j  is indexed by the growth in the average wage, which rate 
















Rt 1 and since 
t t 1 , E t 1
Nt
Nt 1
Rt 1 . So automatic financial stability only applies when the 
number of contributors remains constant.  Because the number of contributors is unlikely 
to remain constant, a stabilizing mechanism like Sweden’s automatic balance mechanism 
is required in order to achieve financial stability.  
 
McGillivray (2005) believes that cohort mortality improvement after the cohort’s 
pensioners have annuitized, in excess of what was incorporated in the annuity factor, has 
the potential to affect financial stability.  Such excess mortality improvement must be 
borne by any buffer funds or be mediated using the ABM. 
 
Letzner et al. (2004) observes that “when the work force decreases, the average 
income growth can be higher than the growth rate of the total wage bill and benefits and 
pension rights will grow faster than the contribution base from which benefits are paid”.  
In such a situation, financial balance can only be achieved by the use of buffer funds or 
the ABM. 
 
     However, when the working population is shrinking dramatically, as is projected for 
the Japanese population through 2050, according to Ono (2007), the automatic balance 
mechanism may not be able to achieve financial balance.  Ono claims that using the 
Japanese population projections, a career average pension formula and applying the ABM 
methodology applicable to the Swedish NDC, the system still exhausts all available 
assets (i.e., requiring an external cash infusion) by 2045.  Without applying the ABM, 
Ono claims the assets would run out by 2038.  Ono concludes that “the [automatic 
balance] mechanism works efficiently to some extent, it has its own limit under the 
decreasing population because it does not assume the rate of annual decrease in the 
discount rate”. Although the plan analyzed by Ono is not the same as the Swedish plan 
design, his observation that the ABM may not operate to ensure financial stability in the 
presence of a decreasing fertility rate that is already below the population replacement 
rate is an important one to analyze.  At the International Actuarial Association Pension 
Benefits and Social Security Colloquium in May 2007 in Helsinki (where Ono presented 
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his findings), Settergren observed that he had not seen the calculations but, based on the 
results, he doubted that the Swedish ABM had been properly applied.  This aspect will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Cichon (2005) states that a central problem will be negative or low economic growth 
rates that could potentially be triggered by a contraction of the labour force.  He considers 
such analysis beyond the scope of that paper and does not elaborate. 
 
Barr (2004a) argues that in SSRS a pension credit earned is only a claim on future 
production.  Extending this argument to the extreme, i.e., in a society where all were 
pensioners and there was no production, such pension claims would be worthless.  
Sweden’s ABM would not be able to produce financial balance in such an extreme 
scenario; although, if Ono’s work is believed, the decline in production due to a declining 
fertility rate does not have to be as extreme as the example above. 
 
 
1.2.3  Critique of the ABM Based on Equitable Balance 
 
 Given that a full discussion of equitable balance does not take place until Chapter 5, it 
is not possible at this juncture to distinguish the relative merits of various possible 
definitions of equitable balance.  The critiques presented in this subsection present the 
various authors’ views on equitable balance without assessment.  It is recognized that 
different authors may be using different definitions of equitable balance. 
 
Settergren (2003) offers several ways in which the system is equitable.  One way is 
by use of a constant contribution rate – all workers (and pensioners) have contributed at 
the same rate.  A second way is by adjusting the amount of pension received in order to 
account for projected increases in cohort life expectancy.  A third method is to define 
intergenerational balance or fairness as having a constant ratio of present value of 
pension benefits over present value of contributions for all birth cohorts, using the growth 
in average income as the discount factor.  He claims that an NDC system achieves a very 
stable cohort benefit/contribution ratio.  A fourth indication of inter-generational balance 
or fairness is a relatively stable ratio of average pension over average income, which he 
calls the pension level. 
 
Analyzing the Swedish NDC in the context of typical European demographics, 
Cichon (2005) thinks that it is likely that pensions will continue to decline from 
generation to generation.  A conclusion shared by Scherman (2003), Hagberg et al. 
(2002), and McGillivray (2005).  Cichon (2005) states further that after the automatic 
balance mechanism has been triggered and even if financial balance is achieved so that 
the mechanism no longer is operating, there will be distortions.  This may occur because 
there is no correction to pensions that were adjusted, for the period of adjustment.  It may 
also occur because in bringing pensions back on track for indexing, account balances of 
non-pensioners may be overcompensated for the loss during the period when the 
adjustment applied.  Cichon considers all of these effects examples of lack of equitable 
balance. 
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Barr (2004a) labels the Swedish NDC with its constant contribution rate and various 
balancing adjustments, an actuarial relationship.  Contrary to those who argue that 
benefits derived from actuarial relationships are equitable, he would argue that state 
pensions might achieve greater equity through redistributive assistance.  Even if it were 
acknowledged that consumption smoothing had been achieved equitably, there may be 
other social welfare goals that are not achieved equitably such as poverty relief and 
distributional objectives.  Letzner et al. (2004) also take a broader social welfare view of 
equity arguing that to view generational fairness only from a perspective of the 
contribution rate and the rate of return fails to take into account changes in society and 
societal values.  They argue that greater equity might be achieved in certain 
circumstances, such as when pensions are deemed inadequate, by raising the contribution 
rate. 
 
McGillivray (2005) thinks a more equitable and transparent reform approach in the 
face of increasing longevity is to gradually increase the normal retirement age.  He 
believes that the Swedish system will lead indirectly to an increase in the retirement age 
but that by using such a complex approach to achieve financial balance, winners and 
losers will be created.  Further, when the ABM operates to reduce the indexing of 
pensions, he thinks it is possible that pensioners will suffer decreases in their standard of 
living compared to the rest of the population, which is inequitable.  Hagberg et al. (2002) 
also express concern that the standard of living of pensioners will decline relative to the 
standard previously experienced by Sweden’s elderly - a standard they categorize proudly 
as among the highest in the world. 
 
Finally, with respect to equity, McGillivray (2005) raises the question of the manner 
in which the Swedish reform was introduced.  He asks whether public pension reform 
should be decided by responsible and visionary political leaders who rise above partisan 
and ideological issues and reach a compromise consensus on the basis of sound technical 
advice and inputs from shareholders, or whether reform should be framed by 
shareholders who are inevitably constrained by parochial perspectives. 
 
Könberg (2004) believes that the new Swedish system is fair.  He would respond to 
McGillivray’s question with a question of his own “Is broad political consensus 
undemocratic?”  He claims the reform was reached through an agreement between five 
political parties representing more than 85% of the voters. 
 
Könberg sites two main principles that underlie the design of the system, which make 
it fair.  The life-income principle requires that contributions result in pension rights.  
With a fixed contribution rate DC approach, the same pension rights as a percentage of 
pay are given to all contributors.  He would consider unfair a system in which 
contribution rates could be raised without giving any new pension rights.  The adjustment 
principle requires that pension rights and the pensions should follow the development of 
the economy and life expectancy. 
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In summary, there is no consensus on whether the system attains an equitable 
balance. Much depends on your definition of equity, which in turn is imbedded in a value 
system.  This issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
     From the commentary, it would appear that there are scenarios based on labour market 
contraction and slowing or negative economic growth in which financial balance is not 
achieved.  As such the system cannot be considered robust.  There are opposing 
arguments regarding whether the system achieves an equitable balance.  Until the 
systematic discussion of this issue in Chapter 5, the most we can conclude is that the 
Swedish ABM is not robust.  Settergren (2003) states that the existence of uninsurable 
risks such as a development of the contribution base at a slower rate than the growth in 
average income or changes in life expectancy may make it impossible to achieve the dual 
goal: financial and inter-generational balance.  The analysis provided later in this thesis 
will provide an assessment of how well the Swedish ABM achieves this dual goal.   
 
 
1.3   Outline of Contributions 
 
This research concerns SSRS and specifically those with ABM.  The objective of this 
thesis is to contribute to the literature on SSRS and ABM in the following areas: 
 In Chapter 2, it establishes a terminology to classify balancing mechanisms. 
 In Chapter 3, it provides a critical analysis of an approach proposed by Valdes-
Prieto referred to as Integration to Financial Markets and the approach is found to 
be deficient. 
 In Chapter 5, it presents families of definitions of equity and presents a 
benchmark by which to measure equitable balance.  In Chapter 7, it illustrates 
how this benchmark could be applied to four countries SSRS that differ in 
significant respects. 
 In Chapter 6, it identifies a critical error in the way in which assets are calculated 
by the Swedish SSRS in determining financial status and proposes a suitable 
correction.  Also in Chapter 6, it identifies a weakness in the manner of applying 
the ABM in the Swedish system, so that once an imbalance occurs, balance is 
unlikely to be restored. 
 In Chapter 6, it discusses some of the unusual characteristics of the steady-state 
contribution rate calculation for the Canadian SSRS and shows that although it 
has limited application and does not appear to depend on any actuarial principle it 
creates a tension between the near and distant future, which is a factor in 
achieving financial balance over a seventy-five year horizon. 
 In Chapters 6 and 7, it provides an analysis of the balancing mechanism in the 
Canadian SSRS and proposes a change in how the mechanism is defined so that 
the mechanism would be robust, within certain ranges. 
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1.4   Outline of Thesis 
 
This first chapter sets the stage for the further work in this thesis by introducing SSRS 
and ABM.  The Swedish ABM is the most famous of all ABM, so it is described and the 
literature with respect to it reviewed.  The contributions of this thesis are outlined. 
 
     Chapter 2 develops terminology to be used to classify purported ABM.  It discusses 
the desirable characteristics of an ABM and distinguishes among the classifications of 
robust, partial and transitory.  It outlines the approach to be used in reviewing the ABM 
of the four countries (Sweden, Japan, Germany and Canada). 
 
     Chapter 3 is divided into Part A and Part B.  Part A provides background information 
necessary for the arguments and research developed subsequently in the thesis.  Topics in 
Part A include: a description of the main assumptions affecting the financial status of an 
SSRS; a general discussion of stochastic optimal control and a positioning of the 
balancing process problem within a stochastic optimal control framework; a brief 
overview of the overlapping generations model which, in some form is often used in the 
analysis of SSRS; a description of different methods of indexing benefits after retirement; 
a discussion of demographic adjustments with respect to life expectancy and fertility.  
Part B presents a number of topics that are related to this research that will not be 
considered further.  The topics in Part B are presented to provide greater understanding of 
the position of this thesis within the broader area of research on SSRS.  It is not necessary 
to read Part B to understand the main arguments of this thesis. 
 
     Chapters 4 and 5 discuss various concepts of equity and by the end of Chapter 5 a 
benchmark to measure equitable balance within the countries’ ABM is presented.  In 
Chapter 4, the methodology of generational accounting developed by Auerbach, Gokhale 
and Kotlikoff is described.  Based on the results of the generational accounting analysis, 
conclusions are frequently drawn regarding generational equity.  Chapter 4 argues that an 
uneven burden of taxes as shown by the generational accounts does not necessarily mean 
there is generational inequity. In Chapter 5, it is shown that the economic concept of 
Pareto efficiency should not be equated with equity.  This chapter presents and discusses 
six families of definitions of equity.  It concludes by presenting the method of 
determining equity to be used in this thesis. 
 
     Chapter 6 begins the analysis of the balance achieved by the four countries’ ABM.  It 
considers financial balance.   The approach used is to describe the ABM, define the 
objective for financial balance to be achieved, and then analyze whether financial balance 
is likely to be achieved in all situations.  Significant financial analysis has been done by 
the countries’ actuaries, economists and governmental agencies, as well as by certain 
other commentators and transnational bodies.  Such analysts have access to vast amounts 
of data, complex models and significant resources.  The approach of this thesis is to 
review the published analysis rather than to perform independent modeling.  None of the 
ABM are found to be robust from the perspective of financial balance. The Canadian 
ABM is found to provide partial financial balance; moreover, an adjustment to the 
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Canadian ABM is proposed that would make it robust from the perspective of financial 
balance. 
 
     Chapter 7 continues the analysis of the balance achieved by the four countries’ ABM 
by considering equitable balance.  The mechanism used by Sweden is found to provide 
partial equitable balance but the equitable balance of the mechanisms in Germany, Japan 
and Canada is considered to be transitory.  The adjustment to the Canadian mechanism 
proposed in Chapter 6 is analyzed and found to be lacking with respect to equitable 
balance, in certain circumstances. Further adjustments are proposed to the Canadian 
mechanism so that it will achieve financial and equitable balance, i.e., will be robust, 
within certain ranges. 
 
     Chapter 8 summarizes the results of the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, using the 
terminology presented in Chapter 2.  It describes the characteristics of mechanisms and 
controls that an ABM should possess in order to be robust and the role that extra-
systematic flows may play in achieving balance, but notes that the existence of such 
extra-systematic flows, unless they are treated as loans, undermines the efficiency of the 
ABM. 
 
     Chapter 9 summarizes the conclusions of this thesis.  It presents the contributions of 
this thesis to this area of research.  It identifies the implications of this work, other areas 
where it might be applied and topics for further research. 
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Chapter 2   TERMINOLOGY 
 
2.0 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter discusses the characteristics of balancing mechanisms and identifies those 
considered to be essential.  It presents terminology to be used to classify ABM.  It 
describes the method to be used to distinguish among ABM that are robust, partial or 
transitory.  It also introduces the concept of natural balance and contends that an ABM 
that did no more than achieve natural balance would not be doing an appropriate job of 
balancing.  
 
2.1   Essential Characteristics of Balancing Mechanisms 
 
Chapter 1 outlined how SSRS that are long-term undertakings and that contain guarantees 
are likely to encounter stresses over time.  ABM have been created to enable the SSRS to 
respond to the stress automatically and to achieve balance.  Vidal-Melia et al. (2008) state 
that the ABM is a selection of predetermined measures set by law to be applied 
immediately as required by the solvency indicator in order to re-establish the solvency or 
financial sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems through successive application. 
For a balancing mechanism to operate effectively, it should possess the following 
characteristics: 
 Gradual – the adjustments take place over a period of time without any sudden 
significant adjustment being borne by any single participant or cohort of 
participants 
 Equitable – the adjustments should be borne by cohorts of participants in a 
manner that each cohort would consider fair, i.e., although the adjustment may be 
viewed negatively, it should be implemented so that the method of 
implementation is not viewed as being distributed unevenly among cohorts 
 Sustainable – the adjustments should be sufficient to deal with the stress for a 
reasonable period of time on some reasonable set of assumptions not merely a 
temporary fix which simply delays the stress for a short period of time. 
 
     These three characteristics are essential to an acceptable adjustment mechanism and 
an adjustment mechanism that displays these characteristics will be referred to as a 
“balancing mechanism”.  “Balancing” carries multiple meanings.  It provides financial 
balance so that as a result of the adjustment, the SSRS is sustainable.  It also refers to 
balance among and within cohorts, i.e., no cohort is treated inequitably relative to others 
and members of a cohort are treated fairly.  It also provides balance through the 
transition.  There is no sudden significant change affecting any cohort. 
 
     There are also some characteristics of an adjustment mechanism that may not be 
essential but might be considered ideal. 
 Automatic – Adjustments would occur as stresses develop in order to keep the 
SSRS in balance. 
 Transparent – The nature of the adjustment would be open and understandable by 
all cohorts. 
 
   14 
 
     A few comments on the characteristic of transparency are warranted.  As will be 
elaborated in the next subsection, the most desirable of all ABM is one that is robust.  If a 
robust ABM could be constructed that were also transparent that would be an 
improvement over a robust ABM that was not transparent.  However, given a robust 
ABM, i.e., an adjustment mechanism that automatically adjusted to stresses, in a manner 
that was gradual and equitable in its treatment of cohorts and members within cohorts, 
and which produced financially sustainable results, such a mechanism would be 
considered successful.  So transparency is an ideal rather than an essential characteristic.  
Moreover, given the complexity of SSRS and the relatively small amount of time and the 
limited amount of interest the public appears willing to expend in understanding 
adjustment mechanisms of SSRS, an adjustment mechanism is unlikely to be transparent 
to all even though it might be transparent to a group with specialized knowledge 
pertaining to SSRS and SSRS adjustment mechanisms.  Accordingly, transparency will 
not be a required component in the determination of whether an SSRS has a robust ABM, 




2.2 Classification of Purported Automatic Balancing Mechanisms 
 
This section introduces and explains the terminology used to classify ABM.  Turner 
(2008) categorizes automatic adjustment mechanisms on two dimensions: frequency of 
adjustment; the event that causes the adjustment to be made.  These dimensions are not 
required for the analysis in this thesis but can be applied to the ABM presented. 
 
     With respect to purported ABM, one may distinguish between those that make an 
adjustment according to set formulae and procedures without any intervention or 
approval by authorities, and those which require an approval by authorities before they 
are triggered in response to certain defined warning indicators.  The former shall be 
referred to as “mechanistic” and the latter as “discretionary”. 
 
     In developing a SSRS it is common and not unreasonable to describe its operation 
assuming a stationary population and a non-decreasing economy, for which the income 
distribution is not changing.  However, if the system follows a stationary population 
model indefinitely, and the economy remains non-decreasing and the income distribution 
is not changing, there should be no need to trigger an ABM.  An SSRS that was 
developed for a stationary population with a non-decreasing economy for which the 
income distribution is not changed that required an ABM would either represent a poorly 
designed system or result from benefits being granted in respect of a period prior to 
system initiation. 
 
     The critical cases where an ABM is required are those where stresses are placed on the 
system.  Typically, the stress will be of an economic or demographic nature.  The 
economic stresses may result from a shrinking economy or from an economy in which 
the income distribution is changing.  For example, if the population is stationary but the 
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economy shrinks either the citizens must pay more taxes or the contributors must pay 
more social security contributions in order to maintain pensions at the same level or 
pensions must be reduced or some combination of the foregoing adjustments is required.  
Or, for example, if the income distribution changes such that the share of income of older 
workers increases relative to the share of income of younger workers and the pension is 
directly related to income, then the actuarial present value of the pensions earned 
increases, even though the nominal amount of pensions earned may be the same as under 
the previous income distribution.  
 
     The demographic stresses arise from an increase in the ratio of pensioners to 
contributors.  Such an increase may result from an increase in the number of pensioners, 
for example, due to improving mortality rates leading to longer longevity.  Or an increase 
in the ratio of pensioners to contributors may be attributable to a decrease in the number 
of contributors.  This may be attributable to a decline in the fertility rate, which is not 
accompanied by an offsetting increase in net migration, or to a decrease in the labour 
force participation rate. 
 
     Another question to be addressed in evaluating an ABM is the time period over which 
it should be assessed.  Valdés-Prieto (2000) focuses on whether a system of notional 
accounts can provide financial equilibrium in the short run and concludes that it cannot.  
He suggests that the short run might be considered to be the period between elections.  
He concludes that with certain restrictions on the benefit formula there will be a tendency 
towards financial equilibrium in the long run where both demography and the economy 
are in a growing steady state. The countries examined in this thesis may have growing or 
steady-state economies but they all have aging populations so the demographics are 
neither growing nor steady-state. 
 
     For the purpose of this thesis, the critical assessment period will be the long run.  
Although there is no universal definition of the long run, many would consider a seventy-
five year time horizon as a reasonable approximation to the long run.  The actuaries for 
both U.S. Social Security and the Canada Pension Plan are required to provide financial 
projections using a seventy-five year horizon.  Some would see disadvantages in using 
such a short horizon, arguing that it may conceal trends in shortfalls, is arbitrary, and 
ignores what happens to system finances outside the valuation period (President’s 
Commission to Strengthen Social Security, 2001).  The projections of financial position 
of the Japanese SSRS use a ninety-five year horizon; although, the same disadvantages 
that were leveled against the seventy-five year horizon could be made concerning a 
ninety-five year horizon.  In discussing SSRS, Cichon et al. (2004) state that it takes at 
least seven decades for a scheme to mature (and some would argue that due to ongoing 
changes to schemes, they never do mature).  An evaluation of an ABM over the long run 
requires a period where the scheme has had a chance to mature after the adjustment.  
Seventy-five years will be used as the evaluation period. 
 
     In Chapter 6, the ABM of the four countries will be evaluated with respect to whether 
they achieve financial balance.  Because significant financial analysis involving vast 
amounts of data and complex models have been performed by the countries’ actuaries, 
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economists and governmental agencies, as well as by certain other commentators and 
transnational bodies, this analysis will be used to analyze financial balance.  If the system 
is able to adjust to stresses regardless of the demographics or economics, however remote 
the likelihood of occurrence, it will be considered robust. This is a very high standard.  If 
the system achieves balance in most circumstances other than those considered extreme 
and quite unlikely, it will be considered to achieve partial balance.  If the system does not 
achieve financial balance even in relatively likely circumstances it will be considered 
transitory.  
 
     The other evaluation measure of the ABM (besides financial balance) is balance 
within and among generations.  Such balance is difficult to define and a number of 
possibilities will be considered in Chapter 5 before identifying the definition to be used 
for this evaluation exercise.  This evaluation measure will be referred to as “equitable 
balance”. 
 
     Using this evaluation measure, a similar terminology will be applied to equitable 
balance as is applied to financial balance.  If the system achieves equitable balance 
regardless of the demographic and economic stresses however remote the likelihood of 
occurrence, it will be considered robust.  If the system achieves equitable balance in most 
circumstances other than those considered extreme and quite unlikely, it will be 
considered to achieve partial balance. If the system does not achieve equitable balance 
even in relatively likely circumstances it will be considered transitory. 
 
     The final classification of purported ABM will be: 
 Completely robust, if they achieve both financial and equitable balance over the 
long run 
 Robust on one dimension of balance that will be included in the label, if they 
achieve either financial and equitable balance over the long run, but not both 
 Partial, if they achieve either partial financial or partial equitable balance in the 
long run 
 Transitory, if they achieve not even partial financial or partial equitable balance in 
the long run. 
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Table 2:  Methods of Classification of Balancing Mechanisms 
 
ABM ABM Achieves  
Triggered Financial Balance Equitable Balance Label 
    
Automatically Robust Robust Mechanistic Completely Robust 
 Robust Partial or Transitory Mechanistic Financially Robust 
 Partial or Transitory Robust Mechanistic Equitably Robust 
 Partial Partial or Transitory Mechanistic Partial 
 Partial or Transitory Partial Mechanistic Partial 
 Transitory Transitory Mechanistic Transitory 
    
After Approval Robust Robust Discretionary Completely Robust 
 Robust Partial or Transitory Discretionary Financially Robust 
 Partial or Transitory Robust Discretionary Equitably Robust 
 Partial Partial or Transitory Discretionary Partial 
 Partial or Transitory Partial Discretionary Partial 
 Transitory Transitory Discretionary Transitory 
 
 
     The standard for robustness has been set high on purpose.  Some proponents of ABM, 
such as Settergren (2003) with respect to the Swedish ABM, claim that the mechanisms 
work without limitation.  Because so many SSRS are experiencing aging populations that 
are subjecting the SSRS to severe demographic stress, there are many countries and 
politicians in those countries that would welcome a solution that would provide balance, 
without limitation.  By setting a high standard for robustness, this thesis provides a 
warning that an adjustment mechanism that is claimed to provide balance without 
limitations should be carefully and critically examined; in the absence of critical 
examination, the adopter of the ABM may find that it has received a Trojan horse rather 
than a robust ABM.  None of the ABM examined in this thesis are found to be robust. 
 
      
2.3 Natural Balance 
 
This section defines natural balance for different types of SSRS. 
 
     In a FDC SSRS where the benefit entitlement of the individual is equal to the 
individual’s account balance, the SRSS is always in natural balance, by definition.  This 
will be referred to as natural balance.  In such a situation an ABM is not required.  
Therefore, such SSRS will not be considered in this thesis. 
 
     In the pure paygo DB SSRS natural balance occurs if annual benefit entitlements are 
defined to be equal to the annual amount of contributions received.  This is the situation 
for the U.S. Social Security system in the event that the trust funds are exhausted, as 
described in subsection 3.10.1. 
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     In a partially funded DB SSRS the concept of natural balance does not arise as long as 
funds exist.  If no funds are exist, then natural balance would be defined as it was defined 
above for a pure paygo DB SSRS. 
 
     For a NDC, because it is paygo, and may or may not have cash assets, the definition of 
natural balance would be as it was for partially funded DB SSRS.  While there are cash 
assets the concept of natural balance does not arise.  Once the cash assets are exhausted, 
natural balance exists if annual benefits payable are equal to annual contributions 
received. 
 
     The definition of natural balance will be discussed further in Chapter 6 when the 
objectives of financial balance for the SSRS in the countries are described.  It is the 
contention of this thesis that an ABM that continued to make adjustments until a state of 
natural balance occurred would not be doing an appropriate job of balancing.  To be 
effective, an ABM should achieve balance at a level higher than natural balance. 
 
2.4    Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has elaborated on the characteristics of balancing mechanisms and 
distinguished between characteristics considered essential and those considered desirable 
although not essential.  It has described how the terms robust, partial and transitory will 
be applied with respect to financial and equitable balance.  In Table 2 terminology has 
been presented to classify purported ABM.  An explanation has been provided for the 
choice of a high standard for robustness.  The concept of natural balance was introduced.  
It is the contention that an ABM that did no more than achieve natural balance would not 
be doing an appropriate job of balancing. 
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Chapter 3  BACKGROUND 
 
3.0    Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter is divided into Part A and Part B.  Part A provides background information 
necessary for the arguments and research developed subsequently in the thesis.  Part B 
presents a number of topics that are related to this research but that will not be considered 
further in this thesis.  The topics in part B are presented to provide greater understanding 
of the position of this thesis within the broader area of research on SSRS.  It is not 
necessary to read Part B to understand the main arguments of this thesis. 
 
     Part A begins with a description of the main assumptions affecting the financial status 
of an SSRS.  It then presents a general discussion of stochastic optimal control and argues 
that in order to be an effective ABM, a stochastic optimal control framework is required.  
The next subsection identifies those assumptions or controls that will be considered in 
assessing ABM in this thesis.  Subsection four presents an overview of the overlapping 
generations model.  Subsection five discusses different approaches adopted by SSRS for 
indexing benefits after retirement.  The final two subsections of Part A discuss 
demographic adjustments with respect to life expectancy and fertility. 
 
     Part B presents briefly topics related to this research that will not be considered 
further.  It begins with a review of the provisions and the administrative approaches in 
SSRS to deliver disability, unemployment and ancillary benefits.  It continues with a 
discussion of other factors that may create imbalance that are not considered further.  
Three adjustment approaches are discussed, that of the U.S., that of Brazil, and a method 
referred to as integration to financial markets.  Finally, SSRS are subject to a variety of 
economic forces that are interrelated.  Empirical data illustrating the lack of stability of 






3.1   Main Assumptions Affecting the Financial Status of an SSRS 
 
An SSRS is a highly complex dynamic system.  Simplistically, its financial status is 
determined by comparing its assets to its liabilities. 
 
     In an SSRS that is solely defined contribution with funded individual accounts such a 
determination is relatively straightforward – the total assets are equal to the total 
liabilities, by definition.  Such a system is in natural balance.  In practice there are few if 
any, SSRS that are solely defined contribution with funded individual accounts.  For 
example, the Chilean SSRS comes close to being this type.  However, because life 
annuities that are indexed for price inflation are the payout form for benefits, there is an 
uncertain liability that must be valued.  Because there is no asset that exactly replicates 
such a liability, the present value of the liabilities may change in a different amount from 
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period to period than do the assets.  Moreover, because Chile had a defined benefit 
system prior to switching to defined contribution with funded individual accounts, there 
are transition issues.  Recognition bonds promised to be equal in value to certain defined 
benefit liabilities provide financial balance since assets equal liabilities; however, the true 
value of the defined benefit liabilities in question is uncertain. 
 
     In a defined benefit SSRS there are many factors about which assumptions could be 
made in order to calculate the value of liabilities.  For example, with respect to the U.S. 
Social Security System, assumptions are made regarding three categories of factors: 
demographic, economic, program (Trustees, 2008). The categories of factors will be 
discussed in the following three subsections. 
 
 
3.1.1  Demographic Factors 
 
Broadly, the critical demographic measure expresses the relationship between the number 
of pensioners and the number of workers contributing to support (pay pensions of) the 
pensioners.  The three main demographic factors affecting this relationship are fertility 
rates, mortality rates and net migration rates. 
 
     The fertility rate plays a large role in determining this relationship for a long period of 
time, albeit on a lagged basis, e.g., the number of babies born in year t  is an important 
determinant of the number of contributors in years t 18  to t 65  and also an important 
indicator of the number of pensioners in the years beyond t 65 . 
 
     Another important factor is mortality rates and the general trend of reductions in 
mortality rates (as countries develop).  If the age of full-benefit entitlement remains 
constant and there is no change to retirement assumptions, there will be upward pressure 
on the relationship between the number of pensioners and the number of contributors, 
because pensioners will be expected to live longer. 
 
     A third factor that may affect this demographic measure is net migration.  Due to the 
typical qualification rules for pension benefits that require a number of years of 
contributory service in order to quality for benefits, in the short term, net migration 
affects the number of covered workers but not the number of pensioners.  If net migration 
is positive, there will be more covered workers.  If net migration is negative, there will be 
fewer covered workers.  In the longer term, the net migration factor affects the system 
similarly to the fertility rate, although usually not with such a long lag.  Migrants who 
have contributed may reach the age of full benefit entitlement and become pensioners.   
 
     Two potential differences between fertility and migration, other than the length of the 
lag until becoming a covered worker, are the following.  The state (or the system) may be 
able to exert greater influence over the migration rate than over the fertility rate, i.e., it is 
easier to decide on the number of immigrants to target and to take the enabling actions to 
admit them than it is to target a positive number of births.  Secondly, depending on the 
country, immigrants may be more likely to leave the country to which they have 
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immigrated than are those that are born in the country – this may be especially true if 
there are significant numbers of illegal immigrants that are unable to change their status 
to legal immigrant.  This latter situation may increase the number of covered workers 
without resulting in these workers becoming pensioners at a later date. 
 
 
3.1.2   Economic Factors 
 
Whereas there were three main demographic factors about which to make assumptions, 
there are considerably more economic factors requiring assumptions.  In fully and truly 
paygo SSRS in which benefits are defined solely by the contributions available to pay 
benefits, natural balance exists.  Unless the SSRS is fully and truly paygo, the rate of 
interest to be earned on excess assets will be an important assumption.  In developing 
assumptions regarding such a rate it is necessary first to consider the eligible investments 
and investment policy.  In this regard, the assumptions for the U.S. Social Security 
system are straightforward, in that the assets are assumed to be invested in special debt 
instruments of equivalent credit quality to U.S. government securities with horizons 
ranging up to 15 years.  Canada, by contrast, in addition to fixed income commitments, 
has assets managed by an independent board that invests in many different asset classes 
including publicly-traded equity and private equity, both Canadian and foreign.  
Developing models and assumptions to forecast accurately the returns on such diverse 
asset classes is challenging. 
 
     Because the benefits in most SSRS are adjusted, at least to some extent, by price 
changes, it is necessary to make assumptions regarding the rate of price inflation.  
Generally, there is available historical data to support time-series analysis to develop 
such a forecast.  However, because benefits are adjusted for price inflation, at least to 
some extent, it is necessary to separate asset returns into a real component and a 
component due to price inflation in order to be able to identify the net assets available for 
benefits and the real rate of return. 
 
     Wage growth is another important factor to be estimated.  Contributions are a function 
of wages, so wage growth has an effect on contribution income.  Benefits are also 
typically a function of wages, so the benefits to be paid in the future will be determined 
by the wage growth assumptions.  Some SSRS adjust pensions in payment using a 
formula that incorporates the rate of wage growth.  Some countries use gross rates and 
others use net rates, where net is defined differently, depending on the country. 
 
     Wage growth may be a single assumption or it may be decomposed into a number of 
components, each of which must be forecast.  Such a decomposition increases the 
complexity.  For example, in developing the rate of growth in real earnings per worker, 
the U.S. Social Security approach is to develop assumptions regarding the following 
components: change in productivity, the ratio of total compensation to GDP, the ratio of 
covered wages to total compensation, the change in the hours worked, the ratio of the 
GDP deflator to the consumer price index. 
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     Labour force participation rates and unemployment rates are also important economic 
assumptions that will affect contributions and eventually benefits. 
 
 
3.1.3   Program Factors 
 
Program factors refer to assumptions required to determine benefits based on program 
provisions.  The extent to which such assumptions are required will vary by SSRS 
depending on the complexity of the program provisions.  All SSRS will require 
assumptions about number of retirements by age.  But this assumption will vary by SSRS 
not only because there are different ages of full-benefit entitlement but also because there 
are different benefit adjustment provisions if retirement occurs at other than the age of 
full-benefit entitlement.  The size of such adjustments may affect retirement elections. 
 
     Many SSRS provide benefits to individuals who did not contribute to the system and 
yet who are entitled to benefits.  For example, the program may provide benefits to a 
surviving spouse or dependent children on the death of the covered worker.  Data with 
respect to such benefit recipients may not be captured until the death of the covered 
worker.  Hence in making financial projections, assumptions must be made about the 
relevant characteristics of potential beneficiaries. 
 
     A related assumption in programs that provide benefits to the spouse of the member is 
the probability of being married. In programs that provide spousal entitlements for 
periods of marriage, assumptions regarding rates of divorce and length of marriage will 
be required.  In programs that provide benefits to same-sex spouses, further refinement of 
assumptions will be required. 
 
     Where program provisions provide different rates or benefit levels depending on 
earnings, for example, or impose limitations or maximums, assumptions will be required.  
For example, if contributions are only required to a limit that is a function of the average 
wage, an assumption regarding the distribution of wages up to this level will be required.  
Or if there are different benefit rates on earnings up to certain bend points, earnings 
distributions must be developed. 
 
     If the program provides special benefits and/or credits for periods of disability, 
assumptions regarding incidence of disability and the probability of recovery from 
disability will be required.  Such assumptions are frequently age and gender dependent.  
Or if the program provides credit for periods when not in covered employment, for 
example, for parenting, assumptions will be required. 
 
 
3.1.4  Mathematical Relationship Among Factors in Paygo SSRS 
 
The following formulas from Thompson (2005) show the inter-relationships among some 
of the demographic, economic and program factors in a paygo SSRS. 
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Paygo contribution rate  =  system dependency ratio * average replacement rate  
 
where      average replacement rate  =   average benefit 
         average wage 
 
and     system dependency ratio  =  
___ retirement age population * recipiency rate _________________________________ 
working age population*labour force participation rate*employment rate*coverage rate 
 
Note that:  average wage, labour force participation rate and employment rate are all 
economic factors; retirement age population and working age population are 
demographic factors; average benefit, recipiency rate and coverage rate are program 
factors.  Thompson (2005) simplifies system dependency ratio by observing that if the 
percentage of the retirement age population receiving benefits is approximately equal to 
the percentage of the working age population working or looking for work, the recipiency 
rate, labour force participation rate, and coverage rate drop out leaving: 
System dependency ratio  =    ________retirement age population______ 




3.2    Brief Review of Stochastic Optimal Control 
 
Stochastic optimal control has been used to analyze problems faced by insurance 
companies (e.g., Taylor 2002, Cadenillas et al. 2006) and by defined benefit pension 
plans (e.g., Taylor 2002, Boulier et al. 1995, Boulier et al. 1996, Cairns 1995, Cairns 
1996). 
 
     It is then an easy step to see that the stochastic optimal control framework is 
applicable to SSRS; although, a literature review did not indicate that this has been done. 
 
     Taylor (2002) states that a typical set up for a stochastic optimal control analysis is as 
follows: 
 There exists a financial system subject to stochastic obligations 
 To be funded by contributions whose magnitude may vary from time to time, at 
the discretion of the contributor 
 Contributions in excess of the amount required to immediately settle obligations 
accumulate in a fund as assets 
 Assets are invested according to some policy, frequently involving at least one 
risky asset 
 The problem is then to avoid insolvency and contributions may be adjusted as 
necessary depending on the returns on assets and the obligations to be settled 
 The desired solution is one that selects the values of the contribution rate and the 
investment in risky assets in an optimal manner at each point of time, according to 
some loss function. 
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     This typical set up is applicable, to some extent, to most SSRS, other than those that 
are FDC.  With respect to the second point in the list, most SSRS do not give discretion 
to the contributor regarding the magnitude of the contribution, however, the contribution 
rate may be changed for the whole system periodically.  With respect to the investment 
policy regarding any (temporarily) excess assets, some SSRS invest in risky assets and 
others do not (excluding the credit risk of the country).  SSRS considered in this thesis 
may also adjust benefit obligations and program provisions in addition to selecting the 
contribution rate and investment strategy mentioned in the last point in Taylor’s list.    
 
     Such stochastic optimal control problems are typically very difficult to solve. Without 
a number of simplifying assumptions they do not permit a closed form solution.  See 
Bjork (2005) for an example of a special case involving simplifying assumptions.  
Typically techniques of dynamic programming are required to approximate the solution, 
if one exists.  The stochastic control problems posed by SSRS are even more complicated 
and it can be challenging to even specify the loss function. 
 
     Taylor (2002) provides an example of a benefit plan for which the function of interest 
is solvency ratio.   The control law permits the adjustment of the contribution rate and the 
allocation to risky assets.  He finds two “optimal points”, 39% solvency ratio and 88% 
solvency ratio.  On further analysis he finds the 39% solvency ratio is stable.  In Taylor’s 
example, the liabilities are calculated at a fixed discount rate and are a set amount.  Since 
the solvency ratio is the ratio of assets to liabilities and liabilities are determined, the 
solvency ratio is effectively a function of assets.  Since the two factors defining assets are 
the contribution rate and the allocation to risky investments, the control law in the 
example seems appropriately structured. 
 
     In SSRS the situation is unlikely to be so simple or capable of such a simple 
definition.  While solvency ratio may be an important function, the liabilities are not 
determined and unchanging; rather they are dependent on many factors, such as those 
described in section 3.1.  The types of controls that might be applied would include:  
adjusting the contribution rate; adjusting the benefit level; adjusting the age of full benefit 
entitlement; investing any excess funds; extra-systematic flows.  A complex control law 
would be required.  If a sufficiently complex control law were developed, it is unlikely 
that the stochastic control problem would have a closed form solution.  This subject will 
be expanded further in Chapter 6. 
 
 
3.3   Factors to be Considered in This Thesis 
 
In Chapter 6 the key relationships used to establish financial balance will be described, in 
both words and symbols, for the four countries’ balancing mechanisms.  It will be shown 
there, that none of the four countries uses a stochastic control framework. 
 
     The thrust of this thesis is to examine whether the balancing mechanisms are robust, 
partial or transitory.  Accordingly, the approach taken is to determine if there are 
circumstances in which the mechanisms would fail to achieve financial balance. 
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     As described in section 3.1 there may be a large number of assumptions that must be 
made, over long time horizons.  There could always be some deviation from assumptions 
– in fact, in practice, it is likely there will be deviations from all assumptions at some 
time over the long horizon. 
 
     In assessing the balancing mechanisms of the four countries, the first step will be to 
define what it will mean for that system to achieve or not to achieve financial balance.   
Then certain assumptions considered particularly important for financial balance will be 
identified. Since the SSRS have different definitions of financial balance and have 
different program provisions, these assumptions vary by SSRS.  Having defined financial 
balance and the assumptions to be considered, the balancing mechanisms will be assessed 
on whether they achieve or do not achieve financial balance when there are deviations 
from the assumptions selected. 
 
     This approach should be clearer in Chapter 6 when the specific objective of financial 
balance and the assumptions to be considered are defined for each of the four countries.  
We provide an example for the sake of illustration.  As is described in subsection 3.10.1 
for the U.S. system, if financial imbalance is defined as being “unable to pay benefits”, 
then that system can never be considered to lack financial balance.  The reason is that the 
provisions of the program define that benefits may not exceed the amount of funds 
available to pay the benefits, i.e., natural balance exists.  However, if some minimum 
level of benefits were included in the definition of financial balance, e.g., financial 
imbalance occurs if available assets are insufficient to pay at least 90% of scheduled 
benefits, then the system might lack balance.  To continue this example, let us assume 
that all the assumptions made by the U.S. Social Security system are the relevant ones.  
Then on the seventy-five year horizon, even assuming that all those assumptions are 
realized, in 2041 the assets are projected to be sufficient to pay less than 80% of the 
scheduled benefits, i.e., by our hypothetical definition of financial balance, the system 




3.4    Overlapping Generations Model 
 
3.4.1  Brief Introduction 
 
A very powerful and commonly used model among economists in analyzing economic 
growth is the Overlapping Generations (“OLG”) model. Peter Diamond first described 
the two-period version, described here.  Many variations on the model are possible by 
changing certain assumptions and such variations produce different results.  The OLG 
model has been used to analyze social security systems (see for example Blanchard et al., 
1989). 
 
     In perhaps the simplest version of the OLG model, people live for two periods.  In the 
first period of their life, i.e., as the “young”, they are born, work, consume part of their 
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income, and save some income for the subsequent period.  In the second part of their life, 
i.e., as the “old”, they don’t work but they consume all of their savings from the first 
period and the earnings on those savings, which have grown with investment income 
from the first period at rate r , and die.  
 
     Let the population grow from one period to the next at rate n, then a golden rule 
economy is said to be one in which the return on capital is equal to the rate of population 
growth (Blanchard et al., 1989). 
 
     It is common to add to this model the rate of time preference, from the perspective of 
either a decentralized economy or a centralized planner.  In this case, for relatively small 
values of the parameters, the modified golden rule economy is one in which the return on 
capital is equal (approximately) to the sum of the rate of time preference and the rate of 
population growth. 
 
     In both the golden rule and the modified golden rule economies the economy moves to 
a steady state where the capital per unit of labour is constant and output, consumption and 
saving are optimal. 
 
     In this simplified theoretical modified golden rule economy, the introduction of a fully 
funded social security system has no impact on capital accumulation, since accounts earn 
the rate of return on capital r .  The impact of the introduction of a pay-go social security 
system is less certain because the accounts are effectively credited with the rate of 
population growth, n .  If the old generation all have a bequest motive, i.e., intend to save 
sufficiently, through reduced consumption, to leave some capital to their children, then 
this theoretical model predicts no change in capital accumulation, because the additional 
social security benefits paid by the young for the old generation are returned to the young 
by the old as an additional bequest.  However, in the absence of a bequest motive, the 
prediction depends on whether the return on capital is higher or lower than the population 
growth rate but generally the theory implies a decrease in capital accumulation 
(Blanchard et al., 1989). 
 
     This background may prove useful in understanding the assumptions and dynamics 
underlying the ABM developed by certain SSRS, specifically the concepts of steady 
state, internal rates of return and growth rates.    
 
 
3.4.2  Internal Rate of Return of Paygo SSRS 
 
There has been much discussion about whether a partially funded SSRS with the excess 
funds invested in capital markets is more efficient than a paygo SSRS.  To better 
understand this issue, consider an OLG model operating on a pure paygo basis, and, as 
Sinn (2000) does, define the following terms:  
 
In period t  there are N t
Y
 young workers and N t
P
 pensioners; each young person 
contributes Ct  in period t ,  each pensioner receives Pt  in period t  , so on pure paygo 
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     Nt
YCt Nt
PPt                     (1)         
  
 
on the OLG model, this period’s contributors are the next period’s pensioners 
           Nt
Y Nt 1
P                           (2) 
 
In pure paygo the implicit debt of the system is Nt
PPt  and this must be serviced 
 
Suppose the rate of return in the capital markets for an investment made in t  and paid in 
t 1 is rt 1 
 
and the rate of return within the system for an investment made in t  and paid t 1 is it 1 
 
Then the implicit saving St  by a young person to provide his or her pension in t 1 is  
     St
Pt 1
1 rt 1
 .                                  (3) 
 
If Ct St  then there is also an implicit tax Tt  , the tax share of contributions is 
       t
Tt
Ct
                                (4) 
 
     Ct St Tt            (5) 
 
We can now derive the following relationships 
 
     Ct
Pt 1
1 it 1
            (6) 
 
rearranging (6) and substituting (1) 
 
     it 1




1       (7) 
 
substituting (5), (3) and (7) into (4) yields  
 
       t
rt 1 it 1
1 rt 1
       (8) 
 
Equation (7) shows that the internal rate of return of the system is determined by the rate 
of growth in the contribution volume.  Since this analysis is of a paygo SSRS the internal 
rate of return of the system could also be expressed as the rate of growth in the pension 
volume.  Equation (8) shows that when the rate of return in capital markets is greater than 
the internal rate of return of the system, there is an implicit tax on contributors.  
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However, if the internal rate of return of the system exceeds the rate of return in capital 
markets then there is a “negative tax” or subsidy to contributors. 
 
     Sinn (2000) states that in the long-run the growth rate of aggregate pensions will not 
be able to exceed the growth rate of GDP which, in a steady state, will be less than the 
rate of return in capital markers, i.e., the internal rate of return will be less than the 
market rate of interest.  However, this relationship need not hold in practice in any year 
and sometimes for a number of consecutive years. 
 
     For example, in the early years of the Canada Pension Plan, the large baby boom 
generation was beginning to enter the work force.  There was strong growth in the 
contribution volume, resulting in a high internal rate of return, that exceeded the market 
rate of interest.  In such a situation, paygo was an efficient basis.  However, by the mid-
1980s when the baby boom generation was participating in the labour force almost fully, 
the growth rate of the contribution volume was much lower, and the internal rate of return 
became less than the market rate of return.  In such a situation, partial funding is more 
efficient than pure paygo.  Partial funding was adopted in the 1997 amendments to the 
Canada Pension Plan. 
 
 
3.5    Indexing of Benefits 
 
A barely adequate initial pension will only maintain its adequacy over a pensioner’s 
lifetime if it is adjusted periodically to reflect changes in prices and/or wages since 
commencement.  In this section the rationale for using a price adjustment or a wage 
adjustment is discussed. 
 
     In the OLG model in steady state, a golden rule economy operates with the real rate of 
interest equal to the sum of the growth rate of the population and the growth rate of 
labour – augmenting productivity.  This rate of interest is equal to the rental rate on 
capital. Assuming there are constant returns to scale, in a steady state, i.e.  
 the rental rate on capital  
equals 
 the rate of wage increase  
equals 
 the sum of the growth rate of the population plus the growth rate of labour-
augmenting productivity.   
 
Since the main rates, i.e., interest, rental rate on capital, and wage rate, are increasing at 
the same rate, the position of an individual whose income is not increasing at such a rate 
is changing, from one period to the next, in relation to others in the country. 
 
     Following this logic, the argument for increasing social security pensions by the 
growth rate in average wages is as follows. During the contributory period, the worker is 
experiencing wage increases, approximately equal to the increase in the average wage, 
and such worker’s contributions, in a pay-go SSRS, are being used to pay benefits to 
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pensioners.  In the worker’s retirement period, unless this worker’s social security 
benefits are increased in line with changes in the average wage, the former worker’s 
relative position in society is deteriorating. However, by virtue of the former worker 
having contributed to social security to provide benefits to other workers, this former 
worker should be entitled to maintain his/her same relative position in society.  
Furthermore, the contributions of the workers are increasing, generally, in relation to the 
increase in average wages, so in a steady state pay-go SSRS, there should be sufficient 
increase in contributions annually to pay pensions to retired workers that are increased at 
the rate of increase in average wages. 
 
     A refinement to this argument is to use the increase in disposable income rather than 
the increase in gross wages.  This approach is also designed so that pensioners’ relative 
position in retirement will remain the same as during their working period.  However, this 
approach recognizes that disposable income is a better measure of position than gross 
wages, especially if the country’s tax system is progressive so that the tax rates are higher 
on higher levels of income than on lower levels of income.  In general, workers who are 
contributing will have higher levels of income than pensioners will have.  In a 
progressive tax system, the rate of increase in contributors’ disposable income will tend 
to be less than the rate of increase in gross wages.  Since pensioners tend to have lower 
incomes, in a progressive tax system, the rate of increase in contributors’ disposable 
income will tend to be less than the rate of increase in pensioners’ disposable income.  To 
prevent pensioners from receiving greater increases to their disposable incomes than 
contributors are receiving, pensions are increased by the average rate of increase in 
disposable income of contributors. 
 
     The argument for increasing pensions by the rate of increase in prices, as measured by 
some appropriate cost-of-living index is as follows.  It is widely observed that the 
expenses to maintain a comparable standard of living are less after retirement than while 
working prior to retirement.  For example, Sakamoto (2005) reports that, in Japan, to 
maintain a comparable living standard, the average consumption of households of aged 
couples to the average disposable income of the active labour force is 50%, although this 
may change as the socio-economic environment changes.  There are various possible 
explanations for this phenomenon, including: 
 
 the consumption needs of the aged are less because they have already 
made significant capital expenditures that have lasting value and because 
they may be less active and as such, they do not need to consume so much; 
 they have a reduction in expenses related to employment such as for 
traveling to work, clothing associated with work, payroll taxes for workers 
such as social security contributions; 
 the elderly receive various age-related subsidies such as age deductions for 
income taxes, discounts on banking and public transit fees due to age, 
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     Accordingly, the retirees may be able to maintain an equivalent life style on a lesser 
income.  If their initial pension is adequate, then its adequacy can be maintained by 
adjusting it periodically for the change in the cost-of-living associated with a basket of 
goods and services that measures approximately the expenses of the elderly. 
 
     Some countries adjust pensions based on the change in a wage index, other countries 
adjust pensions based on a change in a price index, and some countries use some 
combination of the change in a price index and the change in a wage index.  See, for 
example, Whitehouse (2006) for a listing of various OECD countries’ practices. 
 
     This discussion is intended to provide some rationale for the different practices.  It is 
not intended to specify the one and only appropriate practice or even to opine on whether 
there is a correct practice. However, in some discussions of equity, individuals will adopt 
one of these approaches to indexing pensions as being the appropriate basis and then 
argue that adjustments using other than that “appropriate basis” are inequitable.  The 
argument may be valid within the assumption that a certain basis is the appropriate basis, 
but I do not accept such an assumption in assessing equity.  However, I would agree that 
a barely adequate social security pension that is not indexed, if there are both wage and 
prices increases, will not maintain its adequacy, and that is inequitable.   
 
 
3.6   Adjustments for Life Expectancy 
 
As observed by Whitehouse (2007a), it is hard to see why people that have benefitted by 
living longer should not bear at least some of the cost of this longer life.  So far reference 
has been made to two countries’ SSRS, i.e., Sweden and Brazil, that make changes to the 
benefits at retirement to reflect changes in life expectancy. This is a type of balancing 
mechanism that attempts to create some form of balance between the period of work and 
contribution or tax payment and the period of retirement and benefit receipt.  Turner 
(2008) classifies countries’ method of adjustment for life expectancy into two categories:  
those that correct for the percentage increase in life expectancy; those that correct for the 
percentage increase in the present value of benefits caused by the increase in life 
expectancy.  He places countries such as Brazil, Finland and Portugal in the first category 
and countries such as Sweden, Italy, Norway, Poland, Latvia in the second category.  
From an actuarial perspective, if the discount rate is zero per cent (which is often 
assumed) then the two methods are the same.   
 
    Such methods achieve financial balance, in the sense of limiting the benefits paid.  
They also provide a type of equitable balance across cohorts, since each cohort receives 
benefits for the same expected period of time or of the same expected present value (after 
suitable adjustments for salary and economic differences across cohorts).  However, such 
methods do not achieve individual equity since the individual is expected to contribute 
for a longer period of time (since the period to full-benefit retirement age has been 
extended) for the equivalent initial level of benefits received by earlier cohorts. 
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     An alternative method of adjusting for changes in life expectancy would be to 
maintain a constant ratio of expected period during which contributions will be made up 
until the age of full benefit entitlement to the expected period of benefit receipt after full-
benefit retirement age (or some similar ratio, such as the inverse of the above, or such as 
the ratio of the expected period of benefit receipt to the expected period of life from work 
commencement, etc.). Such an approach maintains individual equity across cohorts and 
within cohorts.  Such an approach would also maintain financial balance.  According to 
Turner (2008) such an approach was proposed in the United Kingdom in discussions on 
how the full-benefit retirement age should be adjusted; however, in the discussions and 
implementation it was discarded for a simpler approach of scheduled increases in the 
retirement age.  This author is unaware of this approach having been adopted by any 
country; although, Whitehouse (2007a) states that France has begun a tightening of the 
qualifying conditions for the public pension, such that after 2012, the ratio of the period 
of pension receipt to the period of working will be kept constant. 
 
     Using an OLG model, the assumption that life length is deterministic and increasing, a 
legislative approach implying that all living generations have an influence on the social 
security scheme and have a veto power; Anderson (2006) claims to show that in a paygo 
scheme the complete solution to increasing longevity cannot be obtained by indexing the 
retirement age and the consumption of the older generation to longevity.  Anderson 
(2006) claims consumption of the younger generation is also reduced.  This has important 
implications for the Swedish ABM that will be described in subsection 6.1.2. 
 
 
3.7   Adjustments for Fertility 
 
For a pay-go SSRS to remain sustainable without adjustment it is important that the 
population of contributors increase at least as fast as the population of pensioners.  An 
important factor determining the rate of increase in contributors is the total fertility rate 
(“TFR”).  For developed countries, at current levels of normal mortality, a TFR of 
approximately 2.10 children per woman of childbearing age is considered sufficient to 
provide for population replacement.  With the exception of Mexico, United States and 
Iceland, most developed countries are experiencing TFR that are well below the 
population replacement level.  The TFR of a selection of developed countries is shown in 
the following table. 
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United Kingdom 1.71 
U.S.A. 2.04 
 
Source:  OECD (www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/57/38181878.xls) 
 
     Andersen (2006) labels a change in fertility a backward looking problem and states 
that a change in fertility cannot be undone.  Some scholars, such as Sinn (2000), are not 
as fatalistic as Andersen (2006) and have argued that to make SSRS financially 
sustainable and more equitable, generations that do not have a TFR sufficiently high to 
replace themselves should have their social security adjusted in some manner.   The 
adjustment might be in the form of higher contributions or reduced benefits. 
 
     As espoused by Sinn (2000), the theory is one of capital production.  In retirement one 
requires either money capital in order to provide a pension or human capital, in the sense 
of workers producing goods and services and willing to pay contributions to provide 
pensions.  The creation of this generation of workers, i.e., the human capital, is to a 
certain extent the responsibility of the retiree cohort.  If the retiree cohort experienced a 
TFR at or above the replacement level, then there is some likelihood that there will be 
sufficient human capital to contribute to pay retirees’ pensions. 
 
     None of the countries examined has an adjustment mechanism that is directly related 
to the TFR.  How such an adjustment could work in practice is unclear.  Some of the 
issues to consider would include how to define cohorts for the measurement of TFR and 
the adjustment of pensions; what a suitable adjustment to pensions would be should the 
TFR be below the replacement rate; whether adjustments would be required if the TFR 
was above the replacement rate. 
 
     Alho et al. (2006) describe an approach that they refer to as fertility-dependent 
prefunding.  In Finland, there is some prefunding of the defined benefit pensions.  The 
extent of prefunding does not affect the benefit levels.  Alho et al. (2006) propose that the 
standard prefunding formula be multiplied by a factor for each cohort that estimates its 
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size at working age to the estimated size of all working age cohorts.  The factor is as 
follows: 
 
b i,t B t i / w
j 0
i 1
j,i B t j 1  
 
where   b i,t    is the adjustment factor in year t  for those age i  
 
 B t i   is size of cohort t i  
 
w j,i    are weights calculated so that they approximate the shares of the 
 various cohorts in the working-age population when the funding 
 cohort (those in age i  at t ) has retired 
 
and w j,i 0 add up to 1 for each i  
 
If the funding cohort is bigger than the younger cohorts (on average) then b exceeds 1 
and funding is increased, whereas if the funding cohort is smaller than the younger 
cohorts (on average) then b is less than 1 and funding is decreased.  This is a novel 






3.8   Disability, Unemployment and Ancillary Benefits 
 
The focus of this thesis is on SSRS, and specifically on earnings-related pensions.  
However, most SSRS provide benefits for other contingencies. It is common to include 
disability provisions, to recognize that a disabled worker cannot have earnings on which 
to earn pensions but said worker should not suffer a reduction in pensions for a disability, 
typically beyond the worker’s control.  Some systems, such as in Germany, extend this 
argument to unemployment, and others such as Canada, extend protection to certain types 
of unemployment, for example a period of unemployment to give birth or to raise young 
children.  Moreover, the pension that the participant is entitled to at retirement may have 
a different (actuarial present) value depending on whether the retiree has a spouse. 
 
     In certain countries in Europe, the SSRS is used as a workforce transition device 
(Holzmann, 2006).  Even though there may exist a relatively high retirement age to 
qualify for a retirement pension, there may be an employment practice that is condoned 
whereby workers below the retirement age for social security pensions are transitioned to 
that age by treating them as disabled.  Marin (2006) estimates that 91.4% of Mexican 
disability benefit recipients are not disabled and shows that disability rates by country 
vary considerably in the age 55-59 and age 60-64 age bands.  Marin (2006) considers 
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most of this variation to be due to the accepted practice by country with respect to using 
disability benefits as a retirement transition device.  
 
     It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider the relative merits of these various 
ancillary benefits and these employment transition practices.  In assessing equity, only 
the situations of contributors and pensioners will be considered. 
 
 
3.9    Factors That May Create Imbalance That Are Not Considered 
 
In addition to the factors described in section 3.8, there are other factors or provisions 
that could affect financial balance that will be excluded from subsequent analysis.  A 
SSRS may contain a variety of provisions designed on redistributive rather than insurance 
principles.  It may also adopt practices for social and/or administrative reasons that add 
additional cost that have not been incorporated directly into the contribution formula.  
The inclusion of such provisions and practices may affect the financial balance of the 
system and may make it more difficult to develop an ABM that will counter the effect of 
such provisions and practices and restore financial balance.  A list of a number of the 
provisions and practices of this type often included in SSRS follows with a brief 
description of each.  Generally, such provisions and practices create a situation in which 
the value of benefits created is not directly related to the amount of contributions made. 
 
(1) The creation of earnings ranges for the purpose of determining contributions 
where benefits earned do not relate directly to the earnings on which contributions 
are required, e.g., contributions may not be required on the first $X of earnings but 
benefits are earned on all earnings. 
(2) The calculation of benefits based on only a portion of the earnings history, even 
though contributions are paid based on lifetime-covered earnings, e.g., if the 
pension formula is based on final average earnings. 
(3) The imposition of benefit maximums in relation to a different level of earnings 
than the maximum earnings for determining maximum contributions. 
(4) The provision for early retirement on a subsidized basis under specified 
conditions, (and much less commonly subsidized postponed retirement benefits 
that are greater than actuarial equivalent value), i.e., most defined benefit SSRS 
reduce the benefits on early retirement by less than an actuarially equivalent 
reduction. 
(5) The provision of credit for years of service when contributions were not made, 
e.g., in respect of certain years of parenting. 
(6) The provision of benefits calculated on a unisex basis, i.e., traditionally defined 
benefit pension formulas do not differentiate by the gender of the participant and 
defined contribution and NDC pensions are often calculated using unisex annuity 
factors. 
(7) The inclusion of survivor benefits on an actuarial inequivalent basis, e.g., in 
defined benefit pension formulas providing the same level of initial pension 
regardless of spousal relationship but providing a continuing pension to a 
surviving spouse or surviving dependent children. 
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(8) The inclusion of special provisions in the event of disability, e.g., providing 
continuing credit for years of disability even though no contributions are required. 
(9) Failure to adjust pensions to recognize increases in life expectancy, i.e., if in a 
defined benefit plan the normal retirement age remains fixed but life expectancy 
increases, the system will move away from financial balance unless the 
contributions are increased. 
 
     Legros (2006) and in an earlier related article, Guerin and Legros (2002), discuss a 
number of these provisions and draw the distinction between actuarial fairness at the 
margin and actuarial fairness on average.  Under actuarial fairness at the margin, as used 
by these authors, all the factors affecting an individual’s choice with respect to a 
provision would be included in determining actuarial equivalence.  For example, rather 
than having a set scale of early retirement reductions, the calculation would consider the 
future wage-earning prospects if the prospective retiree were to remain in the labour 
force, the individual weights and discount factors the prospective retiree would apply 
with respect to work and labour tradeoffs and possibly an allowance for myopia 
regarding future life expectancy and future inflation.  Certainly such a calculation would 
be impossible to administer within an SSRS and would also likely be impossible to 
calculate since there is so much information that must be gathered regarding an 
individual’s circumstances and preferences.  Although these authors refer to this as 
actuarial fairness at the margin, I would view this more as an attempt by an economist or 
central planner to get the optimum from an economic system.  I would not refer to this as 
actuarial fairness. 
 
     Under these authors’ definition of actuarial fairness on average, the measure is 
whether the value of benefits is equivalent to the value of contributions, on some set of 
reasonable assumptions.  This is very close to the approach used to prepare the list of 
provisions and practices that may add additional cost to the system beyond what is 
provided for directly in the contribution rate basis.  However, Legros (2006) takes this 
definition further than this in the following example.  She writes that in a defined 
contribution or an NDC system where the annuity factors are not adjusted to incorporate 
the fact that longer life expectancy is closely correlated with higher income, then those 
with higher incomes are receiving a benefit of greater value than are those of lesser 
income, because the same annuity factor is used to convert the accumulated contribution 
balances into pensions.  In this instance, I think Legros takes the definition of actuarial 
fairness too far, as will be explained below. 
 
     Quiesser et al. (2006) distinguish between actuarial fairness and actuarial neutrality.  
For these authors, actuarial fairness requires the present value of lifetime contributions to 
equal the present value of lifetime benefits.  Actuarial neutrality requires the present 
value of accrued pension benefits for working an additional year be the same as in the 
year before.  As defined by these authors actuarial neutrality is certainly an individual 
concept.  These authors err in assuming that actuarial fairness must also be determined on 
an individual basis.  Actuaries frequently perform calculations, design plans and assess 
fairness on a group basis. 
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     First, actuaries do not typically speak of actuarial fairness but rather of actuarial 
equivalence.  It may be a subtle distinction but for actuaries the focus is on determining a 
financially equivalent value on the basis of a set of reasonable assumptions.  If the 
actuary has studied the mortality experience and trends likely to be applicable to a 
particular group and if the annuity factors have been determined using this information, 
then financial equivalence will be achieved.  It may well be true that there is a sense of 
intragenerational inequity between those with higher incomes and those with lower 
incomes. It is also true that if the actuary took such correlations into account in 
developing the annuity basis such inequities would be mitigated, at least in part.  But 
regardless of whether such adjustments are made, if the actuary has developed the 
appropriate tables, the financial balance of the system should be unaffected. 
 
     Actuarial equivalence is about financial balance at a system level.  It is a collective 
measure.  Within accepted actuarial practice, occasionally modified by social 
considerations, actuaries have identified factors of collectives that, in the absence of other 
more relevant information, determine prospective life expectancy, factors such as gender, 
smoking behaviour, presence of ill health such as heart disease or cancer, income, etc.  
Within an SSRS most of these factors are not permitted to be used in calculating benefits, 
not for actuarial reasons but for social reasons.  Even without refined tools and 
considerations, the actuary is able to determine actuarially equivalent values for the 
collective.  They may not be actuarially fair, either at the margin or on average, as 
defined by Legros (2006) and Guerin and Legros (2002), but they are actuarially 
equivalent and that is what matters for financial balance. 
 
     In conclusion, the list of provisions and practices at the beginning of this section will 
affect the financial balance of the system.  To the extent that appropriate actuarial 
techniques are used to value these provisions and to adjust the contribution rates 
accordingly, the SSRS is more likely to be in financial balance and an ABM will be more 
likely to operate effectively. 
 
 
3.10    Adjustment Approaches Not Considered 
 
3.10.1  U.S. Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
 
There is much concern regarding the financial sustainability of the United States social 
security system (“OASDI”).  The 2008 Trustees Report indicates that assuming no 
changes, on the basis of a valuation over a 75-year horizon: 
 There is an actuarial deficit of 1.70% of covered taxable payroll; and 
 in 2017 projected cash inflows will be less than projected cash outflows; and 
 in 2025 the DI Trust Fund will  be exhausted; and 
 in 2042 the OAS Trust Fund will be exhausted. (Trustees, 2008).  
 
     This does sound like a financial situation worthy of attention.  However, the OASDI 
contains a form of automatic balancing mechanism that ensures financial viability.  The 
law is written to provide that benefits paid may not exceed funds available.  Hence, if no 
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changes were made and if assumptions and projections were realized, in 2025 when there 
were insufficient funds to pay DI benefits at the then-current level, the DI benefits would 
be adjusted so as not to exceed available funds.  A similar adjustment would occur in 
2042 in respect of OAS payments when OAS benefits, at the then-current level, are 
projected to exceed the available funds.  According to information provided by Stephen 
Goss, Chief Actuary for social security, in a personal communication, the law does not 
prescribe how benefits are to be adjusted in such a situation and the responsibility for the 
determination would lie with the Commissioner who was appointed at the time. 
 
     From a financial perspective, this is truly an automatic balancing mechanism since it 
ensures that benefits do not exceed funds available.  From an equity perspective, it is 
impossible to assess this mechanism since it is not known or knowable how benefits 
would be determined.  Accordingly this mechanism will not be considered further. 
 
 
3.10.2  Brazilian Adjustment Mechanism 
 
Brazil’s social security system is a defined benefit pay-go contributory system that 
includes retirement pensions. In 1999 it adopted a benefit formula that provides for 
pensions commencing in the year to be adjusted to take account of changes in life 
expectancy. 
 
     According to Pinheiro (1999), after the five-year phase-in period, the basic pension is 
defined as: 
fMSb  
where Sb  is the pension 
  
     M  is the average of 80% of the best years’ earnings on which contributions were 
made since 1994 to the date of retirement (1994 earnings are substituted for earnings in 
the years of contributions prior to 1994), i.e., one-fifth of the earnings that pertain to the 









     And f  is an adjustment factor 
 
     Tc  is the length of time contributions have been made, in years (plus 5 years in the 
case of females) 
 
     a  is the contribution rate, currently 31% 
 
     Es  is the unisex expectation of life in years at the retirement age 
    
     ld  is retirement age in years 
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     This factor is calculated annually and published by the Instituto Brasilero de 
Geografia e Estatistica in a two dimensional table showing time of contribution on the 
vertical axis and retirement age on the horizontal axis. To understand the f  factor, note 
that aTc  is a factor that when applied to a year’s earnings provides an estimate of total 
contributions without interest (or treating the rate of interest credited on contributions as 
zero). Dividing this quantity by Es , expectation of life, provides an estimate of the 
pension provided by each dollar of contributions, treating the interest discount rate as 
zero.  The term in brackets does not have an intuitive meaning, but it may be thought of 
as a way to increase pensions to reflect the time at which they start.  So, for example, for 
someone with 30 years of contributions who retired at age 65 the pension would be 
2.95% higher than for someone with 30 years of contributions who retired at age 60. 
 
     The particularly interesting feature of this approach is that the initial defined benefit 
pensions are adjusted to reflect unisex life expectancy at the age of retirement in the year 
of retirement. Vidal-Melia et al. (2008) report that in its 2005 pension reform, Finland 
introduced a life expectancy coefficient to be applied to its defined benefit pension that 
adjusts the amount of pensions in payment as longevity changes. Although the approach 
adopted by Brazil and Finland adjusts the present value of the pension liability at 
retirement, this mechanism does not directly relate to the financing of the SSRS.  As such 
it is an unsophisticated balancing mechanism. Because the Swedish system contains an 
adjustment for changing life expectancy, this type of mechanism will be considered in the 
analysis of the Swedish system. It is worth noting though that both the Brazilian and 
Finnish systems are defined benefit whereas the Swedish system is notional defined 
contribution.  Hence we see that a mechanism that adjusts for life expectancy at 
retirement could be applied to different plan designs.  
 
3.10.3  An Integration to Financial Markets Approach  
 
Valdes-Prieto (2006) proposes an approach for an SSRS he describes as integration to 
financial markets (“IFM”).  In this subsection, this approach is described, analyzed 
critically, and reasons are provided for not considering it further in this thesis. The IFM 
approach is quite complicated. A brief description of the details related to this discussion 
follows: 
 The starting point is an SSRS that is solvent.   As defined by Valdes-
Prieto, a solvent pension plan is one that does not require financial support 
from its sponsor, nor will pay a profit to it, in present expected value. 
 The type of pension plan analyzed is one that relates benefits to lifetime 
earnings, requires contributions at rate 0  of earnings, operates on a 
notional account, pay-go basis, and pays a pension of  percent of 
earnings.  
 The preliminary balance sheet of the plan would show no assets, in pure 
pay-go, and would have liabilities calculated using the benefit formula and 
the salary and contribution history of current members, including 
pensioners. 
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 However, if all future generations are considered, there is a net hidden 
asset equal to the present value of all future contributions less the present 
value of all future benefits. This asset arises from the definition of a 
solvent plan. 
 The existence of a hidden asset means there is a hidden tax , such that 
the true required contribution rate  plus the hidden tax is equal to the 
actual contribution rate  0 , i.e., 0 .  The first step is to make the 
hidden tax explicit.  
 In a steady-state pay-go SSRS, the rate credited to contributions is the sum 
of the rate of population growth and the rate of labour-augmenting 
capital, g , which is less than the return on physical capital, r .     
 Through legislative means, establish that the future net flow of 
contributions in excess of benefits is an asset of the plan and that this asset 
has enforceable property rights. Then securitize this net cash flow through 
Covered Wage Bill (CWB) securities that pay a dividend in each period, 
that is sufficient along with to pay the pension payments that are due. 
 Now 0  earns g  in total, but could be credited with r , since it is the 
amount of actual contributions which could be invested in physical assets 
and used to pay future benefits when due.  The CWB securities could be 
priced in financial markets. Given that they were legitimate assets, they 
would also command a rate payable on physical capital as determined by 
financial markets.  The CWB securities would have a payment profile, like 
equity, with the return varying with fluctuations in fertility, labour force 
participation, and real earnings trends.  
 Accounts would be established using a mutual fund approach, so that 
contributions would create shares and at any time the share value would be 
determined as the total value of assets divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. This guarantees the system is always in financial 
balance. Another way to ensure financial balance would be to hire a 
sponsor that guarantees wage-indexed annuity benefits. 
 
 The method described has appeal. Not only does it ensure financial stability at all 
times, but it also creates a method of linking the rates credited to accounts to the rates 
available in financial markets while retaining a system of notional accounts using a 
pay-go approach. Unfortunately, it suffers from several difficulties, as explained 
below. 
 First, although the definition of solvency is appealing, it is slippery. 
Valdes- Prieto’s argument uses both finite horizons for an illustration and 
an infinite horizon to make his case. To see the difficulty, consider a debt 
D  on which interest is accruing at rate i , so that payments of iD  are 
required each period.  If this debt must be repaid in n  periods and the 
discount factor is v  then the expected present value is:      
 

v i D v 2i D  v ni D v nD
v v n 1
1 v
i D v nD                   (9) 
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However, if we let n to go to infinity, because v  is less than 1, then the 
expected present value is: 




                               (10) 
 
To apply this to Valdes-Prieto’s case, D  is the value of benefits granted to 
previous generations in excess of their contributions. If that debt is 
required to be repaid over n  periods then (9) shows that not only must the 
debt be serviced but also it must be repaid.  However, if the time horizon 
is infinite, all that is required is to service the debt, as shown in (10).  By 
using an infinite horizon, on Valdes-Prieto’s definition of solvency, a plan 
that paid benefits falling due and just serviced its debt would be 
considered solvent, i.e., the plan would not require financial support from 
its sponsor, nor will it pay profit to it, in present expected value. 
  
However, this is not the traditional meaning of solvency. In traditional 
parlance, one would require that the present expected value be calculated 
over a finite horizon using formula (9). Suppose that this requirement is 
made and that the pension plan had a level contribution rate. Then during 
the first n years the contribution rate must be sufficient to pay benefits as 
they fall due and to amortize the debt; thereafter, such a contribution rate 
will be higher than that required to pay benefits, i.e., by the periodic 
amortization payment. Accordingly, the concept of a level contribution 
rate and a solvent plan are inconsistent unless an infinite horizon is used.  
If an infinite horizon is used, the definition of solvency is inconsistent 
with traditional parlance because it permits the non-repayment of an initial 
debt, i.e., an initial debt can be created to pay social security benefits to 
the founding generation, that debt need only be serviced and never be 
repaid, and the plan is solvent. 
 
 Second, Valdes-Prieto is no doubt correct that social security systems with 
level contribution rates with legacy benefits must charge a contribution 
rate higher than the rate required to pay the benefits being earned by the 
current members, if the system is to continue unchanged indefinitely. 
Using the steady-state growth model the pay-go rate credited to 
contributions is g .  If the contribution rate required to provide the current 
members benefits is , then, in theory, it could be invested to earn a rate 
of return of r . Even if the remaining hidden tax could be made explicit 
and endowed with enforceable property rights, it is a leap to argue that the 
return on such an asset would approximate the return earned in financial 
markets.  
 
An example will help to clarify this point. The Canada Pension Plan is 
considered to be actuarially sound over a 75-year horizon. It has a 
contribution rate of 9.9%, say 10%, and it has been estimated that the level 
 
   41 
contribution rate required over a current member’s career to pay that 
member’s benefits is approximately 7%, i.e., the hidden tax is 
approximately 3%. Valdes-Prieto suggests, for example, that the real rate 
of interest might be 3%.  Then we can write the following equation where 
g  is the rate of growth of the population plus the rate of growth of labour-
augmenting productivity and i  is the rate that may be credited to the 
hidden tax, per unit of salary: 
 
irg 1110  
 






So unless g  is greater than 2.1%, i  is negative and i  is only 3%, i.e., the 
return on financial markets, if g  is greater than 3%, which Valdes-Prieto 
argues is too high. Valdes-Prieto’s argument can be criticized along 
similar lines to how proponents of financial economics have criticized 
pension plan actuaries that valued the liabilities by anticipating the equity 
risk premium. If, in fact, the correct rate of interest to credit on 0  is g  
then, at the same level of risk, it cannot be possible to credit  with some 
rate gr  and the balance 0  with the same rate gr , regardless of 
how the contributions are sliced and repackaged, using property rights and 
securitization. The only way that this could happen is if there is a 
mispricing of risk.  Such risk could take a variety of forms such as credit 
risk that future generations will pay the required contributions or default 
risk that the property rights may not be fully enforceable.  
 Finally, it is true that Valdes-Prieto’s approach brings financial stability, in 
the sense that assets equal liabilities. But this is not due to his definition of 
solvency, making the hidden tax explicit, creation of CWB and 
enforceable property rights, or integration to financial markets. Financial 
stability arises from two mechanisms:  
-  The use of mutual fund accounting. 
-  The reliance on a sponsor to guarantee wage-indexed annuities. 
 
     The first mechanism automatically guarantees that assets equal liabilities because the 
liabilities are defined by the total value of all the shares and the value of each share is 
determined by dividing the total value of the assets by the total number of shares.  By 
convention, total assets equal total liabilities. This does not say anything about the 
adequacy of pensions.  Financial markets rise and fall, over time, in a relatively 
unpredictable manner, and the value of pensions that are integrated with financial 
markets could be expected to similarly rise and fall.  A social security system is 
comprised of many individuals who have short horizons.  While one may argue that over 
long time horizons the general trend of markets is upward, producing real returns, 
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designing a social security system that passes the full exposure of financial market 
volatility to these individuals is a poor design.  Even in Chile, the home country of 
Valdes Prieto, the social security system using funded defined contribution accounts does 
not pass full exposure to financial markets to the participants, requiring instead minimum 
rates of return, within a range, to be credited to accounts.  
     The second mechanism would be a way to guarantee the ongoing adequacy of 
pensions, if the initial pension level P were adequate, since it provides wage-indexed 
benefits.  However, such a sponsor is more likely to be a theoretically desirable construct 
than a realistic possibility in any economy of significance, for the following reasons.  
First, such a sponsor would have to be well capitalized with an indefinitely long future 
lifetime. Not only is it difficult to identify such entities, but it is extremely difficult to 
identify any such entity that would be large enough and sufficiently well capitalized to 
provide a financial guarantee for a country’s social security system.  Second, if an 
appropriate entity were identified how would it hedge its exposure to wage-indexed 
benefits? In the absence of appropriate hedging instruments, how secure is a “guarantee”? 
 The IFM approach proposed by Valdes Prieto creates financial stability through 
mutual fund accounting, which would expose participants to inappropriate levels of risk 
exposure and may result in inadequate pensions, or through the use of a sponsor that 
provides guarantees that are not realistically attainable.  As such, this approach to 
automatic balancing will not be considered further for this thesis. 
 
 
3.11   Some Financial Rates 
 
The models discussed and the assumptions underlying many projections assume 
relatively stable relationships among key financial rates.  In practice, these relationships 
are not stable over annual measurement periods and may even include apparent 
idiosyncrasies over longer periods, such as ten years.  For the purpose of illustrating this 
point, consider the financial rates in the following table excerpted from a Canadian 
Institute of Actuaries report (2008). 
 
   43 
 

































2.13 4.31 4.76 2.02 11.33 13.92 
1968-
1977 
6.61 9.45 9.47 5.66 5.71 3.69 
1978-
1987 
7.15 6.90 7.25 10.04 16.01 17.18 
1988-
1997 
2.65 2.90 3.45 13.29 10.99 19.09 
 
Source:  Canadian Institute of Actuaries, Report on Canadian Economic Statistics 1924-
2007, Tables 2A, 2B. 
 
Examples of what might be considered idiosyncrasies include the following: 
 
 In the 1958-1967 period, the extent to which the return on common stocks, both 
Canadian and US, exceeded the returns on Canada Long Bonds. 
 
 In the 1968-1977 period, the return on Canadian stocks exceeded the return on US 
stocks, but both these returns were less than the increase in Consumer Price 
Index. 
 
 In the 1978-1987 period, the increase in the Consumer Price Index exceeded the 
increase in the Wage and Salary Index. 
 
 In the 1988-1997 period, the return on Canada Long Bonds exceeded the return 




3.12   Chapter Conclusion 
 
Part A of this chapter has provided background information necessary for the arguments 
and research developed subsequently in this thesis.  Section 3.1 described the types of 
demographic, economic and program factors that affect the financial position of an SSRS.  
Section 3.2 argues that maintaining financial balance in an SSRS is a stochastic control 
process, but due to the complex nature of SSRS, a complex control law would be 
required and there is unlikely to be a straightforward solution to the problem.  Subsection 
3.3 identified the assumptions and controls to be considered in this thesis when assessing 
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ABM.  Section 3.4 presented an overview of the OLG model.  Section 3.5 discussed 
different approaches adopted by SSRS for indexing benefits after retirement, which will 
be important in understanding the methods used by different countries.  Sections 3.6 and 
3.7 discussed demographic adjustments with respect to life expectancy and fertility, the 
two demographic factors considered in this thesis. 
 
     Part B of this chapter presented a number of topics that are related to this research that 
will not be considered further in this thesis.  The topics were presented to provide greater 
understanding of the position of this thesis within the broader area of research on SSRS.  
Of particular importance was the analysis in subsection 3.10.3 of the integration to 
financial markets approach proposed by Valdes-Prieto (2006), which showed that 
approach to be deficient.  This is one of the contributions of this thesis. 
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4.0   Chapter Overview 
 
Generational accounting is an approach used to assess the relative burden of taxes borne 
by different generations to support current policies, assuming no change in policy.  
Frequently those who perform a generational accounting analysis argue, or imply, that an 
uneven burden of taxes means that generational equity does not exist.  This chapter 
introduces generational accounting.  It then considers generational equity.  It argues that 
an uneven burden of taxes as shown by the generational accounts does not necessarily 
mean there is generational inequity. 
 
 
4.1    Generational Accounting 
 
This chapter describes the approach referred to as generational accounting, discusses the 
connections and differences between generational accounting and generational equity.  
 
     Credit for the methodology of generational accounting is often given to Auerbach, 
Gokhale and Kotlikoff.  The methodology was developed circa 1990 and has been 
applied to the accounts of more than 22 developed nations. 
 
     Generational accounting is based on the budget constraints of all levels of a nation’s 
governments.  Assuming that existing policies and programs continue indefinitely, it 
requires that the present value of future net tax payments of current and future 
generations be sufficient to cover the present value of future government consumption as 
well as to service the government’s initial net indebtedness.  A set of generational 
accounts is established for each birth year to the present and an additional single 
generational account is established in respect of future unborn generations.  The 
generational accounts reflect taxes paid less transfers received with government 
expenditures on health care and education being treated as transfers.  Social security 
taxes, contributions and payments are included in the accounts.  However the accounts do 
not impute to particular generations the value of the government’s purchases of goods 
and services.  Therefore the accounts do not show the complete net benefit or burden any 
generation receives in full (Auerbach et al., 1999). 
 
     If the present value of the generational accounts for the unborn generations, assuming 
the continuation of current programs and policies, is not exactly equal to the net present 
value of future consumption plus initial indebtedness less the present value of the 
generational accounts of those already born, then current programs and policies are 
considered unsustainable.  Potential actions to make programs and policies sustainable 
include tax increases, consumption reductions or some combination of the two. 
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kskt rpTN 1,,,  and K max t,k  is a generational account for the 
generation born in the year k . k  runs from t D (those aged D, the maximum length of 
life, in year 0) to t  (those born in year 0). 
 
Ts,k   stands for the projected average net tax payment to government in the year s by a      
       member of the generation born in year k . 
ps,k  stands for the number of surviving members of the cohort in year s  who were  
       born in year k . 
Gs  is the value of government consumption in year s. 
Wt
g  denotes the government’s net wealth in year t . 
 
     r  is the interest rate used to discount the future tax, consumption and transfer 
payments.  Auerbach et al. (1999) say that common practice is to use a constant rate per 
annum and to present a range of results using a number of different interest rates.  
Typically, when Auerbach et al. (1999) present a single result, a rate of 5% per annum 
has been used. 
 
     Since the choice of interest/discount rate could affect materially the results, some 
further discussion is warranted.  Auerbach et al. (1999) discuss the rationale regarding the 
use of a risk-free rate or a risk-adjusted rate. 
 
     If one were to assume that the program and policies would be delivered forever into 
the future then one might choose the risk-free rate as the appropriate discount rate.  
However there are several difficulties with such an approach.  First, the appropriate risk-
free rate does not likely exist for all desired maturities.  If a proxy for the risk-free rate is 
the government bond yield curve, then for most countries, rates would not be available 
for cash flows more than 30 years from the present.  Second, some programs and policies 
are adjusted based on inflation and economic growth; hence, the discount rate should be 
able to reflect inflation or economic growth, as appropriate.  There are even fewer 
government bonds available with these characteristics from which to derive discount 
rates.  Third, the promises of many governments, particularly over long time horizons, 
are far from risk-free.  On the one hand, use of such a government’s bond yield rate 
would not be a risk-free rate.  On the other hand, one could argue that the appropriate 
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discount rate in a country where the programs and policies have a positive probability of 
default or revision is not the risk-free rate. 
 
     What then about recognizing that a country’s tax revenues and expenditures are 
uncertain and choosing a discount rate that includes some provision for uncertainty, a 
risk-adjusted rate.  Auerbach et al. (1999) acknowledge that is the correct approach but 
rightly point out some of the difficulties in identifying the appropriate adjustment for risk.  
First, different adjustments may be appropriate with respect to revenues, consumption 
and transfers.  Second, how should one account for the potential difference in perspective 
of each generation?  Auerbach et al. (1999) present the example of two generations 
whose income is negatively correlated which might arise due to relative productivity 
shocks where the first generation supplied capital and the second generation supplied 
labour.  Both generations might perceive lower net tax burdens but the risk-adjustment 
each generation perceives as appropriate may differ.  It is a relatively difficult task to 
assess the risk-adjustment of a current generation with respect to current taxes and 
expenditures.  It is a more difficult task to assess the risk-adjustments of a current 
generation with respect to future taxes and expenditures. It is an even more difficult task 
to assess the risk-adjustment of future generations with respect to future taxes and 
expenditures.  In the context of such uncertainty, the standard practice of discounting 
using a range of rates is understandable and defensible. 
 
     With respect to the four countries that are analyzed in this thesis – Canada, Germany, 
Japan and Sweden – Kotlikoff et al. (1999) present information shown in the following 
table: 
 
Table 5:  International Comparisons of Generational Accounting: 
      Alternative Ways to Achieve Generational Balance 
 
 Cut in Government 
Purchases 






Country A B A B A B A B 
Canada 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 
Germany 21.1 25.9 17.6 14.1 9.5 9.5 29.5 29.5 
Japan 26.0 29.5 28.6 25.3 15.5 15.5 53.6 53.6 
Sweden 37.6 50.5 22.6 18.9 16.1 15.6 42.9 41.9 
 
Note:  Table entries are percentage adjustments needed to achieve generational 
balance.  In the columns labeled “A”, education is treated as government 
consumption.  In the columns labeled “B”, education expenditure is 
treated as government transfers and distributed by age groups. 
 
     Although the calculations were performed in the late 1990’s so that the precise figures 
may be somewhat outdated, the numbers are sufficiently large (or small in the case of 
Canada) to draw some relevant conclusions.  Canada’s programs and policies are almost 
in balance and hence sustainable.  The programs and policies of Germany, Japan and 
Sweden are not sustainable and will require tax increases and/or government 
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consumption and transfer reductions to be made sustainable.  Although these calculations 
do not identify social security as a separate component, given that social security is a 
significant component in the accounts, based on the information in the table, it is not 
surprising that Germany, Japan and Sweden have all adopted measures to “balance” 
social security.  In 1997, Canada took measures to reform its Canada Pension Plan, 
designed to achieve balance, and from the table it would appear that, in aggregate, 
Canada’s programs and policies are sustainable. 
 
     The methodology of generational accounts requires numerous assumptions, substantial 
amounts of data and complex calculations.  Nonetheless, it does provide useful insight 
regarding the sustainability of programs and policies.  
 
 
4.2    Introduction to Generational Equity 
 
It is an easy step to conclude that if the generational accounts indicate that the programs 
and policies are unsustainable then they are not fair.  This subsection discusses this 
conclusion and argues that while it is an easy conclusion to draw it is not necessarily 
correct. 
 
     A simple argument to lead to the conclusion that generational equity is lacking given 
that the generational accounts show that the policies and programs are unsustainable is 
the following: 
 
1. The generational accounts show that the current programs and policies are 
unsustainable. 
2. For the programs and policies to be sustainable either taxes must be increased or 
consumption reduced or some combination of the two. 
3. If taxes are increased, the burden of such tax increases will be borne more heavily 
by future generations of taxpayers than by past generations of taxpayers. 
4. If consumption is reduced, the burden of such consumption reductions will be 
borne more heavily by future generations of consumers than by past generations 
of consumers. 
5. Based on 3 and 4 there will be some future generations that bear a heavier burden 
(of tax increases or consumption reductions) than was borne by some past 
generations. 
6. Bearing a heavier burden than another generation is inequitable. 
7. Therefore if the generational accounts show that current programs and policies are 
unsustainable then generational equity is lacking. 
8. Consequently a condition for generational equity to exist is that the generational 
accounts indicate that the programs and policies are sustainable.  
 
     Since this thesis is focused on SSRS, the foregoing argument will be analyzed in that 
context with an indication of how the analysis could be generalized to the full range of 
programs and policies.  However, before analyzing this argument, I present similar types 
of arguments that are made to define generational equity in the SSRS context. 
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     In Chapter 1, four arguments of Settergren (2003) were presented on why he thinks 
the Swedish system is equitable.  Three of the arguments have similarities to the 
argument that a condition for equity is that the generational accounts indicate that 
programs and policies are sustainable.  Those three arguments are summarized below: 
 
1. The system is equitable because of the use of a constant contribution rate – all 
workers (and pensioners) have contributed at the same rate. 
2. Intergenerational balance or fairness may be defined as having a constant ratio of 
the present value of pension benefits over present value of contributions for all 
birth cohorts, using growth in average income as the discount factor. 
3. Intergenerational balance or fairness is a relatively stable ratio of average pension 
over average income (referred to as the “pension level”). 
 
Let us expand on these arguments in turn to identify the similarities to the argument 
regarding the connection between the sustainability of programs and policies under 
generational accounts and generational equity. 
 
1. A constant contribution rate is equivalent to stating that tax rates need not be 
adjusted.  However, this argument makes no connection between contributions 
and benefits received.  It makes the statement that equity is achieved by having 
everyone contribute at the same rate.  The proponents of the argument regarding 
the connection between generational equity and the sustainability of programs and 
policies under generational accounting do not make such a bold claim.  They 
require current programs and policies to continue without change to taxes (or 
contribution rates) and without change to consumption.  They would not claim, as 
Settergren does, that equity is achieved by maintaining constant taxes (or 
contributions) regardless of the consumption. 
     It is a strange sense of fairness that Settergren proposes – paying the same 
contributions regardless of the benefits received.  In analyzing generational 
equity, the weaker claim that a condition for generational equity is that programs 
and policies be sustainable according to the generational accounts will be 
analyzed. 
 
2.  Let us try to re-express a constant ratio of present value of pension benefits over 
present value of contributions for all birth cohorts, using the growth in average 
income as the discount factor in the context of the methodology of generational 
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where    is the oldest age 
 r    is the retirement age 
 t Pr is the pension at retirement for those born in year t 
 u   is the average rate of increase in pensions 
 w  is the rate of growth in average income 
 e    is the age of entering the work force 
 t Ie   is the income at entry for those born in year t 
 cs   is the contribution rate in year s 
and t<e<r<  
 
     Let us assume that the programs and policies are the ones that define the 
pension benefits and contributions and that the pension benefits are defined as 
consumption or transfers and that contributions are defined as taxes.  Then 
ignoring the initial indebtedness of the government, the generational accounts 
reflect the difference in the present value of taxes to be paid less the present value 
of future consumption and transfers.  Unless this difference is constant for all 
future generations, the programs are unsustainable.  But this result can be re-
arranged to be expressed as Settergren has: 
 
k PV taxes PV consumptionand transfers 
 
where k  is constant for all generations.  Dividing by PV consumption and 









But if r  is constant then PV consumption and transfers must be constant and so 
also must PV taxes.  
     Hence Settergren’s formulation is equivalent, provided the discount rate is 
equivalent.  Settergren uses the growth in average income as a discount factor.  
How does this compare to the range of discount rates or single constant rate used 
by proponents of generational accounting?   Settergren (2003) says the underlying 
assumption is that the system is in steady state with respect to both income and 
mortality.  Moreover, Settergren states that an advantage of this approach is that it 
is simple and avoids projections.  As a consequence of this assumption, the 
discounting to calculate present values is at a constant single rate that is consistent 
with the approach used by Auerbach et al. (1999).  Hence this formulation of 
intergenerational equity is very similar to the formulation used by those who 
examine the sustainability of programs and policies under generational 
accounting. 
 
3. Let us try to re-express Settergren’s relatively stable ratio of average pension to 
average income in the language of generational accounting.  Once again, assume 
that the rules regarding pensions and contributions form the programs and policies 
and that pensions represent consumption and contributions represent taxes.  In this 
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context contributions are a fixed percentage of average income.  For a population 
in a steady state where rates of mortality, income (and consequently pension 



















where    is the oldest age 
 r    is the retirement age 
 Pr is the pension at retirement 
 u   is the average rate of increase in pensions 
 e    is the age of entering the work force 
 Ie   is the income at entry 
 w is the rate of growth in average income 
 
On these assumptions the above ratio is only constant if r  and r e  are 
constant, i.e. if the period of labour-force participation and the period for which a 
pension is received are constant.  Settergren (2003) observes that variations in 
pension level result primarily from changes in life expectancy, but that increasing 
life expectancy should result in individuals working longer which will help 
maintain a constant ratio and that the Swedish system adjusts pensions for 
changes in life expectancy, which makes the ratio more stable.   
However, in the language of generational accounts, it is necessary to work 
with the present value of taxes (or contributions) not the average value and to 
work with the present value of consumption and transfers (or pensions) not the 
average value.  Note that where the contribution rate is a constant percentage of 
income, income may be used as a proxy for contributions.  A constant pension 
level will not be an equivalent formulation to the generational accounting 
approach unless the discount rate is zero percent.  Zero percent is a single 
constant rate and arguably one of the rates in a possible range of discount rates 
but it is a very special case.  The following analysis will use the more general 
formulation of generational accounting and focus on definition two of 
generational equity used by Settergren. 
 
 
4.3    Analysis of Generational Accounting Approach to Generational Equity 
 
To restate the argument to be examined, Settergren (2003) would say that generational 
equity arises from having a constant ratio of the present value of pension benefits to the 
present value of contributions for all birth cohorts, using the growth in average income as 
the discount factor.  Proponents of generational accounting would make the weaker claim 
that if the present value of net taxes less the present value of net consumption and 
transfers is constant by generation, generational equity is achieved. 
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To assess generational equity for a SSRS, it is necessary to recognize the context of 
the assessment, namely that a SSRS is a form of insurance arrangement.  SSRS provide 
income during retirement years in return for contributions (or taxes) paid during the 
working years.  To assess the equity of insurance arrangements, it is common practice to 
assign utility functions to the contracting parties, in this case the individual and the state.  
The utility function of the state may be linear so that the present value of a dollar of 
pension benefit paid must be matched by the present value of a dollar of contribution 
collected, in aggregate, for the arrangement to be considered equitable to the state.  
However, individuals seldom demonstrate linear utility functions over the whole range of 
outcomes.  Individuals are typically risk averse resulting in utility functions that are 
concave downward (i.e., their first derivatives are positive and their second derivatives 
negative).  In such circumstances, there can be a range of outcomes where it may be 
considered to be of mutual benefit for the parties to contract.  Such a range of outcomes, 
if they are mutually beneficial, would be considered fair or equitable. 
 
The existence of different utility functions for contracting parties, some of which are 
concave downward, underlies many insurance arrangements.  Such insurance 
arrangements are considered equitable even though the present value of benefits received 
by one party may be less than the present value of contributions paid.  Due to its risk-
averse nature, the risk-averse party may be prepared to pay a premium to avoid or reduce 
the impact of an outcome that is considered undesirable and consider the payment of such 
a premium equitable, even if the premium (and the expected value of any other costs) is 
greater than the expected value of benefits.  
 
Another way of viewing this same point is to consider that the contracting parties 
each discount the future cash flows using different discount rates.  In the presence of 
different discount rates, it is possible that one party will perceive that it is receiving a 
premium while the other party will consider the contract “premium-free” or fair or 
equitable.  The possibility of such a situation was suggested in the earlier example from 
Auerbach et al. (1999) in the discussion of the appropriate discount rate to use for 
generational accounting.  In that example, it was suggested that if the relative 
productivity of capital and labour supplied by generations was negatively correlated then 
from the perspective of each generation, the burden might be reduced and a higher 
discount rate would be used.  Although Auerbach et al. (1999) admit this possibility, they 
recognize the practical difficulties in attempting to model different discount rates by 
generation.  However, our purpose here is not to derive a practical approach to 
discounting but to develop a coherent theory of generational equity. 
 
If one admits that in insurance arrangements, two parties may enter into a contract in 
which the present value of future contributions exceeds the present value of future 
benefits for one party and that such an agreement will be considered fair and equitable 
provided that the other party believes that it is increasing its utility by entering the 
agreement or believes that the present value of future contributions equals or is less than 
the present value of future benefits on the discount rates it uses, then the requirement that 
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policies and programs be considered unsustainable is not a sufficient condition for the 
arrangements to be considered to lack equity.  
 
 
4.4   Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter has introduced the concepts of generational accounting and generational 
equity.  Generational accounting is an approach used to assess the relative burden of 
taxes borne by different generations to support current policies, assuming no change in 
policy.  The chapter has argued that an uneven burden of taxes as shown by the 
generational accounts does not necessarily mean there is generational inequity.  In 
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5.0   Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter six families of definitions of equity are presented and discussed.  At the 
conclusion of this presentation, the method of determining equity to be used in this thesis 
to analyze the ABM is identified and a discussion of this method to analyze equity is 
presented. 
 
     Before presenting the six families of definitions of equity, the chapter begins with a 
discussion of the economic concept of Pareto efficiency and shows that this concept 
should not be equated with equity.  The chapter also discusses transition considerations to 
show that because it may take decades for a change to an SSRS to be fully incorporated, 
individuals are required to evaluate conditions to decide on whether a condition is 
equitable in the face of (almost) continuous change. 
 
 
5.1   Pareto Efficiency and Equity 
 
In assessing questions of equity, it is often necessary to compare the situations of 
different individuals who may have diverse and conflicting preferences.  Utility theory 
provides a general framework for such a comparison, because utility is a measure of the 
individual’s satisfaction. Utility theory becomes hard to apply in practice for a number of 
reasons including: 
 
 Individuals have difficulty quantifying their level of utility. 
 Individuals may not exhibit rationality in comparing items with differing 
utility measures. 
 There is no universally accepted standard method of categorization of 
utility measures that can be used to compare utility among members. 
  Even if there were such a standard universal categorization, it would still 
not be clear what weight to apply to the utility of different individuals. 
  It is not clear which individuals’ utility should be considered when making 
an assessment, e.g., should as yet unborn generations’ utility be 
considered?  This might be important if the yet unborn generations are 
expected to pay taxes based on the decision taken. 
 
     These considerations aside, various methods have been proposed for calculating a 
single aggregate utility measure to determine a social outcome for a group. Kreps (1990) 
lists the following:  
 
1. Equal weights to each individual’s utility, i.e., pure utilitarianism. 
2. Some other set of non-equal weights of the individual’s utility, e.g., if the 
ship is sinking, women and children are loaded into the life rafts first and 
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the crew leaves the sinking ship last - this may be referred to as weighted 
utilitarianism. 
3. Weights may be applied based on social position, so, for example, those in 
society who are worse off receive a heavier weight - this carries a measure 
of social justice with it. 
4. All the weight is given to the worst off member of the social group - this is 
often referred to as being a Rawlsian approach. 
 
     Another concept used in economics to assess options is that of Pareto optimality.  A 
particular set of choices is considered to be Pareto optimal if any change in the choices 
would make at least one individual worse off. 
 
     It is important not to equate equity with Pareto optimality, which is an economic 
construct to measure efficiency.  For example, one can imagine a situation of great 
inequality where a dictator enjoys great advantages to the detriment of his/her 
countrymen.  There are a number of alternative distributions of wealth that most people 
would consider more equitable, but since all of those redistributions would involve 
reducing, at least to a certain extent, the wealth of the dictator, none of the alternative 
distributions would be Pareto optimal.  
 
     In the situation to be considered, where we are comparing the equity of the application 
of an ABM, we will be concerned with choices/alternatives that are less attractive for 
some than the status quo, i.e., these balancing mechanisms operate when the status quo 
approach has produced or will lead to financial deficits so some reductions (of benefits) 
or increases (of contributions) are required.  Hence, in our context, none of the 
approaches will be considered Pareto optimal; however, these approaches might be able 
to be considered equitable. 
 
     For the purpose of comparing alternatives, a weighted utilitarian approach is adopted. 
The rationale is that the system includes both contributors and pensioners and both of 
their situations should be considered in assessing the equity of the application of the 
mechanism. That being said, to assess equity, we should also assess the capability of the 
individual to adjust to the proposed alternative distribution. For a social security system 
that relates benefits to earnings, it is reasonable to give consideration to the situation of 
all who have had earnings covered by the system, be they current contributors or 
pensioners.  It is argued that pensioners are generally less able to adjust to a redistribution 
of the system’s wealth because, on average, they tend to be heavily dependent on their 
social security pension for their livelihood or life style and because they have a shorter 
time horizon over to which to adjust.  Hence in assessing the equity of the various 
mechanisms, a weighted utilitarian approach will be adopted with greater weight being 
given to pensioners. 
 
5.2    Transition Considerations 
 
Cichon et al. (2004) state that it takes at least seven decades for a SSRS mature. From the 
perspective of an individual participant, many of whom may not participate for as long as 
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seven decades, the scheme may be viewed as always being in transition, i.e., not mature. 
If, from the individual participant’s perspective, the system is viewed as being in 
continuous or ongoing transition, it adds some rationality to the adoption of an ABM, 
which is a type of transition mechanism. 
 
     The individual’s perspective of continuous transition is different in some significant 
ways from the creators’ or designers’ perspective.  Their perspective tends to be of a 
steady state and of the desirable level of benefits and provisions in a mature system. For a 
creator/designer of a system, a financial imbalance which moves the system out of steady 
state is a shock to the system, whereas the individual participant may view the imbalance 
as another step in the system’s evolution.  Because, from the individual’s perspective, the 
system appears to be always in transition, the individual participant may recognize that 
there is an ongoing process of intergenerational sharing and that it is unrealistic to assess 
the equality of the system based on whether each participant gets out of the system an 
equivalent amount to what he/she contributes.  However, in the creators’/designers’ 
mature steady-state it is reasonable to do such an assessment. Chen et al. (1997) discuss 
many factors such as gender, marital status, earnings level, birth cohort, that a 
creator/designer would wish to consider in trying to do such an assessment. 
 
     Hence, the individual participant is more likely to compare his/her situation, i.e., 
contributions and entitlements, to other participants participating in the system during 
his/her lifetime, or a shorter period.  The individual participant judges equity on a relative 
basis rather than comparing his/her own benefits to contributions ratio, i.e., using an 
absolute basis.  
 
     Because the individual participant judges over a short comparison period, he/she is 
more likely to judge equity based on his/her situation compared to that of his/her family 
members, such as parents or children.  So, for example, a “second generation” participant 
may accept paying a contribution rate higher than what is technically required to provide 
for the payment of his/her own pension because he/she recognizes that a parent, a 
member of the “first generation” received benefits of greater value than contributions 
made. Analogously, the second-generation member may recognize that if his/her 
generation has reproduced, in aggregate, at less than the population fertility replacement 
rate, then in a pay-go system, a financial burden is placed on the third generation. 
Recognizing this, the second generation may be willing to accept some of the financial 
burden. The purpose of this argument is to suggest that individual participants may: 
 
 recognize that the system is continually evolving; 
 understand that intergenerational sharing is occurring; 
 judge equity by comparison with other participants in a short time frame, 
perhaps as long as the individual’s lifetime; and 
 accept as equitable arrangements under which the individual receives 
benefits whose value is less than the contributions made. 
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5.3    Definitions of Equity 
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, there are many possible definitions of equity, some of which 
are completely incompatible with each other.  Six possible families of definitions are 
considered in this subsection and two definitions are identified for further consideration 
and evaluation in this thesis.  The six families of definitions are described and the reasons 
for their inclusion or exclusion explained. 
 
1. “Hardline-No Changes” – This definition of equity may be paraphrased as saying 
“There are certain provisions of the social security act and these provisions form a 
binding contract with the individual, abiding by the exact terms of the contract is 
equitable and any change to the terms of the contract without the mutual 
agreement of both parties to the contract is inequitable”.  For the purposes of this 
thesis, the equity of ABM is being considered.  By definition, the ABM is only 
applied in situations where operating the system as it has operated in the past is no 
longer sufficient to maintain financial balance so some change is required. For 
anyone who had earned any benefits under the social security system prior to the 
introduction of the ABM, the introduction and application of the ABM would 
violate the “Hardline No Changes” definition of equity.  Therefore, without 
disputing the validity of this definition of equity, it is not informative to evaluate 
ABM using this definition since, by definition, the application of the ABM would 
be inequitable. 
 
2. “Paying the same contribution rate” or “Paying the same contributions” – These 
two definitions are slight variations on the same definition, so they will be treated 
as a single definition.  Palmer (2005) states that a definition of fairness across 
generations is that the percentage of individual earnings transferred between 
generations (in a paygo arrangement) is the same for individuals in all 
generations.  There is a simple appeal to the notion that if everyone has paid the 
same contribution rate or that if the contributions for a particular earnings history 
are the same among participants with this earnings history, then an equitable 
arrangement exists.  However, this definition of equity does not have any relation 
to benefits.  Hence, two participants could receive benefits of considerably 
different amounts and yet, if they paid the same contribution rate or the same 
contributions, it would be considered equitable.  It seems that for equity to be 
achieved there needs to be some consideration of the value of benefits received. 
Furthermore, in response to Palmer, as successive generations live longer on 
average than their predecessors then either more contributions are paid for 
benefits of the same value if the retirement age is adjusted for life expectancy or 
more benefits are received, even though the contribution rate is the same – it is 
hard to see the inherent fairness in such an approach.  Moreover, on this 
definition, if the ABM operated solely to change (reduce) benefits but did not 
change the contribution rate or contributions paid then the ABM would be 
equitable by definition.  Conversely, any ABM that modified the contribution rate 
or the contributions paid would be considered inequitable regardless of the effect 
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it had on benefits.  In this case, I would dispute the validity of the definition, but it 
is being discarded because it is not informative in assessing equity. 
 
3. “Having a constant relationship between the present value of pensions and the 
present value of contributions across cohorts” – There is a family of definitions of 
equity here.  The key elements of this family of definitions are: 
 both pensions and contributions are considered 
 there is a comparison across cohorts 
 a present value is calculated for the purpose of the comparison. 
 
Some components of this family, which must be selected, that would affect the 
calculations but would still result in a definition within the same family of 
definitions are: 
 the relationship to choose, i.e., one might choose the ratio of the present 
value of pensions to the present value of contributions or the present value 
of contributions to the present value of pensions or some standardized 
measure such as the ratio of the difference between the present value of 
contributions and the present value of benefits to the present value of 
contributions. 
 A discount rate must be selected for the present value calculations.  There 
are many possible choices for the discount rate, such as growth in the 
average income proposed by Settergren (2003) or an interest rate available 
in capital markets or a risk-free interest rate or some arbitrary, yet 
appropriate, rate. 
 
This family of definitions seems to be valid; although, the choice of discount rate 
could affect the validity of the definition.  This will be one measure used to assess 
equity of the ABM.  Since, for the purpose of assessment, a specific definition 
must be considered, I will use a constant ratio of the present value of pension 
benefits over the accumulated value of contributions for all birth cohorts using 
growth in the average income as the discount factor, which is similar to the 
definition Settergren (2003) states. 
 
Settergren (2003) also indicates that a high degree of intergenerational fairness 
could be achieved if there were a stable ratio of average pension to average 
income.  Note that in a system with a fixed contribution rate that is a constant 
percentage of income, such a system belongs to this family of definitions. By 
calculating the present values at a zero discount rate, and instead of using the 
present value of contributions, using the present value of contributions divided by 
the contribution rate, i.e., the present value of income at a zero discount rate, the 
ratio is of a present value of pension to a linear transformation of contributions. 
 
4. “The lifetime net benefit rate is zero for all cohorts” – The U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (2007) has defined the lifetime net benefit rate as the present value of 
net Social Security benefits (benefits less taxes) as a percentage of the present 
value of the individual’s lifetime wages.  For this discussion, tax is used 
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interchangeably with contribution rate.  Hence, the lifetime net benefit rate is a 
definition within the family defined in 3.  The reason that this definition is 
discussed separately here, is that the definition regarding equity is formulated 
from the perspective of generational accounting, i.e., unless the lifetime net 
benefit rate is zero, there is intergenerational inequity.  If the lifetime net benefit 
rate is positive then that individual/cohort will receive greater benefits than were 
paid for by its taxes or, in other words, some of its benefits must be paid by other 
generations’ taxes which is considered an intergenerational subsidy that is unfair.  
Similarly, if the lifetime net benefit rate is negative, then that individual is 
receiving less  benefits than taxes paid and its taxes may be used to subsidize 
another generation which is also considered unfair.  Hence to avoid subsidies and 
be fair, the lifetime net benefit rate must be zero. 
 
Although this definition is a member of the family of definitions defined in 3, 
which I will consider further, I reject this definition for further consideration 
because it is too restrictive.  First, as noted earlier, it may take seventy or more 
years for a social security system to cease to be in a transition period and to 
become mature.  During the transition period, the lifetime net benefit rate will be 
positive for some individuals who are beneficiaries of the introduction of or 
amendment to the social security system and will be negative for some individuals 
whose contributions or taxes must be used to subsidize the beneficiaries; hence, 
throughout the transition period, the system could not be considered equitable, by 
definition.   
 
Note that a version of this definition of equity is incorporated in the argument for 
the inherent fairness of a system of individual social security accounts, which, in 
the extreme version, would permit individuals to contribute, invest their 
contributions (and any other employer contributions), and then receive benefits 
only to the extent to which there were a positive balance in their account to 
provide such benefits; moreover, if on the contributor’s death there were still a 
positive balance in the contributor’s account it would be transferred to the 
contributor’s beneficiary. Although such an approach provides a hardnosed 
version of individual fairness, it does not rely on any insurance principles of risk 
pooling and so is not an appropriate approach to apply to a social security system.  
By their nature, social security systems are insurance systems, which involve risk 
pooling and risk transfers.  They are not established to provide an administrative 
mechanism to receive an individual’s contributions, do record keeping (and 
perhaps investment), and administer payments until the contributions are 
exhausted.  One might quibble with these last few sentences by pointing to the 
example of social security in Chile, and other Latin American countries, that have 
fully funded defined contribution social security systems.  However, even in such 
systems, there is some risk pooling, e.g., requiring a guaranteed minimum rate of 
interest be credited or requiring an annuity be purchased. Therefore, this 
definition of equity is rejected as invalid for SSRS with an ABM. 
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5. “Equity requires achieving certain social welfare goals“ – as in Barr (2004).  As 
noted in the previous discussion, there is no question that social security systems 
are designed to go beyond the strictest version of individual equity to achieve 
some social welfare goals through risk pooling and risk transfer.  Rather than 
attempt to challenge the validity of this definition, I will describe the approach 
taken and how it addresses, to some extent, this definition.  Note that this 
definition is not well specified.  The social welfare goals to be achieved are not 
listed.  Does it mean providing a minimum pension?  Does it mean requiring 
lifetime annuities with survivor benefits?  Does it mean that benefits must be 
adjusted for inflation?  None of these questions are answered and there are many 
more possibilities and questions that could be posed.   
 
One way to answer these questions would be to look at Convention No. 102 of the 
International Labour Conference that defines minimum standards of social 
security.  This convention was first adopted in 1952 as a result of thoughtful 
discussion and negotiation among international representatives of national 
governments, employers and labour organizations.  As such, it is a standard 
worthy of consideration.  Briefly, it specifies that a male worker with a wife who 
has earnings at the level of the ordinary male labourer and who has 30 years of 
employment, should be entitled to an annual pension in old age of at least 40% of 
average annual wages, valorized to time of calculation, and indexed after 
retirement.  While both the establishment of a minimum standard and the level of 
standard are laudable achievements, fewer than one quarter of the countries have 
complied with this convention.  Canada is one of the countries that has not 
complied.  Hence to apply this standard may be to set the bar too high (whether or 
not it be a relevant level to set the bar).   
 
Barr (2004b), for example, and other scholars believe that social security systems 
need to have some redistributive provisions in order to achieve their social 
welfare goals.  For example, for workers whose earnings are disrupted due to 
disability, there should be special provisions, and, for example, for individuals 
whose pension is inadequate (however defined) there should be programs to 
provide supplementary income.  To simplify this analysis, I will assume that in 
addition to a contributory earnings-related social security system that I will 
analyze, that there are other redistributive programs designed to meet specific 
social welfare goals for those who require assistance and qualify.  Furthermore, I 
will analyze SSRS that have level contribution rates and that can be considered to 
provide the same level of benefit per unit of contribution.  This will narrow the 
range of considerations regarding whether or not equity is achieved. 
 
It is worth noting that in all of the four countries’ SSRS (except Canada) that I 
consider there is a level contribution rate on eligible earnings and that the same 
level of benefit per unit of contribution is promised.  Even in Canada, this is 
almost the case, because contributions are not paid on the first $3,500 of earnings, 
a relatively small percentage of earnings for all but low-paid workers.  It is also 
worth noting that this approach has possibly eliminated some valid considerations 
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of equity.  For example, the U.S. social security system has a level contribution 
rate on eligible earnings but provides a different level of benefit per unit of 
contributions, based on earnings ranges, i.e., lower earnings receive a higher level 
of benefit per unit of contributions than do higher earnings.  In fact, one could 
describe the U.S. SSRS formula as progressive and argue that progressivity is an 
aspect of (intragenerational) equity.  Consideration of such a benefit formula is 
beyond the analysis of this thesis but is a valid area for future analysis. 
 
6. “Having an equivalent change in the expected utility among cohorts” – This 
definition is not a way of measuring equity prior to a change but it is a way of 
measuring the equity of a change.  In the context of this thesis in which the equity 
of the operation of an ABM is being considered, it is appropriate to consider 
definitions of equity that measure the impact of a change.  However, this 
definition is a relative definition of equity, evaluating the impact of a change, as 
opposed to an absolute definition of equity. 
 
      A prime difference in this family of definitions of equity, from any of the other 
 definitions considered, is that it introduces the notion of expected utility.  This 
 changes the perspective from simply measuring the amount of the change, 
 expressed in some form (such as a ratio), and then comparing across cohorts, to 
 one of considering the impact of the change using the cohort’s utility measure.  In 
 this regard, it is arguable that a change in the future level of expected pension of 
 x% may have quite a significantly different impact on expected utility if the 
 change in expected pension is a long way in the future with much time to adjust 
 lifestyle, savings plans, etc., as would be the case for a 20-year old, than if the 
 change is immediate as in the case of a 75-year old pensioner. 
 
     To measure the effect of a change in expected utility requires at least the following: 
 a utility function which can be used to evaluate the impact of an action 
 a method of weighting the changes in utility for various periods in order to 
compute a simple measure of expected utility 
 a way of comparing the expected utility before and after the change 
 
     In keeping with the methodology adopted which is to make as few assumptions as 
possible, I will make the following assumptions regarding the utility function without 
going so far as to specify the precise characteristics of the utility function: 
 in assessing the impact of a change, the individual does a comparison, 
quite likely informal and not highly quantitative, of the expected value of 
the “item under consideration”, both before and after the change 
 the expected value is calculated using discount rates 
 for our particular investigation, the “item under consideration” is a 
standardized measure of the present value of future pension benefits.  To 
standardize the measure, I will calculate the ratio of the present value of 
pension benefits to the accumulated value of contributions. 
 the utility curve is upward-sloping and concave.  However, given that the 
annual changes that will occur as a result of applying the ABM are likely 
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to be relatively small, I will treat the relevant part of the utility curve as 
being constant, i.e., there is no change in the utility of the alternatives to 
be considered.  A ratio of expected utility before and after the change will 
be calculated to minimize the effect of the different utility functions.   
 
     With respect to what are the appropriate discount rates to use, I propose the following 
approach.  A general rule of thumb is that a well-functioning economy with well-
developed capital markets should permit investors to achieve a real rate of return of 3% 
per annum over the long term.  Provided that an individual is assessing an investment 
over the long term, it is a reasonable assumption to discount future income at a real rate 
of 3% per annum.  Consumers, in our case pensioners or future pensioners, view their 
prospective pension like an investment.  It is reasonable to apply the discount rate that 
reflects time preference.  For my calculations, I will assume that the long term is defined 
as the minimum of the individual’s years of life expectancy and 30 years.  So, for 
example, an individual age 20 with a life expectancy of 60 years would treat the long 
term as 30 years whereas an individual age 75 with a life expectancy of 9 years would 
treat the long term as 9 years. 
 
     In terms of discount rates, if the long term is at least 30 years, it is reasonable to use a 
real rate of return of 3%; however, for much longer terms a higher discount rate may be 
used and for much shorter horizons a lower discount rate may be used.  The relevant 
considerations in developing this approach are: 
 in capital markets, the normal shape of the yield curve for risk-free bonds is 
upward sloping by term to maturity 
 individuals place higher present value on events that will affect them immediately 
or in the near future.  A higher present value means that the future income to be 
received closer to the present is discounted at a lower rate than future income to 
be received further into the future is discounted. 
 
     I propose to evaluate income streams using the following discount rates: 
 
Table 6:  Personal Discount Rates 
 
             Discount Rate 
Period 
(current age x) 




   
65 – x > 30 4% 4% 
30 ≥ 65 – x > 20 3% 3% 
20 ≥ 65 – x > 10 2% 3% 
10 ≥ 65 – x > 0 1% 3% 
  0 ≥ 65 – x 0% 3% 
      
    In calculating the period, 65 is used as a proxy for the normal age at retirement.  So in 
this model, individuals determine how far they are from the age at which the pension will 
commence and adjust their discount rate accordingly.  This decreasing discount rate, as 
 
   63 
time to normal age at retirement decreases, is consistent with the theory that individuals 
are risk averse, which is consistent with a concave-shaped utility function. 
 
     3% is used as the hypothetical normal long-term discount rate.  When individuals are 
considering a time period in excess of their life expectancy, they revert to 3%, if they 
were below that level, or remain at a higher level if already at a higher discount rate. 
 
     Using this table of discount rates, in Chapter 7 I will evaluate the ratio of the 
following quantity (for the Canadian SSRS): 
 
Present Value of Pension 
Accumulated Value of Contributions to 65 
 
after-change to before-change. 
 
     To assess equity I will compare this ratio across cohorts.  It is probably too much to 
demand that this ratio be equal across cohorts.  For equity to exist, I will require that 
ratios be not more than 5% different in any one year and be not more than 10% different 
in any five-year period. 
 
 
5.4    Methodology 
 
There are at least three approaches that might be adopted to attempt to evaluate the 
properties and robustness of the provisions or mechanisms to be considered and tested, as 
follows: 
 
1. Make a number of assumptions regarding the economy, population growth, etc. so 
that a model can be adopted that admits of a closed form solution. 
2. Make fewer assumptions than above, but not so many that a closed form solution 
exists, and then attempt to use dynamic programming techniques to draw 
conclusions. 
3. Make fewer assumptions than in 2, use population projections and examine the 
 results. 
 
     For this thesis, for the purpose of evaluating equitable balance, approach 3 has been 
adopted.  Reasons for adopting this approach include: 
 By making sufficient assumptions to be able to use approach 1 or 2, there is the 
danger that relevant factors will be excluded or modified as a result of the 
assumptions made, that will jeopardize the validity of any conclusions drawn. 
 For approach 1 to be viable, it is generally necessary to assume a steady state, 
whereas the provisions to be tested only apply in situations when steady state 
conditions do not hold; consequently, approach 1 is not appropriate for the 
purpose. 
 Population projections from reliable sources are available through 2050.  If the 
mechanisms are demonstrated to be equitable over such a time horizon, many 
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observers would consider such a time frame to be sufficient, for practical 
purposes.  On the other hand, if the mechanisms are demonstrated to be 
inequitable over such a time horizon, the conclusions would be valid. 
 For many observers, especially those who are not pure mathematicians, a 
demonstration by applying the mechanisms to actual population projections is a 
more understandable, acceptable and convincing demonstration than an approach 
using models and mathematical techniques. 
 
 
5.5   Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with a discussion of the economic concept of Pareto efficiency and 
showed that this concept should not be equated with equity.  The chapter then made the 
important point that because of the long period time that may be required for a change to 
be fully incorporated in an SSRS, from the perspective of the individual conditions must 
be evaluated in the face of (almost) continuous change. 
 
Six families of definitions of equity were presented and discussed and the 
definition of equity to be used in this thesis was determined. This definition measures the 
ratio of the present value of pension to the accumulated value of contributions at age 65, 
after-change to before change.  Using this approach the effect on cohorts can be 
compared. Provided that the adjustment is less than 5% in one year and less than 10% 
over five years, equity will be considered to exist. With this definition, the characteristics 
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6.0   Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter, the stabilizing mechanisms of the four countries on which this thesis 
focuses are described.  The countries are Canada, Germany, Japan and Sweden.  Next the 
objective of financial balance is determined.  Within this context, the mechanisms are 
analyzed to determine whether they are designed to be a solution to a stochastic optimal 
control problem.  All of the mechanisms use a set of mechanical rules.  It is demonstrated 
that the application of these rules is insufficient to ensure financial balance.  Because 
significant financial analysis has been done by the countries’ actuaries, economists and 
governmental agencies, as well as by certain other commentators and transnational 
bodies, this analysis is referred to.  Since such analysts have access to vast amounts of 
data, complex models and significant resources, the approach of this thesis is to review 
the published analysis rather than to perform independent modeling.  A significant 
problem in the manner used by Sweden to calculate assets is identified, quantified, and an 
approach suggested to  correct the error.  The unusual properties of the steady-state 
contribution rate calculation in the Canadian SSRS are analyzed. 
 
 
6.1    Sweden 
 
6.1.1  Sweden’s ABM 
 
The ABM for Sweden’s NDC was described in Chapter 1.  To determine if the approach 
used is a formulation of a stochastic optimal control problem, define the following: 
 
Buffer Fund (assuming no positive contribution flow) 
 
Ft t,It  is the amount of the buffer fund which commenced at F0 and varies 
Ft 0 with time t  and the investment earnings It  
 
 
Return on Buffer Fund for period 0,t  
 
It F0 1dBt 1 1 dSt  where 1 is allocated to risk-free investments B  and      
  1 1  is allocated to risky investments S  where rr  
dB rrBdt     is the return on the risk-free asset and S  follows a 
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Contributions 
 
Ct k,nct,wnct  contributions at time t  depend on contribution rate k  which is 
Ct 0  constant and number of contributors nct  and average wage of the 
nct 0  contributors tncw  
wnct 0 
 





At At 1,Ct ,Tt,rt  Account at time t  depends on account at time t 1, 
At 0  contributions at time t , the withdrawals Tt , and the 
 Ct 0  rate credited to accounts tr  
Tt 0   





Pt npt,Pnpt 1 , t,et,Dt  Pensions at time t  depend on npt  the number of pensioners at time 
 t , the average pension the previous year Pnpt 1 , the increase rate in 
 the pension t , the number of new entrants to pension status et   
npt 0    and pensioners deceased Dt , where ta  is the annuity factor to 
 convert entrants’ accounts to pensions 










t R   
 
 
Control law (ignoring situation where balance ratio goes below 1 and then increases 
above 1) 
 


































Ft Ct TDt  sum of buffer fund plus sum of one year’s contribution multiplied by the 


















 is the absolute value of the weighted average of 
contributors age c x  with contributions Ccx  of their age x  minus the weighted average for 








epx  sum of the accounts for contributors and suspended contributors 
and sum of the pension accounts for pensioners multiplied by their 
remaining life expectancy. 
 
     Comparing this to the traditional formulation of the stochastic optimal control problem 
we note that: 
 it is a stochastic process as obligations increase in relation to accounts and life 
expectancy, where accounts are dependent on contributions and the growth in the 
average wage 
 the contribution rate is constant 
 the control law is defined deterministically. 
 
     The ABM of the Swedish NDC is relying on a deterministic control law to maintain 
the system in balance.  In effect, the problem reduces to one of determining whether the 
Swedish system is self-financing given a constant contribution rate, a deterministic 
control law and a stochastic process for obligations based on the growth in average 
wages, i.e., the stochastic process is dependent on the Swedish economy. 
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6.1.2  Objective of Financial Balance - Sweden 
 
There are two methods of adjustment used in the Swedish SSRS to attempt to achieve 
financial balance.  The first is the adjustment of the age of full-benefit entitlement to 
reflect expected increases in life expectancy.  According to the work of Anderson (2006), 
in a paygo social security system, it is not sufficient to adjust the retirement age and the 
consumption of the elderly in proportion to longevity increases, in order to obtain 
balance.  It is also necessary to increase the contribution rate for the young.  Because in 
the Swedish SSRS, the contribution rate is fixed, it is necessary to have a second 
adjustment.  The second is the ABM, which applies when the ratio of assets to liabilities 
is less than one.  It reduces the nominal rate of return credited to the contributors’ 
accounts and rate of increase applied to pensions paid. 
 
     The Swedish SSRS defines a minimum benefit.  If the pension benefit falls below this 
minimum benefit level then a supplemental pension is paid from general revenues to 
increase the total pension from all sources to the minimum benefit level.  For the 
balancing mechanism to be considered to work effectively, financial balance should be 
achieved without any pensioner who became entitled at retirement to a pension above the 
minimum level, ever having such pensioner’s payment from the system fall below the 
minimum benefit level.  The reason for this condition is that if it is not met then the 
Swedish SSRS and its balancing mechanisms will achieve financial balance by definition.  
This results because the SSRS could always pay pension benefits with available 
contributions and if those pension benefits were below the minimum benefit level then 
they would be supplemented from general revenues.  In the extreme, everyone would 
receive the minimum benefit from the contributions and general revenues.  But such a 
balance should not be attributed to the effectiveness of the balancing mechanism but 
rather to the failure of the mechanism to achieve balance, i.e., continuing to reduce 
benefits until they equal contributions is not a balancing mechanism but the absence of an 
effective mechanism.  Hence, in assessing the effectiveness of the mechanisms in the 
Swedish SSRS, it is necessary to determine whether it will achieve balance without 
reducing pensions that were higher than the minimum benefit at retirement, to below the 
minimum benefit level, i.e., balance will be achieved without extra-systematic flows. 
 
 
6.1.3  Analysis of Swedish Balance Sheet 
 
As explained previously in subsection 1.2.1 and in subsection 6.1.1 with the aid of 
mathematical symbols, the balance sheet used in the NDC portion of the Swedish system 
to calculate the financial position in order to determine if the ABM is to be applied 
defines assets and liabilities as follows:  Total assets equal the contribution asset plus any 
assets in the buffer fund where the contribution asset is defined as one year’s 
contributions multiplied by the expected turnover duration, which is defined as the 
absolute value of the number of years difference between the expected income-weighted 
age of income earners and the expected pension-weighted age of pensioners, both 
represented as a single age.  Total pension liabilities are defined as the accumulated 
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notional account balances of non-pensioners plus the sum over all pensioners of the 
product of their current pension times their remaining life expectancy.   
 
     In this subsection, I will show that this method of defining the balance sheet 
systematically over-states the value of the assets and therefore the balance ratio.  
Moreover, as a consequence of this over-statement, the application of the ABM does not 
achieve financial balance.  I suggest a modification to the formula to improve the 
definition.  
 
     Let us start by considering how the balance sheet would be defined in an actuarial 
valuation using a closed group approach.  Assets would equal the assets in the buffer fund 
plus the present value of contributions to be paid by non-pensioners.  Liabilities would 
equal the accumulated notional account balances of non-pensioners plus the present value 
of contributions to be paid by non-pensioners plus the present value of remaining 
pensions to be paid to pensioners.  In a closed group approach, only pensioners and non-
pensioners that were part of the SSRS at the valuation date would be included.  Let us 
compare this formulation to the balance sheet defined by the Swedish system. 
 
     First, note that the present value of contributions to be paid by non-pensioners appears 
in the traditional closed group valuation balance sheet in both the assets and liabilities, so 
it can be deducted from both terms without affecting the financial position.  Next, 
consider the calculation of the present value of remaining pensions to be paid. If this were 
computed at a zero percent interest rate, then it would be equal to the sum over all 
pensioners of the level of pension by pensioner multiplied by the pensioner’s remaining 
life expectancy.  On this basis, pension liabilities, net of the present value of future 
contributions, are equal to pension liabilities as defined in the Swedish system; however, 
pension assets, net of the present value of future contributions, are equal to the assets in 
the buffer fund.  This differs from the assets in the Swedish system by the contribution 
asset. 
 
     The definition of the actuarial financial balance in the closed group seems correct.  If 
the system were terminated at the valuation date, the assets available to pay all the 
accumulated liabilities, which are the accumulated value of the notional accounts and the 
present value of pensions to the pensioners, would only be the assets in the buffer fund.  
So the Swedish SSRS includes an additional amount of assets equal to the contribution 
asset.  How is this inclusion to be rationalized? 
 
     Because the SSRS is not being terminated at the valuation date and because the 
country can rely on future contributors or taxpayers to continue to pay to provide for the 
liabilities, the Swedish system adds contributions to be paid in the future. 
 
     In a steady state, which the Swedish system assumes, there is some rationale for this 
approach.  Even though new contributions create new and additional liabilities, new 
contributions may be used to pay pensions because in a steady state there will be an 
equally large successor group of contributors to pay the pensions being earned through 
contributions by the current group of contributors.  In other words, if the net value of the 
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closed group liability can be maintained then, in a steady state, each group of 
contributors’ pensions is paid by the subsequent group of contributors and there is no 
change to the net financial position.  But does the contribution asset make the appropriate 
adjustment? 
 
     The expected turnover duration is the absolute value of the difference between the 
expected income-weighted age of income earners and the expected pension-weighted age 
of pensioners.  The rationale is that the current contributions (along with the buffer fund) 
can be used to pay pensions because the current contributors (on average) will not receive 
their pension until the expected duration has elapsed.  In a steady state, there should be a 
sufficient contribution to pay their pensions.  The rationale is appealing but it is flawed. 
 
     The problem is that the rationale implicitly assumes that the contributions of one 
group can be used to pay the pensions of the predecessor group and that those 
contributions will be paid from the expected turnover duration.  But that is not the case.  
Contributions will only be paid by the current contributors until their normal retirement 
age, approximately age 65. (Or if greater refinement is desired, calculate contributions up 
to the expected retirement age of contributors, which could be determined, for example, 
by using the scheduled age for full benefit entitlement for the contributing cohort but 
adjusted for expected retirements at other than the age of full benefit entitlement by 
applying retirement-age weights based on an analysis of the retirement experience of the 
pensioners). The expected turnover duration provides for contributions to be made for a 
period of time up to the pension-weighted average age.  During the time period between 
the normal retirement age and the pension-weighted average age, it is not the current 
contributor group who will be paying pensions for the predecessor group; it is the group 
following the current contributor group.  In other words, the assets to pay the pensioners 
are coming from both the group of current contributors and the group of not-yet 
contributors. 
 
     If we think back to the closed group valuation, we included the present value of future 
contributions in both the asset and liability values.  This represents the appropriate 
portion of liability that the present contributors could expect the successor contributors to 
bear in a steady state pay-go model; however, the present value of contributions only 
would include contributions to be paid to the contributors’ normal retirement age.  
 
     Because the expected turnover duration includes the years beyond the normal 
retirement age up to the pension-weighted average age of pensions, it overstates the 
contribution asset.  Because the assets are overstated, when and if the ABM is triggered, 
the financial position is much worse than is represented and the amount of the annual 
adjustment via the ABM is less than required to rectify the financial imbalance.  
Moreover, because the assets implicitly include some contributions from a future group 
of contributors after the current group of contributors, when there is a negative 
imbalance, due to demographics or economic factors, there will be insufficient uncounted 
contributions from the future group of contributors available to rectify the imbalance. 
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     To get a sense of the magnitude of the misstatement of the assets, consider the 
following.  Settergren (2003) states the expected turnover duration is approximately 33 
years, the difference between age 76 and age 43, the pension-weighted average age and 
the income-weighted average age respectively.  If normal retirement age is approximately 
age 65, then the correct expected turnover duration is approximately 22 years.  Hagberg 
(2006) estimates that the 2006 buffer fund assets are approximately 11.75% of total 
assets.  So combining these figures and the adjustment, assets are overstated by 
approximately 41.60%.  On this basis the ABM ought to have been triggered already. 
 
     Next, notice that once triggered, the ABM is unlikely to restore balance, because its 
application still results in liabilities greater than assets.  When liabilities exceed assets, 
the stated method of adjustment is to multiply the liabilities by the ratio of assets to 
liabilities in order to adjust liabilities.  But the adjustment is not applied in this manner. 
The ratio of assets to liabilities is multiplied by the rates to credit to the accounts of 
actives and the rates to increase the pensions.  Such an application of the adjustment 
results in new liabilities that still exceed assets.  Even if all economic and demographic 
variables develop as expected in the next period, liabilities will still exceed assets and the 
mechanism must be applied again.  However again, adjusted liabilities will still exceed 
assets, and so it will continue.  Using the notation developed earlier.   
 





  =  Assetst 
     Then for balance we want 
 
Assetst  =  Adjusted Liabilitiest  =  Unadjusted Liabilitiest  U t  
 







and        adjusted At   =  unadjusted At At 1,Ct ,Tt, adjustedrt  
 
and    adjusted Px   =  unadjusted Px npt,Pnpt 1 , adjusted t,et,Dt  
 
so         Adjusted Liabilities  >  Unadjusted Liabilitiest  U t  
 
and    Adjusted Liabilities > Assets 
 
so financial balance is not achieved. 
 
     Recall that we require as a minimum for the ABM to be considered to be operating 
effectively that any pensioner whose initial pension exceeds the minimum benefit will 
not, at a later date, find, as a result of the operation of the ABM that the pension is less 
than the minimum benefit.  But there is no assurance of this for initial pensions that are 
only slightly above the minimum benefit.  These pensions have been determined using a 
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1.6% interest rate to calculate the annuity factor.  If the average rate of real wage growth 
is 1.6%, in the absence of the ABM being applied, the pensions will be increased by the 
rate of inflation.  This is the same rate to be applied to the minimum benefit.  However, if 
the rate of average wage growth is less than 1.6% then the amount of deficiency will be 
deducted from the rate of inflation and the rate credited to pensions will be reduced 
further.  No such adjustments apply to the minimum benefit that continues to increase 
annually by the rate of inflation.  Therefore, it could easily be the case that with a few 
years of average wage growth less than 1.6% that an initial pension that commenced 
slightly above the minimum benefit would have increased less rapidly than the minimum 
benefit so that in the absence of supplement, it would be less than the minimum benefit.  
This point alone is sufficient to conclude that the Swedish ABM does not even achieve 
partial financial balance.  It would be economic factors that would cause such a situation 
to occur. 
 
     Finally, there is no direct financial connection between the rate of increase in average 
annual income per capita for contributors and the amount of indexing that can be 
provided to pensioners.  To illustrate this point, assume that the real rate of increase in 
average wages is 1.6 percent, the rate that has been incorporated in the pensions of 
pensioners.  If 16% (the contribution rate) of the volume of income increase is exactly 
equal to the volume of pension increase, then, on a paygo basis, the system is balanced 
financially.  But it is highly improbable that this balance would exist, given the number 
of unrelated parameters, and if it did exist in any year, it is highly unlikely that it would 
persist.  It is extremely difficult and highly conjectural to project future rates of income 
growth, but changes in population are more predictable.  The following figures from the 
United Nations 2002 population projections (“UN 2002”) provided by the International 
Labour Organization (“ILO”) show how the population ages 15-64, a proxy for the 
working population of contributors, is expected to decrease from 2010 onward while the 
population age 65 and over, a proxy for the pensioner population, is expected to increase 
in all years until 2045.  With such changing demographics, it is unlikely that a persistent 
financial balance can be achieved. 
 
Table 7:  Swedish Population Projections 
 
Year 
Population (in thousands) 
Ages 15 – 64 Age 65 and Over 
2005 5,805 1,576 
2010 5,826 1,723 
2015 6,646 1,924 
2020 5,509 2,051 
2025 5,354 2,158 
2030 5,167 2,274 
2035 4,980 2,375 
2040 4,823 2,417 
2045 4,701 2,386 
2050 4,555 2,353 
 
 
   73 
 
     Legros (2006) states that when the contribution rate is fixed, as in the case in NDC 
systems, the indexing rule will try to provide an automatic stabilizing effect.  She 
concludes that Sweden’s system is the only one that does this successfully.  For the 
reasons, presented in this subsection, this author disagrees that Sweden’s system succeeds 
in providing automatic stabilization (balance). 
 
6.2    Japan 
 
6.2.1  Japan’s Pension System – Greatly Abbreviated 
 
The Japanese pension system is highly complex, with many components that have been 
subject to various reforms over the past two decades.  The Japanese society is aging 
relatively rapidly due to the combination of increasing life expectancy and a total fertility 
rate that has been below the replacement rate of approximately 2.10 (per female aged 15 
to 49) since 1975 and has continued to decline to 1.3 in 2000 (Sakamoto, 2005).  The 
impact of an aging society has been to exert pressure on the financing and stability of 
Japan’s pay-go defined benefit social security system resulting in amendments to the 
contribution rate, government subsidies, retirement age, benefit indexation formulas and 
system structure.  For the purpose of this thesis, only a specific component of the system 
will be analyzed.  The analysis will be generally applicable to other components of the 
system.  For a fuller description of the system and reforms see Sakamoto (2005). 
 
     For the purpose of this analysis, I will consider the social security pensions available 
to those employed in the private sector not covered by an occupational pension plan.  
Such employees are covered by the National Pension Scheme (NP) that provides a basic 
flat-rate pension benefit proportionate to covered months divided by 480 months 
(maximum 1) and by the Employees’ Pension Insurance Scheme (EPI) that provides 
earnings-related pensions for the covered period.  The annual accrual rate for EPI is 
0.5481 percent of average earnings, revalued to age 65.  After age 65, benefits are 
indexed to increases in the Consumer Price Index.  The pensionable age for the flat rate 
part is 65 and the pensionable age for the earnings-related part is 60 but it will be 
increased gradually to reach 65 in 2025 for men and in 2030 for women. 
 
     The EPI receives contributions from employees and employers and is required to 
transfer funds to pay the NP and EPI pensions in proportion to the covered pensioners.  
Under the 2004 reform the contribution rate was set at 13.58%, then raised to 13.934% in 
October 2004, thereafter it is to be raised by 0.354% in September every year until it 
reaches the ultimate rate of 18.3% in September 2017, when it becomes fixed.  Funds 
held by the EPI are invested in various securities including bonds, Japanese equities and 
foreign equities. 
 
     In addition to contributions and investment income, the government also subsidizes 
the basic pension.  In 2004 the subsidy rate was 13.  It is scheduled to be ½ in 2009 and to 
increase to that level in three steps. 
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     With this very abbreviated background on a specific component of the social security 
system, the description of the automatic balancing mechanism in subsection 6.2.2 will 
have a context. 
 
6.2.2  Japan’s Automatic Balancing Mechanism 
 
Even with the various reforms to increase contributions, raise the government subsidy 
and extend the pensionable age, it is not forecast that financial stability will be achieved.  
The 2004 reform of Japan’s system introduced an ABM, which is described in this 
subsection.  The ABM is a method of reducing earnings-related benefits from the EPI 
until financial equilibrium is achieved.  There are two prongs to the benefit reduction: the 
one adjusts the initial level of benefits earned by adjusting the factor for revaluing 
average earnings; the second adjusts the indexation of pensions being paid.  However, the 
contribution rate remains fixed according to a set schedule. 
 
     Prior to the introducing an ABM into the system, average wages for the purpose of 
benefit determination were revalued in respect of the improvement in active workers’ 
disposable income, until the beneficiary attains the age of 65.  After the age of 65 the 
benefit was indexed to the increase in the Consumer Price Index.   
 
     Recognizing that an increasing ratio of pensioners to active workers increases the 
costs of a pay-go system and is de-stabilizing, Japan introduced an ABM that 
incorporates adjustments for the factors creating this increasing ratio.  In Japan’s case, 
this increasing ratio is attributable both to a declining active work force due to below 
replacement level fertility rates and to increased life expectancy.  Thus the traditional 
adjustments, discussed in the foregoing paragraph, are modified by the rate of decline of 
active contributors.  The traditional revaluation of earnings or indexation of benefits is 
modified by subtracting a modifier from the traditional increase factor.  The modifier is 
equal to the rate of decline of active participants in social security pension schemes plus 
the yearly rate of increase in life expectancy at age 65. For completeness of description, 
should financial balance be achieved through the application of the ABM then the system 
reverts to indexation without the modifier.  An approximation for the increase in life 
expectancy is used, namely a constant adjustment of 0.3 percent per year. 
 
     This may be expressed in mathematical symbols, in respect of the EPI, as follows: 
 
Pensions in year t  
 
New pensions in year t  in respect of pensioner x     x Pk
j
  is pension payable in year k  for 
               worker x  retiring in year j   
x Pt
t





   x wi    is gross wage in year i  for 
                 worker x  
             is accrual rate   
       bt      is balancing factor in year t  
 
   75 
        







k 1 cp j 1 b j 1
j k
t 1
   k j     is the average increase in  
               disposable income of active  
               workers in j  over  year  j 1 
       x St
k   is a survival function – the  
               probability a life age x  who  
               retires in year k survives to year 
               t  
       cp j   is average increase in consumer  
                prices in year j  over j 1 
 
 
Total pensions in year t     Pt     is pensions in year t  










    ct     is contribution rate in year t  
 
 








Government subsidy (from 2009)   NCt   is number of active workers in  
                           year t  
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6.2.3   Objective of Financial Balance – Japan 
 
For Japan the contribution rate for the EPI is scheduled to increase from 2004 until it 
reaches its ultimate level of 18.3% in 2017.  Financial balance will be considered to be 
maintained provided the replacement rate is at least 50%.  The balancing mechanism will 




6.2.4   Analysis of Japan’s ABM 
 
According to projections, the application of this ABM will gradually bring the system 
into financial balance by reducing the initial replacement rate for pensioners and by 
reducing the amount of increases in pensions.  However, in order to achieve financial 
balance, the replacement rate was projected to drop to 45%.  Because it was deemed that 
50% was the ratio of the average consumption of aged couples to the average amount of 
disposable income of the active labour force, the reform imposed a minimum 
replacement rate of 50% (Sakamoto, 2005).  Accordingly, if the projections are correct, 
some further adjustments to the system will be required to achieve financial balance.  In 
assessing financial stability and making projections a 95-year time horizon is used. 
 
     Based on these projections the automatic balancing mechanism will not achieve 
financial balance at a benefit replacement rate considered adequate by the Japanese.  The 
mechanism is a manner of reducing benefits according to a defined approach, without 
political intervention, but it does not achieve financial balance.  It is anticipated that a 
review of the system resulting in revisions to contributions and/or benefits will be 
required.  But the introduction of this mechanism will postpone the time for such review 
and revisions.  Since on the Japanese own projections, the system is not likely to achieve 
financial balance, the mechanism can only be considered to achieve a transitory balance.  
It is primarily demographic factors that cause this to occur.   
 
     One problem with this mechanism is that the parameters linking the contributions and 
the benefit reductions are not closely enough associated with the objective of financial 
balance.  First, the rate of benefit modification is determined by the rate of increase 
(decrease) in income adjusted for an increase in life expectancy.  These factors are 
indicators of the financial pressures on the SSRS but they are not good measures of the 
SSRS ability to pay benefits at a level that maintains a 50% replacement rate.  The rate of 
increase (decrease) in gross income volume is a proxy for the available contributions 
increase (decrease) in the year, since contributions are a percentage of income.  The 
factor to reflect increases in life expectancy is an indication of how much longer benefits 
may be expected to be paid than was previously expected.  However, neither of these 
factors is a good measure of the contributions available (not available) to pay pension 
increases (decreases) in the year nor an indicator of the replacement rate.   The 
contributor population is projected to decline over time and the group of benefit 
recipients is projected to continue to increase until 2045, when it is projected to begin to 
decline slightly.  See the following table, based on the UN 2002 projections as supplied 
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by the ILO, that shows how the group ages 15-64, a proxy for contributors, is projected to 
decrease and the group ages 65 and over, a proxy for pensioners, is projected to increase 
until 2045.  With such significant demographic changes occurring not only to the 
numbers of contributors and pensioners but also in the rate of change in contributors and 
pensioners, as shown in Table 8, the actual decreases in contributions measured by a rate 
of gross income change with a fixed life expectancy adjustment could not be expected to 
equal the paygo cost of benefit reductions and the system could not be expected to 
achieve at least a 50% replacement rate. 
 






Rate of Change 
Ages  
15 – 64 
Age 65  
and Over 
Ages  
15 – 64 
Age 65  
and Over 
2005 84,854 25,176 n/a n/a 
2010 81,908 28,683 -.0347 .1393 
2015 77,638 33,056 -.0521 .1525 
2020 75,050 35,338 -.0333 .0690 
2025 73,209 36,070 -.0245 .0207 
2030 70,471 36,748 -.0374 .0188 
2035 66,570 37,824 -.0554 .0293 
2040 61,317 39,798 -.0789 .0522 
2045 57,187 40,474 -.0674 .0170 




6.3    Germany 
 
6.3.1  The German Public Pension System 
 
This section describes briefly the component of the German public pension system that 
applies to employees excluding civil servants and the self-employed, after the reform 
package, proposed by the Rurup Commission in 2003, was put into law in 2004.  It does 
not include a description of revised tax measures that were introduced subsequently that 
are described by Toft (2007).  These reforms are frequently referred to as the Rurup 
Reform.  The system had undergone significant change in 2001, referred to as the Riester 
Reform after the Secretary of Labour at the time.  This description is based on an article 
by Borsch-Supan et al. (2006). 
 
     The reforms have transformed a pay-go career-average defined benefit retirement 
insurance system that provided a high level of net income replacement, approximately 
70%, to a worker who had earned average lifetime earnings and participated for 45 years 
to a notional defined contribution (NDC) system look-alike.  Net replacement rate was 
based on disposable income defined as gross income net of income tax.  Approximately 
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70% of the budget of the retirement insurance system is financed by contributions 
administered like a payroll tax, levied equally on employers and employees.  The 
remaining 30% of the budget is financed by earmarked indirect taxes and a subsidy from 
the federal government.  The insurance system distinguishes five types of old-age 
pensions: normal; long service life; women; older disabled; unemployed.  Only “normal” 
does not have an earnings test, so it will be the focus of this analysis.  The “normal” 
pension is available at age 65 after 5 years of service.  Benefits are computed on a 
lifetime basis and adjusted according to the type of pension and the retirement age, as 
follows: 
Pt,i = EPi x SYi x AFi x PVt 
 
where in respect of pensioner i :  
 
itP ,  is the annual value of a pension in year t  
 
EPi are earnings points expressed as a multiple of the average annual 
contribution in each historical working year, e.g., one EP  corresponds to 
average earnings, 0.5 EP  corresponds to 50% of average earnings, two EP 
corresponds to earnings twice as large as earnings for the year 
 
SYi comprise years of active contributions plus years of credit where no 
contributions were made, e.g., in respect of military service, parent’s time 
in respect of a child’s education, etc., and notably years of unemployment 
 
AFi is an adjustment factor that is 1 for the normal old-age pension 
 
PVt represents the current pension value in year t  and is the crucial link 
between workers’ earnings and pensioners’ benefits.  It is indexed to the 
annual changes in the level of wages and salaries, net of pension 
contributions. 
 

























where tPV , 1tPV  are current pension value in year t  and year 1t  respectively 
 




 represent the assumed contribution rate to supplementary pensions in 
year 2t  and year 3t  respectively, which is gradually increased from 0.5% in 
2003 to 4%, which is the ultimate level, in 2009 and thereafter 
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2t , 3t  represent the contribution rate to social security in year 2t  and year 
3t  respectively 
 
2tPQ , 3tPQ  represent the ratio of the number of pensioners to the sum of the 
number of contributors and the unemployed in year 2t  and year 3t  
respectively 
 
 is the sustainability parameter that is set (at least for some time) at 0.25, which 
shares the burden of the adjustment between pensioners and workers 
 
 In the 1992 reform, normal retirement age was increased to age 65.  Further increases to 
normal retirement age, which are not directly linked to life expectancy, are scheduled.  
The 1992 reform also anchored benefits to net wages of social security taxes and  savings 
rather than to gross wages, which provides a stronger link between pensioners’ benefits 
and workers’ wages. 
 
     The Riester Reform changed the nature of the system by introducing a funded pension 
component.  It also introduced measures to control costs and provide for stable pension 
levels.  Contributions must remain below 20% until 2020 and below 22% until 2030 and 
the net replacement rate for pension benefits in relation to lifetime earnings must stay 
above 67% until 2030.  Net replacement rate is based on gross earnings less income tax 
and social security contributions, which effectively reduces the target replacement rate.  
To compensate for the drop in net replacement rate (from approximately 70%), a system 
of tax-assisted supplementary (funded) pensions, using a DC approach, was created. It is 
not mandatory to contribute and the uptake in participation has been slow (although the 
change is relatively recent so it is too early to make any conclusive assessment regarding 
the popularity of this reform). 
 
     The Rurup Reform introduced two significant provisions to enhance the financial 
stability of the system.  It provides for a gradual increase in the normal retirement age 
from 65 to 67 years, in monthly steps from 2011 to 2035.  It also introduced a 
sustainability factor that is a part of the mechanism that modifies pension benefits in 
relation to the system dependency ratio.   
 
     Let us consider how this mechanism works.  To begin, assume a steady state 
population and a mature system so 32 tt  and 32 tt .  In a steady state, 
population 32 tt PQPQ  so the formula reduces to PVt PVt 1
AGIt 2
AGIt 3
.  This means 
that the current pension value is adjusted by the rate of increase in average gross income 
(wages) on a lagged basis.  The lag was introduced to provide sufficient time to assemble 
the data and do the computations. 
 
     Note 222 1 tttAGI  represents average income in year 2t  net of deemed 
pension saving, i.e., both through supplementary pensions and social security.  So if the 
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contributions to pensions increase, then the increase in the value of current pensions is 
dampened, so that pensioners share some of the pain of a more costly pension system. 
 
     Note also that PQ  introduces a demographic dependency ratio of the number of 
pensioners to the number of non-pensioners, i.e., the contributors plus the unemployed.  
If this ratio increases year over year, then the ratio of 
PQt 2
PQt 3
 is greater than 1 so there is a 
reduction in the otherwise calculated increase in the current pension value, because this 







.   
 
     Note that this demographic dependency ratio is not only affected by retirement 
practices and life expectancy but also by labour force dynamics such as retirement 
practices and participation rates.  However, the full amount of this reduction is not 
applied – it is modified by a sustainability parameter .  In effect,  shares the burden of 
the adjustment between pensioners and workers.  If  were 1, then pensioners would 
bear the whole burden of the adjustment.  If  were 0, then pensioners would not bear 
any impact of a change in demographic dependency ratio.  (  is now equal to 0.25). 
 
     Whitehouse (2007a) states that the German system is unique because it adjusts the 
point value, PVt , even after the pension has commenced.  Thus the adjustment affects the 
entitlements of both current and future pensioners.  Whitehouse (2007a) has calculated 
that 3 8  of financial effects of life-expectancy changes fall on pensioners and 5 8  on 
contributors. 
 
     Legros (2006) refers to this mechanism to adjust the value of the current pension as 
the reverse spring mechanism.  If the current pension value increases by more than the 
system can support financially, then the contribution rate would have to rise in a 
subsequent year.  The consequence of a contribution increase in a subsequent year would 
be that the increase in current pension value subsequently would be moderated, i.e., if the 






tt  is less than 1 and PVt  is less than 1tPV  (all other things being equal).  
(However, contribution rates are scheduled and could only change by legislative action, 
so Legros’ description is somewhat idealistic.) 
 
 
6.3.2  Objective of Financial Balance – Germany 
 
The reform measures in Germany required that the contribution rate must remain below 
20% until 2020 and below 22% until 2030, according to a contribution increase schedule.  
They require also that the net replacement rate for pension benefits in relation to lifetime 
earnings, including the pension to be provided from an assumed maximum contribution 
each year to private pensions, must stay above 67% until 2030.  The balancing 
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mechanism will achieve financial balance if the combined replacement rate from 
pensions payable by social security and from deemed maximum contributions to provide 
pensions stays above 67% until 2030, given the contribution schedule. 
 
 
6.3.3  Analysis 
 
The German system contains some important features that will produce greater financial 
stability, as follows: 
 the gradual increase in the normal retirement age which will reduce the financial 
pressure created by increasing life expectancy 
 the method of adjusting the value of a current pension point shares the burden of 
any financial balance between workers and contributors in the following ways: 
(1) in the absence of other factors, the pension’s value would increase by the rate 
of increase in average wages, on a lagged basis, net of (deemed) pension 
contributions; hence, if the contribution rate increases then the rate of 
increase in the current pension value is dampened 
(2) by including a factor that is based on the demographic dependency ratio, the 
rate of pension value increase is dampened when the demographic 
dependency ratio is increasing, on a lagged basis; thus reducing the burden 
measured in amount of pensions as the demographic dependency ratio 
measured in numbers of participants is increasing the burden 
(3) the sustainability parameter shares the adjustment between pensioners and 
workers; at present, pensioners bear 25% of the adjustment but the 
sustainability parameter could be changed. 
 
     Are these components sufficient to create an automatic balancing mechanism?  
Raising the normal retirement age has a significant impact on financial balance; however, 
the increase in the normal retirement age is defined by a fixed schedule and is not related 
directly to life expectancy changes, so this component does not provide automatic 
balance.  Moreover, because the first scheduled increase in age is not until 2011, it was 
not included in the current legislation.  In other words, further legislative action will be 
required. 
 
     Suppose that due to increasing longevity, after the normal retirement age of 67 is in 
place, that it is not a sufficiently high age to maintain financial balance.  Would the other 
components restore financial balance automatically? 
 
     In this situation, one would expect that the demographic dependency ratio, year over 
year, would be increasing, which would reduce the amount of the increase in pensions.  
Moreover, to achieve financial stability, the contributions could be increased which in 
turn would dampen the increase in pension value.  There is no question that both these 
factors operate in the right direction towards restoring the financial balance.  However, 
there is no assurance that financial balance will be restored, for several reasons: 
 the demographic dependency ratio includes the unemployed in the numerator.  If 
the number of unemployed is increasing, the demographic dependency ratio might 
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remain unchanged but the financial position of the system would be deteriorating 
because there would be less in contributions in aggregate, due to the large number 
unemployed, and there may be increased pensions to pay because average gross 
income might continue to increase. A similar argument would apply if the 
demographic dependency ratio were stable or decreasing, year over year, but the 
proportion of the contribution base that were unemployed was increasing. 
 Any required increases in contribution rates do not occur automatically.  
Legislation would have to be passed to change the contribution rate, so this part of 
the mechanism does not work automatically. 
 The sustainability factor is a useful device for sharing the burden of financial 
imbalance between pensioners and workers; however, the sustainability parameter  
is set at 0.25 and does not adjust automatically as the financial position changes. 
 The amount of replacement ratio is not included in the application of the ABM so 
there is no assurance that the desired replacement rate will be maintained. 
 
     The German system identifies several components that are likely to affect the financial 
position and includes them in its adjustment mechanism.  However, some of the 
components are fixed and so there is no assurance that automatic financial balance will be 
achieved.  By setting a tight range for contribution rates and also setting a desired 
replacement rate, if the economy does not perform in the required manner to provide 
sufficient wage growth and adequate employment to overcome demographic change then 
the only component in the mechanism that can provide a necessary adjustment is the 
pension available from the individual savings accounts.  If the accounts have sufficiently 
high investment earnings then the target replacement rate could be achieved.  The return 
on the individual accounts is not part of the defined balancing mechanism. 
 
     Furthermore, just as for the balancing mechanisms of the Swedish and Japanese 
SSRS, rates of change in gross income and in dependency are used to determine benefit 
reductions.  To achieve financial balance in a paygo SSRS, it is necessary that the change 
in contribution income equal the change in benefit outflow.  The use of rates of change 
provides only an approximation, at best.  In countries such as Germany, Sweden and 
Japan where the number of contributors is projected to decrease for many years and the 
number of pensioners is projected to increase for many years, if such an approximation 
produces equality in any year, it is unlikely that equality would persist in subsequent 
years, i.e., the approximation is neither strong nor persistent.  The following table based 
on the UN 2002 projections supplied by the ILO, show how Germany’s population ages 
15-64, a proxy for contributors, is projected to decrease, and how the population ages 65 
and over, a proxy for pensioners, is projected to increase until 2035, after which it is 
projected to decline. 
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Table 9:  German Population Projections 
 
Year 
Population (in thousands) 
Ages 15 – 64 Age 65 and Over 
2005 55,279 15,351 
2010 54,624 16,672 
2015 54,479 17,132 
2020 53,147 18,193 
2025 51,101 19,534 
2030 48,203 21,536 
2035 45,561 23,137 
2040 44,402 23,036 
2045 43,457 22,456 
2050 42,043 22,121 
 
 
     Moreover, in the German SSRS, success of the ABM requires achievement of at least 
a 67% replacement rate.  In reviewing projections for the German system, Toft (2007) 
concludes that if all assumptions are realized the system will provide the desired 
replacement rates within the scheduled contribution rates.  However, he views the 
assumptions as optimistic and he finds it hard to find a “basis for this optimism” (Toft, 
2007).  The projections are based on a long-term nominal wage growth of almost 3 per 
cent and a rate of inflation of 1.5 percent leading to an expected 1.5 percent annual 
increase in real earnings.  Toft (2007) states that real net earnings have been stagnant and 
may even have fallen a few percentage points since 1991.  Toft (2007) also expresses 
reservations about whether contributors will contribute the maximum amount to private 
pensions, which is a necessary assumption to maintain the replacement rate.  He thinks 
this is a particularly questionable assumption for low-income earners. 
 
     Borsch-Supan et al. (2003) state that an important task of reform is to find a formula 
which is capable of providing a systematic response to the kind of unforeseeable changes 
which we must always live with in the labour market.  Although they see the 
sustainability factor as elegant, they see it as merely a way of taking a weighted average 
between placing the burden of adjustment on pensioners through benefit reductions and 
placing the burden of adjustment on contributors through increased contributions.  
Borsch-Supan et al. (2003) conclude that the burden which demographic change imposes 
on the pay-as-you-go system cannot be eliminated by reform.  Moreover, Borsch-Supan 
et al. (2006) note the governmental commission’s projections incorporate scheduled 
increases in the retirement age which were not legislated, so even those projections 
cannot be expected to be realized as the system is currently defined.   
 
 Given Toft’s (2007) and Borsch-Supan’s et al. (2003, 2006) observations, as well as the 
analysis of the changing demographics, the balancing mechanism is judged to achieve 
transitory financial balance.  It is a combination of economic and demographic factors 
that cause this to occur. Based on this author’s readings, the sustainability factor was 
carefully selected to fit the German situation and requires a great many assumptions to be 
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realized.  Its complexity may mask the benefit reductions that are likely to occur, 
particularly when assumed contributions to voluntary accounts with hypothetical earnings 
are included in calculating replacement ratios. 
 
 
6.4    Canada 
 
6.4.1  Canada Pension Plan 
 
The Canada Pension Plan (CPP) is a defined benefit earnings-related pension plan, 
currently requiring contributions from employers and their employees, and from the self-
employed of 9.9% of covered earnings, in aggregate, which is approximately equal to, 
although slightly higher than, the steady-state contribution rate, determined over a 75 
year horizon. The Canada Pension Plan Act (the “Act”) contains a provision that has 
some similarities to an ABM. Briefly, this Act provides that if the actuary has 
recommended that the contribution rate be increased, which would occur if the 
contribution rate were less than the required steady-state contribution rate, and if the 
federal finance minister, after consultation with the provincial finance ministers, is not 
able to make a recommendation, then the following changes will occur: 
 the contribution rate will increase by 50% of the increase recommended 
by the actuary; and 
 the benefits will be frozen for three years, the time until the next actuary’s 
report, by treating the cost-of-living adjustment factor as 1 so no increase 
in benefit is prescribed. 
 
     In the classification terminology adopted, this provision would be considered 
“discretionary” as opposed to “automatic”, since it requires an action not to be taken, i.e., 
the finance ministers failing to agree to an amendment.  The provision has a direct impact 
on the financial position of the CPP since it increases contributions (without increasing 
benefits because it is a defined benefit formula) and it freezes benefits, thus limiting 
liabilities and reducing the present value of the liabilities and thereby reducing the 
steady-state contribution rate.  Does it ensure financial balance? 
 
     Based on the current demographics of the plan, it would be expected to bring the plan 
into actuarial balance. The Act provides that the maximum annual increase in the 
contribution rate for each of employees and employers is 0.1%. The Chief Actuary of the 
CPP, Jean-Claude Menard, has estimated, based on current provisions and demographics, 
that the financial impact of a benefit freeze is equivalent to a contribution increase of 
0.15% of covered wages. So, for example, if the actuary’s report recommended a 0.20% 
contribution rate increase to the aggregate contribution rate from 9.9% to 10.1% and if 
the requisite ministerial agreement regarding an amendment was not achieved, then the 
balancing provision would apply. The aggregate contribution rate would increase to 
10.0% and the benefits would be frozen.  The financial impact of these actions would be 
an increase in contributions of 0.1% of covered wages plus a decrease in liabilities of 
0.15% of covered wages for a total financial impact of 0.25% of covered wages.  Since 
the required contribution increase recommended by the actuary was 0.20% of covered 
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wages, there would be a net financial gain or improvement of 0.05% of covered wages. 
The financial deficit would be more than rectified.      
 
     This is the situation based on current demographics but there is no certainty that these 
provisions would always have such an impact, for two reasons: 
 
 First, the reason that the application of the provisions overcame the financial 
imbalance in the example is because the benefit freeze had a greater value than 
the value of one-half the required contribution increase. This situation need not 
necessarily obtain. 
 
 Second, our considerations thus far regarding the CPP have been with respect to 
its financial position considering only the impact of contributions and changes to 
the value of liabilities. If the CPP were pure pay-go, this would be the complete 
analysis.  However, the CPP is accumulating an investment fund that is invested 
in markets and from which the CPP actuary anticipates an investment return in 
assessing the financial position and determining the required contribution rate.  
The system is partially funded.  It is possible the investments of the CPP 
investment fund might not achieve the rate of return assumed by the actuary for a 
number of years.  Hence, even if the balancing provisions were activated, and 
even if they should be sufficient on their own to restore balance, as in the 
example, it is possible that poor investment performance of the CPP investment 
fund might keep the CPP from ever achieving financial balance. Note that the 
balancing provisions only relate the balancing mechanisms to contributions and 
benefits and not to investment performance. 
 
      The operation of the mechanism will be analyzed in more depth in subsection 6.4.3.  
As will be discussed further, the steady-state contribution rate is defined as the minimum 
rate such that the asset-expenditure ratio is the same in the thirteenth and sixty-third years 
after the valuation date.  (These apparently odd dates occur because the valuation is in 
respect of the three-year period following the valuation date and the asset-expenditure 
ratios are compared at the tenth and sixtieth years following the end of the current 
valuation period). 
 
     In mathematical symbols, the balancing mechanism, ignoring administrative expenses, 
may be described as follows: 
 
 
 At   =  assets end of year t  
 Ci   =  contributions in year i  
 Pi   =  pensions payable in year i  
 ri   =  investment return in year i  
 A0 =  assets at inception 
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1 rj  
       St   =  those surviving to year t  


















1 rj  AERt  is asset-expenditure  
                  ratio in year t  
 
 














1 rj  
 
 
Contributions in year t    Ct   is contributions in year t  
 
Ct minimum x wt, Yt 3,500 ct
allx
 ct   is contribution rate in year t  
      w t
x  is wage rate in year t  for worker x  (treat 
             x wt 3,500 if x wt 3,500) 
      Yt    is YMPE in year t  
 
 
Pensions in year t     x Pk
j
  is pension payable in year k  for  
              worker age x  retiring in year j  
New in year t  in respect of worker x  





Yt  Yt 5
5
   nx  is number of years of credited   
           service at the maximum pension   
           level for worker x  
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payable in year t  due to retirements  x St
j   is a survival function – the probability 
prior to year t   by worker x                       a life age x  who retires in year j  
              survives to year t    










1 cpS 1     cpS   is rate credited in respect of  
               consumer price growth in year  
               S  
 




















C, a constantC such thatfor all t V,Cis theminimumcontributionratesothat
AERV 13 AERV 63
 
 
Adjustment Mechanism in year t 1 
 







and cp j 0 for j t 1,t 2,t 3 . 
 
 
6.4.2  Objective of Financial Balance – Canada 
 
For Canada, if the actuary’s report has determined that the required contribution rate over 
a 75-year horizon needs to be increased to achieve financial balance, and the Federal 
Finance Minister after consultation with the provincial finance ministers, has not 
recommended the action to be taken, then the balancing mechanism is triggered.  
Financial balance is achieved if the balancing mechanism will bring the contribution rate 
to be at least equal to the steady-state contribution rate determined by the actuary in some 
subsequent report. 
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6.4.3   Analysis of the Canadian Balancing Mechanism 
 
It is difficult to conceive of how the Canadian SSRS could ever be much out of financial 
balance given its very strong financial position and the good governance provisions it has 
adopted. For the purpose of analysis, different levels of imbalance and assumptions are 
made. 
 
     In 1997, legislated increases in the contribution rate were adopted to raise the total 
contribution rate in a number of annual steps to 9.90%.  This steady-state contribution 
rate, as it is referred to, was the appropriate rate at the time the legislated increases were 
adopted.  As at December 31, 2006, 9.90% exceeds the required steady-state contribution 
rate of 9.82% (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2007).  Moreover, the legislation provides 
that any improvements to the CPP be fully funded on an incremental basis, through an 
adjustment to the contribution rate.  A seventy-five year horizon is used in the actuarial 
report and the steady-state contribution rate requires that the asset-expenditure ratio be 
equal in the tenth year and the sixtieth year after the three-year review period covered by 
the valuation, i.e., at years thirteen and sixty-three after the valuation date. 
 
     This is not to say that the contribution rate may not change from its current level.  This 
is certainly possible.  The rate calculated is based on many assumptions.  Over a seventy-
five year horizon, there are certain to be deviations from assumptions, both positive and 
negative.  However, given that reports are prepared at least tri-annually, it is unlikely that 
there could be a significant move in the steady-state contribution rate from one report to 
the next.  Also, it is possible that the action agreed upon to adjust the contribution rate 
might be less than the amount recommended in the actuarial report, which could 
contribute to a worsening of the financial position of the plan.  Nonetheless, it is unlikely 
that the plan’s financial position would be significantly out of balance. 
 
     With this preamble, it is important to recognize that the purpose of this thesis is 
neither to assess the financial status of any country’s SSRS nor to opine on how that 
financial status could change.  Purposes of this thesis include to describe and examine the 
operation of balancing mechanisms in the SSRS of certain countries, to evaluate and 
classify those balancing mechanisms. 
 
     In the event that the Canadian SSRS was not in financial balance and the actuarial 
report recommended that the contribution rate be increased, and the finance ministers 
failed to agree on a course of action, the balancing mechanism would be triggered.  The 
balancing mechanism stipulates that the contribution rate would be increased by one half 
the recommended amount and the indexing of benefits to pensioners would be frozen for 
three years (ignoring refinements regarding the maximum increase at a time and rounding 
rules).  All other things being as assumed, if the value of the freezing of the indexing of 
benefits to pensioners for three years is less than one-half the value of the recommended 
increase, then financial balance would not be achieved within three years.  Of course, this 
process would repeat itself (if the finance ministers could still not agree on the action to 
be taken) at the time of the next actuarial review if the contribution rate were still less 
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than the recommended amount.  If the amount of the freeze of indexation of pension 
benefits for three years was still less than one half of the recommended increase in the 
contribution rate, then, all else being equal, the system would still not be in financial 
balance.  The process would be repeated at the next actuarial review, and so on. 
 
     Some would conclude that in practice the system would come back into financial 
balance.  I would not disagree with such an assessment; however, from the perspective of 
classifying this balancing mechanism, it is necessary to be rigorous.  This mechanism 
does not ensure that financial balance will be achieved. 
   
     Let us take an extreme example.  Suppose that inflation had been eliminated and that 
it were acceptable for the actuary to assume an inflation assumption of 0% for the future.  
Extrapolating from the Actuarial Report as at December 31, 2006, the adoption of such 
an assumption would mean that the steady-state contribution rate might be approximately 
10.45%.  In this scenario of no inflation, the freezing of indexation of benefits for three 
years has no value at all.  Every time the valuation is repeated, the freezing of indexation 
of benefits would have no value.  Which raises the paradoxical type of question asked by 
Zeno many centuries ago:  How can one get all the way to the required rate by only going 
one-half of the way there every three years?  We know that the sum of the series 
1 2 1 4 1 8  is equal to one in the limit, but if we stop before the limit it is less 
than one. Nonetheless over a seventy-year horizon, with an adjustment every three years 










 is 1 for all intents and purposes. 
 
     But one might think that if all else is as assumed, that the steady-state contribution rate 
would remain as a fixed target.  This is unlikely to be the case because of the way that the 
steady-state contribution rate is defined, as explained in the following subsection.   
 
 
6.4.3.1  Steady-state Contribution Rate 
 
     The steady-state contribution rate is defined (effectively) as the minimum rate such 
that the asset-expenditure ratio is the same in the thirteenth and sixty-third years after the 
valuation date.  It is highly unlikely that the asset-expenditure ratio would be constant 
throughout the seventy-five-year period or even over the period from the thirteenth year 
to the sixty-third year.  If the critical asset-expenditure ratios are not constant, then the 
steady-state contribution rate may change, from valuation to valuation, even though all 
else is as assumed. 
 
     Selected asset-expenditure ratios, as presented in the actuarial report at December 31, 
2003 are shown in the following table to provide a clearer appreciation of how these 
ratios vary by year (Office of the Chief Actuary, 2007).  The years 2025 to 2033 are 
shown because this is a period of relative stability, even though the paygo rate exceeds 
the steady-state contribution rate, due to the expected income from investments.  Between 
2050 and 2060 the paygo rate exceeds the steady-state contribution rate sufficiently that 
 
   90 
the asset-expenditure ratio begins to decline.  It is not apparent that the asset-expenditure 
ratios are equal in 2016 and 2066, but differences are due to rounding. 
 
Table 10:  Selected Asset-Expenditure Ratios Canada Pension Plan 






Based on 9.8% Rate 
PayGo 
Rate 
2004 3.08 8.27 
2013 4.75 8.97 
2014 4.87 9.04 
2015 4.99 9.13 
2016 5.09 9.22 
2017 5.19 9.31 
2025 5.53 10.42 
2029 5.53 10.84 
2033 5.53 11.03 
2040 5.60 11.07 
2050 5.62 11.29 
2060 5.46 11.52 
2075 5.38 11.32 
 
 
     Moreover, the likelihood that all assumptions will be realized is small.  In this regard, 
the steady-state contribution rate moves in odd ways.  Consider what happens to the 
steady-state contribution rate when the investment returns are better than assumed, all 
else being equal.  In such a situation, the asset-expenditure ratio at the thirteenth year will 
be higher than expected, which may require the steady-state contribution rate to increase, 
in order for the asset-expenditure ratios after the thirteenth and sixty-third years to be 
equal.  Conversely, when investment returns are less than expected, all else being equal, 
the asset-expenditure ratio at the thirteenth year will be less than expected.  This may 
require that the steady-state contribution rate be decreased so that the asset-expenditure 
ratios after the thirteenth and sixty-third years will be the same.  This is not logical. 
 
     Because of the various manners in which the steady-state contribution rate is 
determined, it is worthy of further examination.  In our analysis let us assume that the 
return on assets and the rate of inflation are both non-negative.   
 
     First, note that in a paygo equilibrium scenario, the typical starting point for OLG 
analysis, the constant contribution rate k  is determined by the following ratio. 
Pension Payments in the Year 
Taxable Wages in the Year 
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Without any initial assets, if the steady-state rate is set equal to the paygo rate k , then the 
asset-expenditure ratio in years thirteen and sixty-three will be equal and will be equal to 
zero. 
 
     Next, note that in a growing population scenario where the annual taxable wage base 
grows faster than annual pension payments, if there were no initial assets, then there is no 
steady-state contribution rate.  This may be demonstrated by defining the paygo rate in 
year t by kt, as follows: 
 
Pension Paymentst  
Taxable Wagest  
 
 
In an expanding population, kt kt 1 for all t .  If the steady-state rate, ssr  were chosen to 
be greater than or equal to kt  then there would be increasing excesses of ssr kt  for all 
t  greater than the initial t  and, in the absence of negative investment returns, the asset-
expenditure ratio in year thirteen would not equal the asset-expenditure ratio in year 
sixty-three. 
 
If in this scenario the initial assets were greater than zero, it might be possible to find a 
ssr  that is less than kt  such that the asset-expenditure ratios in year thirteen and year 
sixty-three were equal.  This is possible because the steady-state rate could be less than 
the paygo rate initially because the available assets could be used to supplement the 
contributions in order to pay the pension payments.  On the right set of assumptions, the 
asset-expenditure ratios at years thirteen and sixty-three might be equal.  In a growing 
population scenario, it is uncertain how long this delicate equality between asset-
expenditure ratios in the thirteenth and sixty-third years after the valuation could be 
maintained.  Certainly it could not be maintained once assets at the valuation date were 
zero. 
 
     Finally, consider an aging population scenario.  In this scenario kt kt 1 for all t .  In 
the absence of any initial assets, it is possible to find ssr kt such that, on certain 
assumptions, the asset-expenditure ratio in year thirteen will equal the asset-expenditure 
ratio in year sixty-three.  In other words, in an aging population scenario choose a 
contribution rate higher than the paygo rate.  This will permit the development of a fund 
of assets that can be used to mitigate the impact of increasing paygo rates, which will 
occur in an aging population scenario. 
 
     This analysis provides some interesting considerations.  First, the Canada Pension 
Plan is expected to face an aging population scenario indefinitely into the future, so 
although this methodology is not universally applicable, it is suitable for the situation 
likely to be encountered.  Second, in an aging population scenario, this methodology 
requires the steady-state rate to be higher than the paygo rate.  In 1997, Canada took the 
necessary legislative action to increase the contribution rate above the paygo rate.  If the 
other countries, Sweden, Japan and Germany, were to take action to raise their 
contribution rates above the paygo rate they would provide an additional margin to help 
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in stabilizing their systems.  Having a margin or pool of assets that can be invested, 
provides an additional dimension with which to attempt to achieve balance.  However, 
there are two marked differences between Canada and the other countries.  First, Canada 
acted at an earlier stage before its senior dependency ratios were as severe as the other 
countries.  See Table 11. 
 














Canada 4,229,882 22,202,220 0.1905 
Germany 15,350,900 55,279,490 0.2777 
Japan 25,175,600 84,853,990 0.2967 
Sweden 1,576,408 5,825,291 0.2715 
 
 
Second, the replacement ratio from the Canadian system is far less than from any of the 
other three countries (Whitehouse, 2007a), so the level to which the contribution rate 
needed to be raised was far lower on an absolute basis, in Canada than any of the other 
countries.  As it currently stands, Canada has taken the action required, yet its 
contribution rate is lower than any of the other countries.  Finally, while there does not 
seem to be any actuarial principle behind why the asset-expenditure ratios in years 
thirteen and sixty-three should be compared, and should be equal; however, by 
performing such a calculation there is a greater tension or alignment between the near and 
distant future, over a seventy-five year horizon.  This means that this approach is more 
likely to bring financial stability over a seventy-five year horizon, than is the type of 




6.4.3.2  Conclusion with Respect to Financial Balance 
 
     In view of the potential for the steady-state contribution rate to move in an uncertain 
manner, the rigorous definition of balance will be maintained in this thesis, even though 
in practice it is likely that balance would be achieved.  Therefore, with respect to 
financial balance, the provisions of the CPP will be classified as partial.  Because the 
steady-state contribution rate equates asset-expenditure ratios at two future points, it is a 
combination of economic and demographic factors that would cause the mechanism not 
to be robust. 
 
     It would be a simple matter to redefine the balancing mechanism so that financial 
balance would be achieved.  For example, in the event that the finance ministers could 
not agree on the action to be taken when the actuarial report recommended an increase in 
the contribution rate, the balancing mechanism might be defined as follows: 
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 If the value of the freeze in indexing for three years is greater than one half the 
recommended increase in the contribution rate, then impose a proportionate freeze 
on indexing for three years such that it has a value equal to one half the 
recommended increase in the contribution rate and increase the contribution rate 
by one half the recommended amount; 
 If the value of the freeze in indexing for three years is less than one half the 
recommended increase in the contribution rate, then freeze the indexing for three 
years and increase the contribution rate by the difference between the 
recommended contribution rate and the value of the freeze in indexing for three 
years expressed as a contribution rate. 
 
     Such a rule would be robust, with respect to financial balance.  In Chapter 6 this rule 
will be examined with respect to equitable balance and a modification proposed that 
would still be considered robust with respect to financial balance but which would also be 
considered robust with respect to equitable balance, within certain ranges. 
 
 
6.5   Stochastic Control Revisited 
 
In section 3.2 it is stated that a stochastic optimal control approach could be used to 
maintain financial balance in an SSRS; however, because SSRS are highly complex 
systems, complex control laws would be required.  Now that the stochastic dynamics of 
the various countries’ SSRS have been described, it is possible to elaborate on this point, 
with an illustration using the Canadian system. 
 
     For CPP, many assumptions and calculations are required in order to determine if 
there is a loss; however, the outcome of the calculations could be represented rather 
simply by an indicator function, such that: 
 
I





The controls are an adjustment to contributions and benefits in such a way that the 
steady-state rate will exceed the contribution rate. In any given year, the contribution rate 
has been determined so it may be considered fixed, but the steady-state contribution rate 
is a complex random variable. The steady-state contribution rate is (effectively) the 
lowest rate such that the asset-expenditure ratio in the thirteenth and sixty-third years 
after the valuation date are equal.  Expenditures will be driven by demographic, 
economic and program factors, such as those described in section 3.1.  Assets will be 
affected by the contribution rates, expenditures, and the investment policy.  The control 
law in Canada, in the default situation, adjusts contributions and benefits, both of which 
will affect the asset-expenditure ratios. However, to do the necessary calculations 
requires projections of many variables over at least a sixty-three year period and many 
assumptions to do those projections. 
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     It is not surprising that the ABM in the four countries do not try to solve a stochastic 
control problem directly.  What is surprising though, is the choice of controls selected by 
the systems.  For example, in both Sweden and Japan a requirement should be that any 
adjustments maintain pensions above the minimum benefit.  Since this is a requirement 
one would expect it to be incorporated in the controls.  But that is not the case. 
 
 
6.6   Important Characteristics to Achieve Financial Balance 
 
The review of the four countries’ SSRS provides some important conclusions about the 
characteristics of mechanisms if they are to attain financial balance under changing 
demographics. 
 
     In a paygo system, to maintain financial balance, contribution income must equal 
benefit outflow, and so change in contribution income must equal change in benefit 
outflow.  None of the mechanisms reviewed have a direct link between contribution 
income and benefit outflow. 
 
     The factors affecting the contribution income are the gross income, subject to 
contributions, of the contributory group and the contribution rate.  The factors affecting 
the benefit outflow are the benefit payments to each pensioner and the number of 
pensioners.  Writing this relationship in the form of an equation, to show the change 
between year t  and t 1 year , and rearranging produces an informative result. 
 
income AIt 1NCt 1 AItNCt  
 
outflow APt 1NPt 1 APtNPt  
 










where AIk  represents average contributory income per contributor in year k  
 
 NCk  represents number of contributors in year k  
 
 APk  represents average pension per pensioner in year k  
 
 NPk  represents number of pensioners in year k  
 
     The last equation shows that the rate of change in gross contributory income from t  to 
t 1 minus 1, is equal to the ratio of the pension outflow to the contribution income in 
year t multiplied by the rate of change in pension outflow from t  to t 1 minus 1. 
 
     The Japanese and German adjustment mechanisms come close to incorporating these 
components, but do not include them completely.  The Japanese mechanism adjusts 
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pensions based on a proxy for the change in the contribution volume but the mechanism 
does not have a component that represents the ratio of the pension outflow in year t  to 
the contribution volume in year t .  The German mechanism adjusts pensions based on a 
proxy for the change in contribution volume and for the change in the number of 
pensioners to the total potential contributory group, i.e., both contributors and the 
unemployed.  However, this latter adjustment is with respect to numbers and not to dollar 
flows.  If the pensions per capita and the income per capita were constant, the two ratios 
would be equivalent; however, neither pensions per capita nor income per capita are 
constants.  Furthermore, the German system adjusts the demographic ratio by a 
sustainability parameter, currently 25%, which moves the balance further away from 
equivalence. Finally, for reasons of administration, the German system uses ratios based 
on lagged data. 
 
     A further technical point is that the adjustment rates may be calculated by addition 
rather than by multiplication, viz., the application of the Japanese mechanism.  For 
relatively small adjustments that are close to 1, which most of these adjustments are, 
these two methods are approximately the same; however, it is worth noting that this is 
only an approximate mathematical relationship.  Similarly, the Swedish mechanism only 
makes an approximate adjustment.  It multiplies the rates by the adjustment factor rather 
than multiplying the accounts or the pensions by the adjustment factor.  For example, if 
the rate of real wage growth is 0.016, the rate of inflation is 0.025 and the adjustment 
factor is 0.99, to achieve balance, the adjustments should be 0.99 (1 + 0.016 + 0.025) = 
1.03059 to the accounts and 0.99 (1 + 0.025) = 1.01475 to the pensions. The actual 
adjustment would be 1 + 0.99 (0.016 + 0.025) = 1.04059 and 1+ 0.99 (0.025) = 1.02475 
respectively, so the resulting liabilities are higher than they should be if the adjustment 
had been applied correctly.  Once again, for relatively small adjustments that are close to 
1, which most of these adjustments are expected to be, the two methods are 
approximately equal.  However, over successive periods of adjustment, there is a 
compounding effect that could become significant.  
 
     In a partially funded SSRS, the pension payments may be met by contribution income 
and by drawing on assets.  The amount drawn from assets could be a portion or all of the 
investment income or some portion of the assets when investment income, along with 
contribution income, is insufficient to pay pensions.  The equation for balance may be 
written as follows, in respect of the year t . 
 
Income  = AIt NCt kt At   where kt  represents the draw-down rate in year t  
     and At  represents the assets in year t  
Outflow  = APt NPt  
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     The foregoing equation may be interpreted as: the product of the inverse of the 
replacement rate and the inverse of the senior dependency ratio is equal to 1 minus the 
draw-down rate multiplied by the asset-expenditure ratio.  Let us examine these 
relationships. 
 
     If the asset-expenditure ratio is constant and the draw-down rate is constant then the 
replacement rate must be adjusted as the dependency rate changes, i.e., if the dependency 
rate is increasing, benefits must be reduced. 
 
     Alternatively, if benefits are not to be reduced and the dependency rate is increasing 
then 1 kt AERt  would be declining, which implies kt AERt  is increasing.  This term may 
be increasing because the draw-down rate is increased or because the ratio of assets to 
expenditures is increasing or both.  If the asset-expenditure ratio is constant then the 



















and we have an expression for the draw-down rate in terms of the dependency ratio. 
 
 
6.7  Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter the stabilizing mechanisms of the four countries were described.  For each 
country their objective of financial balance was determined.  Using financial analysis 
performed by actuaries, economists and governmental agencies, the countries’ ABM 
were analyzed. 
 
     A significant problem with the manner of calculating assets in the Swedish 
determination of financial balance was identified.  This is an important contribution of 
this thesis.  The magnitude of the error was quantified and a suggestion made on how to 
correct the definition of assets. 
 
     None of the SSRS of Sweden, Japan or Germany was considered to even achieve 
partial financial balance.   The Canadian system is in a strong financial and governance 
position so it is unlikely to encounter financial difficulty.  Nonetheless it was concluded 
that the balance achieved by applying the mechanism would only be considered partial. 
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     Subsection 6.4.3.1 analyzed the unusual features of the calculation of the steady-state 
contribution rate in the Canadian SSRS and explained why it was easier for Canada to 
adopt such a mechanism than it would be for the other three countries to try to adopt it.  
Although the mechanism has limited application and does not appear to rely on any 
specific actuarial principle, it does create a tension between financial ratios in the near 
and distant future, which does provide greater financial stability over a seventy-five year 
horizon, in an aging population scenario.  This is a contribution of this thesis. 
 
     Section 6.5 expanded on the observations in section 3.2 regarding the complexity of 
setting up and solving a stochastic control problem for an SSRS, because of the 
complexity of SSRS.  It used Canada as an illustration.  Section 6.6 discussed some 
important characteristics to maintain financial balance.      
 
   98 




7.0   Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter the definition of equity described in Chapter 5 is applied to each of the 
four countries’ balancing mechanisms.  Numerical results are presented.  Using Canada 
as an example, calculations are performed to show how various rules could be tested.  
The mechanism used by Sweden is found to provide partial equitable balance, because 
the burden of adjustment is borne by both contributors and pensioners.  Even though in 
Canada the burden is borne by both these groups, the share borne by pensioners is 
considered inequitable.  The equitable balance of the mechanisms in Germany and Japan 
is considered to be transitory. 
 
 
7.1   Background 
 
In this chapter, the results of calculations are presented to assess whether the balancing 
mechanisms of the four countries can be expected to achieve equitable balance, using the 
measure of equitable balance described in Chapter 5.  This measure is repeated here for 
ease of reading.  The following quantity is calculated using the discount rates in Table 12. 
 
Present Value of Pension 
Accumulated Value of Contributions to 65 
 
This quantity is calculated both after-change and before-change and the ratio of after-
change to before-change is then calculated.  If this ratio is not more than 5% different in 
one year (i.e., is greater than .95) and is not more than 10% different in any five-year 
period (i.e., is greater than .90), then the adjustment will be considered equitable. 
 
Table 12:  Personal Discount Rates Repeated 
 
             Discount Rate 
Period 
(current age x) 




   
65 – x > 30 4% 4% 
30 ≥ 65 – x > 20 3% 3% 
20 ≥ 65 – x > 10 2% 3% 
10 ≥ 65 – x > 0 1% 3% 
  0 ≥ 65 – x 0% 3% 
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     Before performing any calculations it is necessary to examine the nature of the 
adjustment mechanisms in the four countries.  In Japan, the contribution rates are set so 
all of the adjustment affects the benefit rates.  With such an approach equity can only be 
achieved if the adjustments are sufficiently gradual.  Since the adjustments are driven by 
a demographic ratio 
NCt
NCt 1
1 (plus a life expectancy adjustment), the analysis examines 
how close the demographic ratio is to failing to preserve equity (i.e., a ratio of after-
change to before-change less than .95). 
 
     For Germany, similar types of calculations are performed.  Although, commentators 
(for example, Legros, 2006) suggest that Germany could change the contribution rates, 
the contribution rates are set and may only be changed by the German legislature.  
Accordingly, the analysis of Germany examines how close the demographic ratio and the 
ratio of change in gross income is to the .95 measure, at which point equity would not be 
achieved. 
 
     The analysis of Sweden is more complicated than for Japan and Germany.  As with 
those countries, the contribution rate in Sweden is fixed, but in Sweden, there are two 
types of adjustments.  The first is an ongoing increase in the age of full benefit 
entitlement to reflect life expectancy improvements.  The second is a reduction in the 
increases in benefits and a reduction in the rate credited to accounts, when the system’s 
liabilities exceed its assets, as Sweden defines those terms.  The first adjustment is borne 
fully by those not yet retired.  The present value of pension remains approximately the 
same but the accumulated value of contributions to receive such a pension is increased.  
In terms of the equity measure, because the accumulated value of contributions to 65 is 
used, it remains unchanged but the present value of pensions decreases, due to the delay 
in age for full benefit entitlement.  The second adjustment is borne primarily by the 
pensioners.  Their accumulated contributions remain unchanged but their pensions, and 
therefore the present value of their pensions, is not increased as much as anticipated.  The 
calculations examine how gradual the adjustments to the benefit rates are likely to be. 
 
     For Canada, the situation is quite different from the other three countries.   The 
adjustment involves both contribution rate increases and benefit freezes.  This provides a 
good basis to compare how the burden of adjustment is shared between individuals of 
different ages and between contributors and pensioners.  Section 6.3 provides a good 
illustration of the application of the approach to determining equity. 
 
 
7.1.1  Data and Assumptions 
 
Because of gaps in the available data, there are limits to the extent to which the 
calculations can be performed, especially for Sweden, Japan and Germany.  Accordingly, 
the calculations identify conditions in which equitable balance would not exist. 
 
     The population data used has been extracted from the UN 2002 projections, as 
supplied by the ILO, using the constant fertility variant projection.  It includes population 
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projections by country at five-year intervals from 2005 to 2050.  It is presented in 
summary form, so, for example, the projected population is shown in certain age groups 
such as population below age 15, population aged 15-64, population aged 65 or over.  
Using this data and assuming that normal retirement age, but not the age of full benefit 
entitlement, will be age 65 and that the age group 15-64 is a proxy for the working age 
population, an indication of the demographic pressures projected to be experienced by the 
four countries’ systems can be modeled. 
 
     Where economic assumptions are required, the assumptions underpinning the Swedish 
SSRS are used, i.e., expected annual real wage growth per capita of 1.6 percent and an 
average annual inflation rate of 2 .5 percent (Settergren, 2003). 
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Table 13:  Sweden Population Profile 
 
SWEDEN 
CONSTANT FERTILITY VARIANT PROJECTION  (population in thousands) 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
           
Total population 8870.987 8857.510 8836.992 8813.714 8760.226 8651.354 8489.467 8296.446 8093.141 7888.250 
Male population 4395.021 4393.364 4386.148 4374.069 4342.763 4281.232 4193.567 4092.923 3989.730 3886.794 
Female population 4475.966 4464.146 4450.844 4439.645 4417.463 4370.122 4295.900 4203.523 4103.411 4001.456 
Sex ratio  
(per 100 females) 
    98.192     98.144     98.546     98.523     98.309     97.966     97.618     97.369     97.230     97.134 
Median age (years)     41.092     42.625     44.086     45.277     45.958     46.603     46.607     48.860     50.225     50.619 
Age distribution           
Population  
below 15 
1489.288 1308.460 1266.707 1253.705 1247.626 1209.773 1135.103 1057.389 1006.625   981.092 
Population  
aged 15 – 64 
5805.291 5825.747 5646.169 5508.892 5354.351 5167.290 4979.603 4822.525 4700.96 4554.658 
Population 
aged 60 or over 
2136.331 2347.784 2486.538 2613.052 2755.18 2882.694 2943.180 2918.719 2883.637 2922.886 
Population  
aged 65 or over 
1576.408 1723.303 1924.116 2051.117 2158.249 2274.291 2374.761 2416.532 2385.556 2352.500 
Population  
aged 80 or over 





Table 14: Japan Population Profile 
 
JAPAN 
CONSTANT FERTILITY VARIANT PROJECTION  (population in thousands) 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
           
Total population 128221.3 128548 127755.6 125952.3 123412.9 120406.5 117058.9 113350.6 109276.5 104842.7 
Male population 62623.34 62606.14 61997.63 60865.26 59379.38 57692.93 55881.43 53951.39 51922.25 49814.54 
Female population 65597.96 65941.89 65757.95 65087.02 64033.5 62713.53 61177.45 59399.19 57354.25 55028.12 
Sex ratio  
(per 100 females) 
      95 94.941         94.282 93.514     92.732 91.994     91.343 90.828     90.529     90.526     
Median age (years)      42.8  44.294         46.069 48.092     50.194 51.829 53.159     54.151     54.782     55.147 
Age distribution           
Population  
below 15 
18191.71 17957.11 17061.82 15564.21 14133.75 13187.37 12665.75 12235.5 11615.44 10801.39 
Population  
aged 15 – 64 
84853.99 81907.64 77637.54 75049.85 73209.09 70470.85 66569.56 61316.71 57187.38 53964.43 
Population  
aged 60 or over 
33636.35 38658.32 41505.57 42702.43 43761.83 45122.17 47314.18 48099.74 47805.97 46544.46 
Population  
aged 65 or over 
25175.6 28683.29 33056.22 35338.22 36070.04 36748.24 37823.58 39798.36 40473.67 40076.84 
Population  
aged 80 or over 
 6136.541 7675.563 9847.012  11426.13 13168.29 15603.27 16485.18 16350.9 15452.9 17053.42 
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Table 15:  Germany Population Profile 
 
GERMANY 
CONSTANT FERTILITY VARIANT PROJECTION  (population in thousands) 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
           
Total population 82496.43 82407.57 82113.57 81559.83 80659.43 79442.89 77967.39 76286.06 74438.53 72459.42 
Male population 40327.02 40282.34 40082.84 39750.52 39217.58 38512.78 37674.39 36728.07 35698.5 34631.8 
Female population 42169.41 42125.23 42028.74 41809.32 41441.85 40930.11 40293 39558 38740.03 37827.62 
Sex ratio  
(per 100 females) 
95.631 95.625 95.375 95.076 94.633 94.094 93.501 92.846 92.149 91.552 
Median age 
(years) 
41.988 44.036 45.944 47.039 47.586 48.099 48.847 49.691 50.191 50.527 
Age distribution           
Population  
below 15 
11866.04 11111.33 10503.29 10220.23 10025.08 9704.078 9269.509 8848.254 8525.712 8295 
Population  
aged 15 – 64 
55279.49 54623.78 54478.53 53146.9 51100.78 48202.85 45561.17 44402.15 43456.66 42043.31 
Population  
aged 60 or over 
20563.78 21195.9 22503.32 24099.88 26323.25 28109.27 28136.34 27670.95 27431.4 27323.42 
Population  
aged 65 or over 
15350.90 13372.46 17131.75 18192.71 19533.58 21535.96 23136.71 23035.66 22456.15 22121.11 
Population  
aged 80 or over 





Table 16: Canada Population Profile 
 
CANADA 
CONSTANT FERTILITY VARIANT PROJECTION  (population in thousands) 
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
           
Total population 32059.24 33280.36 34443.36 35516.91 36449.63 37198.23 37732.79 38082.72 38294.36 38418.16 
Male population 15871.96 16477.52 17046.28 17560.3 17992.57 18323.37 18544.97 18680.7 18760.18 18810.36 
Female population 16187.28 16802.84 17397.08 17956.61 18457.06 18874.86 19187.81 19402.02 19534.18 19607.8 
Sex ratio  
(per 100 females) 
95.052       98.064 97.984 97.793 97.483 97.078 96.65 96.282 96.038 95.933 
Median age (years)   38.836     40.353 41.555 42.609 43.593 44.537 45.418 46.201 46.565 46.681 
Age distribution           
Population  
below 15 
5627.14 5364.371 5364.496 5430.214 5471.279 5438.48 5356.291 5290.927 5276.479 5292.21 
Population  
aged 15 – 64 
22202.22 23163.63 23468.67 23495.91 23267.49 22985.03 23039.31 23146.84 23167.88 23076.18 
Population  
aged 60 or over 
5762.204 6734.287 7848.716 9126.587 10377.06 11136.47 11634.77 11994.89 12293.63 12570.04 
Population 
 aged 65 or over 
4229.882 4752.353 5610.198 6590.792 7710.855 8774.722 9337.185 9644.954 9850.007 10049.77 
Population  
aged 80 or over 
1115.955   1283.223 1414.872 1537.512 1784.766 2236.718 2712.823 3214.917 3630.689 3714.087 
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7.2     Sweden 
 
Since Sweden has a NDC SSRS, a starting point is to check if the demographics and the 
fixed contribution rate can be reasonably expected to sustain the benefit rate.  The cost of 
the benefits will vary depending on the length of participation, contributory history and 
service.  The following table shows the expected real accumulation per unit of starting 
salary at age 65, assuming a continuous contributory period from different 
commencement ages.  This accumulation can then be converted to an annuity using the 
annuity factors shown in Chapter 1, that vary by birth cohort attaining age 65 (Settergren, 
2003). 
 
Table 17: Accumulations at Age 65 
 
    Age of Commencement of    
Continuous Contributory Service 
Real Accumulation at Age 65  









     Converting these real accumulations using the annuity factors and dividing by the 
projected real salary at age 65 provides the following replacement rates (assuming the 
NDC had been in effect for a whole career for a person retiring in the year shown). 
 
Table 18:  Sweden Replacement Rates at Age 65 
 
Replacement Rates at Age 65 













      
2005 .5096 .4586 .4076 .3567 .3057 
2010 .4969 .4472 .3975 .3478 .2981 
2015 .4878 .4390 .3902 .3415 .2927 
2020 .4790 .4311 .3832 .3353 .2874 
2025 .4706 .4235 .3765 .3294 .2824 
2030 .4651 .4186 .3721 .3256 .2791 
2035 .4598 .4138 .3678 .3218 .2759 
2040 .4520 .4068 .3616 .3164 .2712 
2045 .4469 .4022 .3575 .3128 .2682 
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     From the table it can be seen that the projected replacement rates decline by year of 
reaching age 65 for all ages of commencement of contributory service.  This occurs by 
design.  Sweden’s SSRS plans to raise the age of full benefit entitlement, according to a 
set schedule, to adjust, at least partially, for increasing life expectancy; accordingly, the 
projected replacement rates at age 65, (which is no longer the age of full benefit 
entitlement), continue to fall.  The replacement rates are also lower by increasing age of 
commencement of continuous service, regardless of year of attainment of age 65.  The 
explanation relates to the defined contribution nature of the plan.  The later one 
commences the period of contributory service, the lower the projected accumulation at 
age 65 and the lower the replacement rate. 
 
     These replacement rates were applied to the demographic projections to show what 
the required contribution rate would be, if the system were pure paygo, i.e., no buffer or 
reserve funds were available.  If the contribution rate exceeds .1600 then the replacement 
rate is not sustainable by the current contribution formula, and the ABM would need to 
be applied. 
 
Table 19:  Sweden Paygo Contribution Rate 
 


























15 .1384 .1495 .1700 .1829 .1946 .2093 .2236 .2317 .2319 .2336 
20 .1245 .1346 .1530 .1646 .1751 .1883 .2012 .2085 .2087 .2103 
25 .1107 .1196 .1360 .1463 .1557 .1674 .1788 .1854 .1855 .1869 
30 .0969 .1047 .1190 .1280 .1362 .1465 .1565 .1622 .1624 .1635 
35 .0830 .0897 .1020 .1097 .1168 .1256 .1341 .1390 .1392 .1402 
 
     From the table it can be seen that regardless of the age of commencement of 
contributory service, the required contribution rate is below .1600 through 2010.  Further, 
the higher the assumed age of commencement of contributory service, the longer the 
required contribution rate is below .1600.  From the population data, it is not possible to 
do a weighted blend of commencement ages; although, in any population one would 
expect there to be many different commencement ages.  However, these calculations are 
sufficient to establish that the contribution rate has been set at an adequate level, when 
combined with the scheduled increases in age of full benefit entitlement, to be sustainable 
for a number of years, without triggering the ABM, should the economic assumptions 
underlying the program be realized.  Consequently, should the ABM be triggered sooner, 
it will likely be due to the economic assumptions not being realized. 
 
     Should the ratio of system assets to liabilities fall below one, the ABM would be 
triggered.  However, the expected changes to the crediting rate for pensioners are likely 
to be small.  Consequently, the measure of equitable balance described in Chapter 5 
 
   105 
would be met.  On this analysis, the Swedish ABM could be considered equitable.  This 
analysis will be considered further in section 7.6. 
 
     In preparation for the analysis in section 7.6, it is important to recognize that on the 
equity measure described in section 5.3, the ratio for a non-pensioner remains constant, 
even though the ABM is applied.  This occurs because the pension is ultimately based on 
the accumulated balance using the set annuity divisor.  When the ABM is applied, the 
rate credited to accounts is adjusted producing a lower accumulation and a lower pension; 
however, because the equity measure is a ratio of the value of pension to an 
accumulation, this ratio remains constant. 
 
     The same relationship does not hold for retirees, whose pensions are reduced by the 
application of the ABM but whose accumulated contributions remain unchanged.  Hence, 
using this equity measure, all the adjustment is experienced by pensioners. 
 
     In assessing the relative shares of adjustment borne by contributors and pensioners 
due to the adjustment of the age of full benefit entitlement and the application of the 
ABM, the adjustment of the age of full benefit entitlement appears to have the greater 
impact.  The adjustment to the age of full benefit entitlement is a response to 




7.3    Japan 
 
Japan’s SSRS has a fixed schedule of contribution rates, so any adjustments required to 
maintain financial balance are borne by pensioners through an adjustment to their benefit 
indexation.  The adjustment is calculated based on the rate of annual increase (decrease) 
in the total wage volume and a set adjustment of .3 percent in respect of increasing life 
expectancy.  The rate of annual increase (decrease) in the total wage volume can be 
decomposed into the product of the rate of annual increase (decrease) in the average wage 
per covered worker multiplied by the rate of annual increase (decrease) in the number of 
covered workers (Sakamoto, 2008).  Throughout the projection period from 2005-2050, 
the number of covered workers declines monotonically.   The rate of decline from one 
five-year date to the next is shown in the following table.  Also shown is the rate of 
decline with the life expectancy adjustment.  It will be noted that these rates of decline 
exceed 5%, i.e., the adjustment factor is less than .9500 in one-half of the periods, and all 
periods from 2035 on. 
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Covered Workers and Life Expectancy Adjustment 
 
Ratio of Covered 
Workers 
Ratio of Covered Workers 
Less Life Expectancy 
Adjustment 
2010 .9653 .9623 
2015 .9479 .9449 
2020 .9667 .9637 
2025 .9755 .9725 
2030 .9626 .9596 
2035 .9446 .9416 
2040 .9211 .9181 
2045 .9327 .9297 
2050 .9436 .9406 
 
 
     In assessing equity using the measure described in Chapter 5, if the decrease is more 
than 5%, i.e., the adjustment factor is less than .9500, then the adjustment might be 
considered inequitable.  The adjustments in the last column of the table above need to be 
further adjusted by the average change in salary per covered worker.  Although it is 
possible that this change will be sufficiently positive that the total adjustment factor 
would never be less than .9500, it does also seem possible that this would not always be 
the case and that the total adjustment factor might be less than .9500.  The Japanese 
economy and its workers have experienced very low inflation and very low salary growth 
rates for at least 15 years.  What will transpire in the future is a matter of speculation.  
Whether low rates will continue or whether there will be higher rates of wage growth as 
the covered worker group declines is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Nonetheless, the 
adjustments required by the Japanese SSRS due to declining numbers of covered workers 
and increasing life expectancy may result in inequitable adjustments. The equitable 
balance achieved by this mechanism is considered transitory, due to the combination of 
demographic and economic factors. 
 
 
7.4   Germany 
 
In Germany, the contribution schedule is fixed, so any adjustments to rectify financial 
imbalances are made to pensioners’ benefits.  The formula for adjustments in year t, 
involves two ratios that will be considered in this section.  One is a ratio of pensioners to 
covered people (including the unemployed), in year t - 2 to year t - 3, multiplied by a 
sustainability parameter, which is currently set at .25.  The other is approximated by the 
ratio of the annual rate of change in gross income of year t - 2 to year t - 3.  The 
following table shows the change in senior dependency ratio from one five-year period to 
the next.  Given that the first ratio includes the unemployed in covered persons, the senior 
dependency ratio is a relatively good proxy for the ratio under consideration, since in the 
German system the unemployed are included in the denominator of the dependency ratio.  
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The last column shows the approximate ratio of the change in gross income required in 
combination with the change in the senior dependency ratio to obtain an overall 
adjustment factor of .9500, i.e., a 5% adjustment.  
 
Table 21:  Germany Demographic and Wage Adjustments 
 







Ratio of Seniors 
Dependent Ratio t to 
Seniors Dependent 
Ratio t - 5 
(3) 
Required Ratio of Change 
in Gross Income When 
Multiplied by Column (2) 
Gives .9500 
2010 .9752 .9741 
2015 .9924 .9572 
2020 .9779 .9715 
2025 .9708 .9785 
2030 .9578 .9919 
2035 .9658 .9836 
2040 .9946 .9552 
2045 1.0010 .9491 
2050 .9955 .9543 
 
 
From the table, if we look at 2030, it would only take a very slight decline in lagged ratio 
of gross income when combined with a change in the senior dependency ratio, similar to 
what is shown, to create an adjustment to pensions of more than 5%.  Using the equity 
measure described in Chapter 5, this would be considered inequitable.  Hence, the 
adjustment mechanism in the German SSRS has the potential to be considered 
inequitable and will only be considered to achieve transitory equitable balance, due to the 
combination of demographic and economic factors. 
 
 
7.5   Canada 
 
In Canada, if the finance ministers could not agree on a course of action, after an actuarial 
valuation indicated action was required to restore financial balance, both the contribution 
rate and the rate of indexation of pensions would be adjusted.  The extent to which the 
burden is shared between contributors and pensioners would depend on the demographics 
at the time of the required adjustment.  As noted in Chapter 6, based on current 
demographics, the burden is borne more heavily by pensioners than by contributors.  
Given that the number of pensioners is only a small fraction of the number of 
contributors, the burden per pensioner is more significant than the burden per contributor.  
However, the CPP is on a sound financial basis now so a comparison based on the burden 
per pensioner and per contributor today, does not prove the formula is inequitable.  But 
there is the potential that it would be inequitable, if applied. 
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     It is also worth noting that if the adjustment provision were triggered and it were 
applied for a number of years, there would be considerations of intragenerational equity, 
if the equity measure in Chapter 5 were used.  Older pensioners, especially those who 
died during the adjustment period, would be less affected than younger pensioners who 
lived well beyond the adjustment period.  Also younger contributors who paid a higher 
contribution rate for a longer period, without any increase in pension, would bear a 
heavier burden than older contributors. 
 
     In the following subsections, numerical calculations for different age-sex groups are 




7.5.1  Further Analysis of Canadian Balancing Mechanism 
 
In subsection 6.4.3, it is argued that, in the extreme, the balancing mechanism is not 
robust because the adjustment to the contribution rate is only one half of the required 
amount but the adjustment to freeze the indexing to pensioners may be less than one half 
of the required amount (referred to as the “Current Rule”).  A simple refinement (referred 
to as the “Financial Rule”) is suggested to achieve financial balance, namely: 
 If the value of the freeze in indexing for three years is greater than one half the 
recommended increase in the contribution rate, then impose a proportionate freeze 
on indexing for three years such that it has a value equal to one half the 
recommended increase in the contribution rate and increase the contribution rate 
by one half the recommended amount;  
 If the value of the freeze in indexing for three years is less than one half the 
recommended increase in the contribution rate, then freeze the indexing for three 
years and increase the contribution rate by the difference between the 
recommended contribution rate and the value of the freeze in indexing for three 
years expressed as a contribution rate. 
 
     Such a rule would be robust, with respect to financial balance.  However, as will be 
shown, the rule is partial, as opposed to robust, with respect to equitable balance, 
depending on the extent of the adjustment required and the age of the contributors and 
pensioners.  After a few alternative adjustments are analyzed, a further refinement is 
proposed to produce a rule that is robust with respect to both financial and equitable 
balance, within certain ranges. 
 
     For this analysis, the measure of equity will be the change in the following ratio, 
which was described in section 5.3, namely: 
 
Present Value of Pension 
Accumulated Value of Contribution to 65 
 
The calculations are performed using the discount rates shown in Tables 6 and 12, which 
are repeated below for convenience. These discount rates are designed to reflect 
 
   109 
differences in utility depending on the proximity of pension payments.  The ratios will be 
calculated for males and females aged 30, 40, 50, 60, all considered to be still 
contributing and also for males and females aged 70, 80, considered to be pensioners.  
Retirement at age 65 is assumed.   The ultimate CPP valuation assumption of 2.5% 
inflation and 3.8% nominal wage growth, both on the best-estimate basis, are used.  
Salaries are assumed to be at least the maximum for CPP benefit calculation purposes and 
contributions are assumed to be made on all salary up to the maximum (ignoring the 
Year’s Basic Exemption). 
 
Table 22:  Personal Discount Rates Repeated Again 
 
 Discount Rate 
Period 
(current age x) 




65 - x  > 30 4% 4% 
30  65 - x  > 20 3% 3% 
20  65 - x  > 10 2% 3% 
10  65 - x  > 0 1% 3% 
  0  65 - x  0% 3% 
 
 
     For the purpose of calculating the ratios the UN 2002 projections for ultimate 
mortality of the general population are used.  These tables are considered by the UN as 
appropriate for the global population in the year 2100.  By that time, it is assumed that 
mortality rates will have ceased improving.  The tables have an upper age of life of 100 
for both males and females.  The following table provides an indication of the life 
expectancy using these tables.  As such they appear reasonable for the purpose of making 
comparisons. Slight variations in the figures are due to rounding. 
 
Table 23:  Life Expectancy Based on UN 2002 Projections 
(Ultimate Table) 
 
 Life Expectancy at Age x  
Age x  Male Female 
Birth 82.44 87.34 
   30 53.11 57.84 
   40 43.29 47.98 
   50 33.79 38.30 
   60 24.84 28.84 
   65 20.64 24.28 
   70 16.68 19.90 
   80 9.84 12.10 
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(i)    Scenario 1: Current Rule - Small Adjustment 
 
 Current Contribution Rate: 9.9% 
 
 Recommended Contribution Rate:10.10% 
 





























30 1.1136 1.0371 0.9911 1.3391 1.3274 0.9913 
40 1.2464 1.2381 0.9934 1.5170 1.5069 0.9934 
50 1.4013 1.3955 0.9959 1.7286 1.7215 0.9959 
60 1.6324 1.6300 0.9986 2.0033 2.0004 0.9986 
70 1.4262 1.3296 0.9322 1.8982 1.7679 0.9314 





 For pensioners the reduction factor is less than 0.95 so the test of equity is  not 
 met.  Equitable balance is at most transitory because the pension freeze, an 
 economic factor, is too large. 
 
 
(ii) Scenario 2: Current Rule - Large Adjustment 
 
 Current Contribution Rate: 9.9% 
 
 Recommended Contribution Rate: 10.30% 
 
 Adjustment: Must be accomplished in two adjustments 
 





























30 1.1136 1.0913 0.9799 1.3391 1.3124 0.9801 
40 1.2464 1.2278 0.9851 1.5170 1.4944 0.9851 
50 1.4013 1.3883 0.9908 1.7286 1.7127 0.9908 
60 1.6324 1.6274 0.9970 2.0033 1.9972 0.9970 
70 1.4262 1.2534 0.8788 1.8982 1.6617 0.8754 





 For pensioners the reduction is factor is less than 0.95 so the test of equity  is not 
 met.  Equitable balance is at most transitory because the pension freeze, an 
 economic factor, is too large. 
 
 
(iii) Scenario 1: Financial Rule - Small Adjustment 
 
 Current Contribution Rate: 9.9% 
 
 Recommended Contribution Rate: 10.10% 
 





























30 1.1136 1.1037 0.9911 1.3391 1.3274 0.9913 
40 1.2464 1.2381 0.9934 1.5170 1.5069 0.9934 
50 1.4013 1.3955 0.9959 1.7286 1.7215 0.9959 
60 1.6324 1.6300 0.9986 2.0033 2.0004 0.9986 
70 1.4262 1.3608 0.9541 1.8982 1.8100 0.9535 
80 0.8021 0.7674 0.9568 1.1868 1.1338 0.9553 
 






 The Financial Rule makes a sufficient adjustment to the Current Rule to 
 achieve equitable balance. 
 
 
(iv) Scenario 2:  Financial Rule - Large Adjustment 
 
 Current Contribution Rate: 9.9% 
 
 Recommended Contribution Rate: 10.30% 
 





























30 1.1136 1.0891 0.9780 1.3391 1.3098 0.9782 
40 1.2464 1.2259 0.9836 1.5170 1.4921 0.9836 
50 1.4013 1.3869 0.9897 1.7286 1.7113 0.9899 
60 1.6324 1.6265 0.9964 2.0033 1.9961 0.9964 
70 1.4262 1.3296 0.9322 1.8982 1.7679 0.9314 





 This rule improves the equity for pensioners by putting more of the burden 
 of adjustment on contributors; however, for pensioners, the reduction factor is less 
 than 0.95 so the test of equity is not met. 
 
 
     To provide greater equity than the Financial Rule, define the following Equitable 
Rule: 
 
 For existing pensioners indexing for years four to six after the date of adjustment 
(for contributors) will be reduced by up to 1%.  If the value of a 1% reduction in 
indexing is greater than one half the recommended increase in the contribution 
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rate, then impose a proportionate reduction to the 1% proposed reduction for 
years four to six such that it has a value equal to one half the recommended 
increase in the contribution rate and increase the contribution rate by one half the 
recommended amount; 
 If the value of a 1% reduction in indexing for existing pensioners for years four to 
six is less than one half the recommended increase in the contribution rate, then 
reduce the indexing by 1% for years four to six and increase the contribution rate 
by the difference between the recommended contribution rate and the value of the 
reduction in indexing expressed as a contribution rate. 
 
 
(v) Scenario 1: Equitable Rule - Small Adjustment 
 
 Current Contribution Rate: 9.9% 
 
 Recommended Contribution Rate:  10.10% 
 





























30 1.1136 1.0100 0.9876 1.3391 1.3226 0.9877 
40 1.2464 1.2349 0.9907 1.5170 1.5030 0.9907 
50 1.4013 1.3932 0.9942 1.7286 1.7186 0.9942 
60 1.6324 1.6291 0.9980 2.0033 1.9993 0.9980 
70 1.4262 1.3761 0.9648 1.8982 1.8282 0.9631 





 Compared to the Financial Rule, the Equitable Rule makes a further 
 reduction to the contributors and improves the reduction of the pensioners.  
 All reduction factors are at least 0.95 so equitable balance is achieved. 
 
 
(vi) Scenario 2: Equitable Rule - Large Adjustment 
 
 
 Current Contribution Rate: 9.9% 
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 Recommended Contribution Rate: 10.30% 
 





























30 1.1136 1.0806 0.9703 1.3391 1.2995 0.9705 
40 1.2464 1.2187 0.9778 1.5170 1.4833 0.9778 
50 1.4013 1.3817 0.9861 1.7286 1.7045 0.9861 
60 1.6324 1.6244 0.9951 2.0033 1.9936 0.9951 
70 1.4262 1.3761 0.9648 1.8982 1.8282 0.9631 





 Compared to the Financial Rule, the Equitable Rule makes a further 
 reduction to the contributors and improves the reduction of pensioners.  All 
 reduction factors are at least 0.95 so equitable balance is achieved. 
 
 
7.5.2  Limits to the Equitable Rule 
 
With the Equitable Rule, the reduction factor applied to pensioners is limited.  It will not 
reduce further as greater aggregate adjustments are required.  The burden of any such 
greater adjustments must be borne by contributors.  With respect to the distribution of the 
burden of adjustment among contributors, it is heavier on younger contributors than on 
older contributors because the higher contribution rate must be paid for a longer period of 
time in order to get the same pension (since the pension is defined by formula unrelated 
to contributions).  At some point, if the aggregate adjustment required were sufficiently 
large, then the reduction factor for contributors would be below 0.95 and equitable 
balance would not be achieved.  Such a situation could be partially mitigated by having 
different contribution rates for contributors of different ages at the time of adjustment.  
(Practically, it is unlikely that such a politically challenging and administratively complex 
approach would be implemented.)  The following table shows the impact on the reduction 
factors of limiting the adjustments for contributors to certain amounts.  The maximum 
freeze to indexing for existing pensioners remains at 1% for years four to six. 
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Table 30:  Canada – Equitable Rule Size of Contribution Adjustment to Maintain 




























30 0.50% 1.1136 1.0657 0.9569 1.3391 1.2816 0.9571 
40 0.75% 1.2464 1.1870 0.9523 1.5170 1.4447 0.9523 
50 1.25% 1.4013 1.3320 0.9506 1.7286 1.6432 0.9506 
60 3.00% 1.6324 1.5648 0.9586 2.0033 1.9204 0.9586 
70 n/a 1.4262 1.3676 0.9648 1.8982 1.8282 0.9631 
80 n/a 0.8021 0.7795 0.9719 1.1868 1.1494 0.9685 
 
  
In summary, the Equitable Rule is only effective in achieving equity for contributors and 
pensioners of all ages within certain limits.  Beyond those limits, some further adjustment 
to the parameters of the system, i.e., the contribution rate, benefit formula, retirement age 
for full benefit entitlement, is required.  The adjustment for pensioners has been designed 
to enhance equity by limiting the amount of the adjustment to 1% and by lagging the 
adjustment to the fourth to sixth years after the time of adjustment.  Both of these factors 
would make for an easier adjustment by pensioners. 
 
7.6   Rethinking Equity 
 
When considering equitable balance, if one party, namely pensioners, is asked to bear the 
full burden of adjustments, it is difficult to see that there is equitable balance.  As has 
been argued earlier, pensioners are poorly situated to adjust to reductions in their income, 
both because their pension often represents a large portion of their total income and also 
because they have few options available to adjust their income and must make the 
adjustments on the expenditure side, which may be difficult.  Both Germany and Japan 
have set the schedule of contribution rates and adjustments are borne by pensioners.  This 
does not appear to be an equitable balance. 
 
     The situation with Sweden is slightly different. Raising of the age for full benefit 
entitlement is a way of sharing the burden between contributors and those eligible to 
retire.  (Those eligible to retire are one subclass of contributors; however, such 
individuals have a choice of continuing to contribute longer in order to receive the full 
pension or ceasing to contribute and receiving a pension that has been reduced to reflect 
the new age of full benefit entitlement).  Barring disability or unemployment, those 
eligible to retire who have not yet retired do have the means to adjust to an increase in the 
age of full benefit entitlement, i.e., to a reduction in the pension amount at age 65.  Such 
people can continue to work, thereby increasing their aggregate lifetime income and 
shortening the expected period on which they must live on a pension.  So this provision 
in the Swedish SSRS is equitable. 
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     However, as the analysis in section 7.2 showed, once the ABM is triggered, on the 
measure of equity described in Chapter 5, pensioners bear the full burden of adjustment.  
This is not equitable. 
 
     It would be desirable from the perspective of equitable balance that both contributors 
and pensioners bear some of the adjustment and contributors who are more able to adapt 
than pensioners bear a larger share of the adjustment. 
 
 
7.7    Chapter Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, there was a thorough demonstration of how the definition of equity 
described in Chapter 5 could be applied to the Canadian system.   The current rule was 
analyzed, as well as the financial rule proposed in Chapter 6.  Both these rules place too 
great a share of the burden of adjustment on pensioners; although, the financial rule is an 
improvement over the current rule.  A further variation of the financial rule, referred to as 
the equitable rule, was proposed.  Using this equitable rule, the Canadian mechanism 
would be robust, within certain ranges.  This is a contribution of this thesis. 
 
     The chapter also examined various numerical ratios for the other three countries’ 
SSRS.  In all these three countries, the contribution rate is fixed so the burden of 
adjustment is borne by the pensioners.  Japan and Germany were not considered to 
achieve equity.  Because Sweden also has a component in its system that adjusts the age 
for full benefit entitlement, a portion of the burden of adjustment is borne by contributors.  
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Chapter 8  CHARACTERISTICS OF AN AUTOMATIC BALANCING  




8.0   Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter begins by summarizing the results of the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, using 
the terminology presented in Chapter 2.  It then describes the characteristics of 
mechanisms and controls that an ABM would possess in order to be robust.  The chapter 
discusses the role that extra-systematic flows may play in achieving balance but notes 
that the existence of such extra-systematic flows, unless they are treated as loans, 
undermines the efficiency of the ABM. 
 
     The characteristics of a robust ABM are identified.  The final subsection of the chapter 
presents a practical approach to applying a balancing mechanism, based on setting 
acceptable limits with respect to contribution rates and benefit replacement ratios.  An 
extraordinary adjustment to the system and/or to the mechanism would be made when the 
system approaches the point at which it will violate the acceptable limits. 
 
 
8.1   Summary Regarding the Four Countries’ Mechanisms 
 
The following table summarizes the analysis of the balancing mechanisms in the four 
countries and applies the classification terminology presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Table 31:  Classification of Balancing Mechanisms 
 
















     
Canada No Partial Transitory Discretionary Partial 
     
Germany Yes Transitory Transitory Mechanistic Transitory 
     
Japan Yes Transitory Transitory Mechanistic Transitory 
     
Sweden Yes Transitory Partial Mechanistic Partial 
 
 
     The conclusion is that none of the four countries’ systems examined has a balancing 
mechanism that is automatic and robust in achieving both financial and equitable balance. 
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8.2    Characteristics of Mechanisms and Controls 
 
This chapter considers characteristics that a balancing mechanism might possess in order 
to be considered automatic and robust, both financially and equitably. 
 
1. To be automatic, the mechanism must be triggered based on some defined 
measure or hurdle, without the requirement of further decisions by lawmakers or 
the system’s administrators.  Hence, a requirement is that a measure or hurdle be 
defined and that the data necessary to calculate the measure or hurdle be 
obtainable.  A further requirement is that when the measure or hurdle indicates 
that a balancing action is required that the required action is determined without 
any further decisions. 
 
2. To achieve financial balance over an indefinite, and possibly infinite, time 
horizon is a problem in stochastic optimal control.  As an initial starting point, if 
the contribution rates, benefit levels and retirement ages have been set so that the 
system is financially sustainable over a long horizon, such as 75 years, on a 
consistent basis on some set of plausible economic and demographic assumptions, 
the system will be better placed to remain in financial balance when adjusted by 
an appropriate balancing mechanism.  Setting the contribution rates, benefit levels 
and retirement ages to produce a contingency reserve (or surplus) on some set of 
plausible economic and demographic assumptions would produce greater 
likelihood of financial balance being maintained.  However, if these rates, levels 
and ages produce too large a contingency reserve, it is likely that the system 
would not meet the requirement of achieving equitable balance. 
 
Assuming that the rates, levels and ages have been set to maintain balance over a 
long horizon such as 75 years, on some set of plausible economic and 
demographic assumptions, then the system will be more resilient to shocks or 
deviations from the assumptions, the more controls are available to make 
adjustments.  In the examination of the four countries’ systems we observed 
mechanisms designed to adjust system outflows, i.e., through benefit payments, 
and to adjust system inflows, i.e., through contributions or taxes.  Such 
mechanisms may respond to economic factors, demographic factors or both.  
These controls observed in the four systems and the country where observed were 
the following: 
(i) Adjust the contribution rate – Canada 
(ii) Adjust the benefit level – Canada, Germany, Japan, Sweden 
(iii) Adjust the retirement age – Sweden (Germany and Japan did some 
scheduled increases but it is not an ongoing feature) 
(iv) Invest reserve funds – Canada 
(v) Extra-systematic flows – Germany through government subsidy, Japan 
through government subsidy and minimum benefit, Sweden through 
minimum benefit.  Supplemental pensions to raise pensions to the 
minimum benefit level are paid by government, i.e., using general tax 
revenues, in both Japan and Sweden.   
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The following table shows how these items affect inflows and outflows and 
whether they are a response to economic or demographic factors. 
 



















(i)   Adjust the contribution rate     
(ii)  Adjust the benefit level     
(iii) Adjust the retirement age     
(iv)  Invest reserve funds     
(v)   Extra-systematic flows     
 
The chart shows the limitations of the controls.  Extra-systematic flows can be 
used to adjust inflows and outflows in response to economic or demographic 
factors.  All the other controls can adjust inflows or outflows or can adjust for 
economic factors or demographic factors but not for all such flows and factors.  
To have the greatest flexibility within the control system, and greater likelihood 
of achieving financial balance, it is desirable to be able to adjust all flows in 
response to both factors.  Although extra-systematic flows can be an important 
and useful way of achieving financial balance, a balancing mechanism which 
requires extra-systematic flows would not be considered an effective balancing 
mechanism, i.e., the assessment of the effectiveness of the balancing mechanism 
is from the perspective of the system and whether balance is achieved without 
resort to extra-systematic flows. 
 
3. To achieve equitable balance requires the sharing of the burden of adjustment 
between cohorts of contributors and cohorts of pensioners.  In the foregoing table, 
we might think of those representing the inflows as contributors and those 
representing the outflows as pensioners.  A control mechanism that only makes 
adjustments in respect of contributors or only makes adjustments in respect of 
pensioners would not be considered balanced.  Hence controls (i) and (ii), if 
adopted without some other control, will mean that the system cannot be 
considered to maintain equitable balance.  Furthermore, controls (iii) and (iv) 
could be designed to be equitable controls since they can affect both contributors 
and pensioners.  Of course, control (v) could be designed to affect all flows and so 
achieve equitable balance; however, as noted, because balance is maintained due 
to an extra-systematic flow, the balancing mechanism would not be considered 
effective (when judged from the perspective of the system). 
 
4. In considering whether to adopt control (iii) or control (iv) one must consider the 
effect that demographics is having on the system and compare the expected 
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“demographic return” to the expected “economic return”.  If changing 
demographics is affecting the system, adjusting the retirement age for full benefit 
entitlement can be used as a financial control and can be designed as an equitable 
control.  As noted in Chapter 3, periodically adjusting the retirement age to 
maintain a constant ratio of the expected period during which contributions will 
be made up until the age of full benefit entitlement to the expected period of 
benefit receipt after full-benefit retirement age (or some similar ratio) maintains 
individual equity across cohorts and within cohorts.  It has the further equitable 
aspect that all adjustments that affect an individual are known before the 
individual becomes a pensioner.  It is easier (and I would argue more equitable) to 
adjust one’s retirement plans based on a change in the age of full benefit 
entitlement while one is not retired than it is to adjust to a change in benefits once 
one has retired. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, in determining whether control (iv) is likely to be 
effective, it is important to compare the expected economic return on investments 
in capital markets to the expected return attainable (due to demographics) if the 
excess funds are used by the economy to generate employment opportunities and 
economic growth.  Hence, although control (iv) is designed to capitalize on 
economic factors, its desirability and viability is dependent on a comparison of 
the returns available due to both economic and demographic factors. 
 
 
8.3   Extra-Systematic Flows 
 
As stated, a balancing mechanism that requires extra-systematic flows is considered 
ineffective.  However, for the benefit of fuller discussion, a description of some of the 
extra-systematic flows used may be informative. 
 
     In Japan, the basic pension is subsidized by the government (i.e., by the current 
taxpayers) by ½ (in 2009).  In Germany, the government subsidy is approximately 30%.  
In both countries, this is a significant subsidy that reduces the extent of the reduction in 
benefits (since the contribution rate is prescribed).  It also broadens the burden for 
financing the social security system to the general taxpayer.  If the general tax system has 
been designed to be equitable, which most countries would claim is their objective, then 
using the general tax system to bear a portion of the contribution burden is an equitable 
approach. 
 
     Greater equity might be achieved if both benefits were reduced and contributions were 
increased, in combination with a subsidy, as this would require contributors to bear some 
of the adjustment directly (not just through the general tax system).  Given that a social 
security system is a complex and dynamic system, greater flexibility and resiliency could 
be achieved with a varying amount of government subsidy that was targeted at some 
expected level.  For example, with respect to Japan, if it were established that the 
expected level of government subsidy was ½ but the actual amount of subsidy in any year 
were to be in a range, say of 2/5 to 3/5, and if over a 10-year period the subsidy had not 
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been in aggregate approximately ½, some adjustment to benefits and contributions would 
be made.  Such an adjustment would provide a more flexible response to economic and 
demographic downturns that might last for several years but which might correct over a 
ten-year time frame, e.g., recession, stagflation, stalled productivity growth, or a sluggish 
economy accompanied by increased unemployment. 
 
     A second type of extra-systematic flow, used by both Japan and Sweden, is the 
establishment of a minimum benefit that is paid for through general revenues.  The 
minimum benefit is set at a level deemed adequate.  Then if the social security pension is 
less than this level, the difference between the minimum benefit level and the social 
security pension is paid as an additional or supplemental pension, using general revenues. 
 
     The existence of such a minimum benefit plays an important social role in ensuring 
adequate minimum pensions.  Sakamoto (2008) argues that a minimum benefit guarantee 
is an essential component in a system where benefits are being reduced.  But the 
existence of a minimum benefit makes it harder to assess the effectiveness of any 
balancing mechanism.  The repeated application of the balancing mechanism may cause 
social security pensions to be reduced below the minimum benefit level but concerns 
regarding the effectiveness of the balancing mechanism may not be raised because 
pensioners receive at least the minimum pension, which is deemed adequate.  However, 
there is a subtle transfer occurring from a self-financing social security system to a social 
security system delivering inadequate benefits that requires transfers from public taxes to 
make the benefits adequate.  This is a concern with the Swedish ABM raised by 
Scherman (2007). 
 
     Moreover there are considerations of intergenerational and intragenerational equity.  
The portion of the pension paid as a minimum benefit supplement is financed from 
general revenues.  This passes the burden to all taxpayers but typically those working, 
who are also contributing to social security, will pay the greatest amount of taxes.  So 
once benefits fall to the minimum benefit level, any further adjustments are paid by all 
taxpayers and the benefit recipient does not experience any further reduction in benefits; 
predominantly a form of intergenerational transfer.  From an intragenerational 
perspective, those whose benefits fall to the minimum benefit level are treated differently 
than those whose benefits are above the minimum benefit level, when benefit reductions 
are required.  The former group maintains its level of income whereas the latter group 
receives a benefit reduction. 
 
     Hence, while one may argue strongly for the existence of a minimum benefit from an 
adequacy perspective, the existence of a minimum benefit may hide the ineffectiveness of 
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8.4   A Mechanistic Adjustment Within Limits 
 
The balancing mechanisms of the four countries do not employ stochastic controls but 
rather make adjustments according to prescribed rules when some measure or hurdle so 
indicates.  The simplicity of the rules provides ease of application and is more readily 
understandable by the public.  However, none of the mechanisms reviewed is sufficient 
to ensure balance will be achieved.  If such simple mechanisms are to be employed, a 
pragmatic approach is to define limits within which the mechanism will operate, without 
any revision to the system.  These limits could be defined in terms of contribution level 
and benefit replacement rate.  These are both items on which societal input could be 
sought.  The levels for both acceptable contributions and replacement rates will vary by 
society (or country). 
 
     This approach was adopted by both Japan and Germany when the most recent reforms 
described were implemented.  In Japan, the contribution rate to the EPI (beginning in 
2004) and National Pension Scheme (beginning in 2005) are to be increased in steps from 
2005 until 2017 when the rate reaches its ultimate level.  Based on the financial analysis, 
the replacement rate, based on disposable income of pensioners to disposable income of 
contributors, will gradually decline in accordance with these economic and demographic 
assumptions.  According to Sakamoto (2008), the 2004 actuarial projections indicated 
that the replacement rate would stabilize in 2023 at 50.2%, which was considered 
acceptable.  Further, it was decided that a replacement rate below 50 percent was 
unacceptable so accommodation measures were introduced, including introduction of a 
minimum benefit at the 50% level, suspension of modified indexing between actuarial 
reviews if the minimum 50% replacement level might be violated, initiation of a scheme 
review.  According to Borsch-Supan et al. (2006) in the case of the German reforms, the 
sustainability parameter was set at .25, which on the basis of projections should be 
sufficient to meet the dual objective of keeping the contribution rate under 20% until 
2020 and under 22% until 2030 and maintaining an adequate replacement rate, 
approximately 67%.  These contribution rate levels were considered acceptable after 
analyzing the impact on replacement rates and determining that they were not projected 
to be much different than the current replacement levels when all aspects of the revised 
SSRS were considered, including assumptions regarding high participation in the 
voluntary savings component (Borsch-Supan et al., 2006).  Toft (2007) raised questions 
of the realism of the projections particularly in view of recent economic performance. 
 
     Using data for Lithuania, Alho et al. (2006) demonstrate how stochastic population 
simulations combined with an OLG model that assumes perfect foresight from the agents 
could be used to demonstrate the probability that reform proposals would require the 
contribution rate to be higher than a set level or that the replacement rate would fall 
below a set level.  This type of analysis might be used by countries considering social 
security reforms in order to gain insight into the likelihood of the sustainability of the 
reform proposal.  Although the work presented involves stochastic methods and appears 
quite sophisticated, Alho et al. (2006) consider it as a first step toward a more 
comprehensive model in which future uncertainty could be handled in a more advanced 
manner.  Perhaps such an advancement would be to define a steady-state contribution rate 
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in the way the Canadian system does.  This would create a tension between the near and 
the distant future that may enhance the likelihood of maintaining financial balance over a 




8.5    Chapter Conclusion 
 
This chapter summarizes the results of the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7 and using the 
terminology presented in Chapter 2 categorizes the four countries’ mechanism.  Sweden 
is mechanistic partial, Canada is discretionary partial and both Germany and Japan are 
labeled mechanistic transitory.  The chapter then described the characteristics of 
mechanisms and controls that an ABM would possess in order to be robust. 
 
     All countries’ mechanism, except Canada’s, involves extra-systematic flows.  Such 
flows may help in achieving financial balance but may change the share of the burden 
between contributors and pensioners by including general taxpayers.  The existence of 
such extra-systematic flows, unless they are treated as loans, undermines the efficiency of 
the ABM. 
 
     The final subsection of the chapter presented a practical approach to applying a 
balancing mechanism, based on setting acceptable limits for contribution rates and 
benefit rates.  An extraordinary adjustment to the system and/or mechanism is required 
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Chapter 9  CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS AND  




9.0   Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter summarizes the conclusions of this thesis.  It presents the contributions of 
this thesis to this area of research.  These contributions were listed in Chapter 1.  The 
thesis concludes by identifying the implications of this work and other areas in which it 
might be applied.  Topics for further research are listed. 
 
 
9.1   Conclusions 
 
The conclusions of this thesis are as follows: 
 
(1)   Managing an SSRS that does not have fully funded individual accounts, in a 
changing environment, is a complex, dynamic problem.  One approach to the 
problem would be to formulate it as a stochastic control problem. 
 
(2) Likely due to the complexity of not only the solution but even the formulation and 
specification of the stochastic optimal control problem, none of the international 
SSRS analyzed uses a stochastic control approach. 
 
(3) If the contribution rates, benefit levels and retirement ages have been set at a level 
 that financial balance may be sustained, on some reasonable set of economic and 
 demographic assumptions, the balancing mechanism will be in a better starting 
 position to maintain financial balance. 
 
(4) Adjusting the retirement age for full benefit entitlement to maintain a constant 
 ratio of the expected contributory period to the expected period of benefit receipt, 
 or some similar ratio, can be an effective method of maintaining financial and 
 equitable balance, when the SSRS is impacted by changing demographics. 
 
(5) When the rate of return available in capital markets exceeds the internal rate of 
 return on a paygo SSRS, there are some financial benefits  to be gained through 
 partial funding. 
 
(6) Since it typically takes at least seven decades for a system change to mature, from 
 the perspective of individual participants in the SSRS, the system is in continual 
 transition and this is the normal state. 
 
(7) Because individual participants perceive the system to be in continual transition, 
 some changes to the system that affect their rights (benefit entitlements) and 
 obligations (contribution requirements) may be considered equitable. 
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(8) Even though gradual adjustments to participants’ rights and obligations may be 
 considered equitable because they fall within acceptable quantitative limits, if 
 such adjustments only affect pensioners, after they have retired, they would be 
 considered inequitable because pensioners are least able to adapt to such changes. 
 
(9) Adjustments are more equitable if they are borne by contributors.  They may also 
 be equitable if their impact is shared between contributors and pensioners.  
 However, where there is a sharing, the greater share should be borne by 
 contributors recognizing that they are more able to adapt to such an adjustment, 
 both because they are working and also because they have a longer time horizon 
 for adaptation.  Such considerations can be incorporated in the assessment of 
 equity, by using different personal discount rates, which vary by time to 
 retirement. 
 
(10) In their current form the adjustment mechanisms of Germany and Japan are 
 inequitable because the contribution rate is fixed and the adjustment is borne 
 primarily by pensioners after  retirement.  Although the contribution rate is fixed 
 in the Swedish system because the age for full benefit entitlement is adjusted 
 based on life expectancy, there is a sharing of the burden of adjustment between 
 contributors and pensioners; hence, Sweden is judged to be partially equitable. 
 The adjustment mechanism in Canada, should the politicians not be able to agree 
 on a course of action, is inequitable,  based on current demographics, since it 
 places a heavier burden on pensioners than on contributors. 
 
(11) The control mechanisms adopted by Canada, Germany, Japan and Sweden are 
 simple to calculate and apply.  They are easy to communicate, which is an 
 advantage.  If such simple control mechanisms are to be used, then it would be 
 desirable to do projections, on various assumptions, ideally using stochastic 
 methods, to determine the likely impact on the contribution rate and the benefit 
 replacement rate.  Acceptable contribution rates and replacement rates should be 
 determined, from time to time.  When the contribution rate or the benefit level 
 would violate the acceptable limit, a review  of the SSRS should be conducted 
 and suitable adjustments made. 
 
(12) The approach to determining the assets of the SSRS adopted by Sweden, in which 
 a contribution asset is defined based on the turnover duration, where the turnover 
 duration includes a period beyond which contributions will be made by the 
 current contributing generation, is flawed.  Although it may be viable on certain 
 idealistic steady state assumptions, it is not appropriate in a non-steady state 
 world since it overstates the assets.  It is important that this inherent flaw in this 
 approach be recognized and corrected.  The Swedish model is widely studied and 
 may be copied.  For example, Boada-Penas et al. (2008) adopt this approach in 
 preparing the balance sheet of the Spanish SSRS; hence, overstating that system’s 
 financial position. 
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(13) Because participants may assign different utility values to current contributions 
 and to future benefit payments, participants (and different generations of 
 participants) may consider the SSRS to be equitable even if the net lifetime 
 benefit is not zero. 
 
 
9.2   Summary of Contribution 
 
This thesis makes the following contributions to the literature on SSRS and ABM: 
 In Chapter 2, it establishes a terminology to classify balancing mechanisms. 
 In Chapter 3, a critical analysis of an approach proposed by Valdes-Prieto referred 
to as Integration to Financial Markets is presented and the approach is found to be 
deficient. 
 In Chapter 5, families of definitions of equity and a benchmark to measure 
equitable balance are presented.  In Chapter 7, it is illustrated how this benchmark 
could be applied to four countries’ SSRS that differ in significant aspects. 
 In Chapter 6, a critical error is identified in the way in which assets are calculated 
by the Swedish SSRS in determining financial balance and a suitable correction is 
proposed.  Also in Chapter 6, a weakness in the manner of applying the ABM in 
the Swedish system is identified.  Due to this weakness, once liabilities exceed 
assets, it is unlikely that applying the ABM will restore balance.   
 In Chapter 6, some of the unusual characteristics of the steady-state contribution 
rate calculation for the Canadian SSRS were identified.  Although this approach 
was shown to have limited application and does not appear to depend on any 
actuarial principle, it creates a tension between the near and distant future, which 
is a factor in achieving financial balance over a seventy-five year horizon. 
 In Chapters 6 and 7, an analysis of the balancing mechanism in the Canadian 
SSRS is presented and a proposed change to the ABM is presented that would 
make the mechanism robust, within certain ranges. 
 
 
9.3   Implications, Applications and Topics for Further Research 
 
Because none of the SSRS analyzed uses a stochastic control process, it is possible that 
the balancing mechanism will not work at some point to maintain financial balance.  To 
avoid misleading the population and those who may copy the approach, it is important 
that this be communicated.  Both the Germans and the Japanese have set limits with 
respect to contribution levels and/or benefit replacement rates that are considered 
acceptable and they conduct regular actuarial reviews of their SSRS to determine how 
they are performing.  Some Swedes (Settergren, 2003) maintain that their ABM will 
maintain financial balance regardless of future economic and demographic developments.  
This claim is misleading and should be rectified. 
 
     This research has application to all SSRS, except those that only have fully funded 
individual accounts, since they are likely to experience economic and demographic 
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pressures which will challenge the ability of the SSRS to deliver its promised benefits for 
the specified contributions.   
 
     This research could also be applied to private pension plans, i.e., those outside the 
realm of social security.  It is not likely to be applicable where the pension plan has been 
established by a commitment made by one party that is considered irrevocable, e.g., the 
situation of single employer pension plans that have been voluntarily established and 
which were not subject to union negotiations.  However, where there has been union 
negotiations and/or where there is some form of risk sharing in the pension deal, it may 
be fruitful to consider how to incorporate a balancing mechanism and how it might 
operate when contribution levels and benefit replacement rates are within acceptable 
limits.  Cui et al. (2005) present some interesting analysis of the application of risk-
absorbing mechanisms to hybrid pension plans that involves the sharing of adjustments 
by contributors and pensioners.  Other types of pension arrangements that include some 
form of risk sharing include negotiated plans, matching contribution defined benefit 
plans, negotiated contribution defined benefit plans, jointly-sponsored pension plans, and 
multi-employer pension plans. 
 
     This research might be extended to any arrangement where certain benefits are to be 
delivered for a fixed budget financed by taxes.  For example, with respect to the funding 
of school boards’ budgets, which is relatively rigid, one might establish certain 
perquisites that would be reduced automatically if there were a financial imbalance or 
one might establish how class sizes would be increased automatically in response to a 
financial imbalance. 
 
     Topics for further research include: 
 
 Consideration of how SSRS should be adjusted to recognize the impact of TFR, 
particularly when a cohort’s TFR is below the population replacement rate. 
 Consideration of how adjusting the age for full benefit entitlement to maintain a 
constant ratio of the expected contributory period to the expected benefit period 
might be applied to other programs than SSRS.  For example, jurisdictions such 
as Ontario provide a drug benefit to those residents age 65 and older that is paid 
from general revenues.  This age of entitlement might be raised as average life 
expectancy increases. 
 Use of dynamic programming to investigate stochastic controls that might be 
adopted by an SSRS.  Examples of stochastic controls to be considered would 
include: adjusting the age for full benefit entitlement; partial funding with capital 
market investments and the appropriateness of various investment asset classes; 
contribution increases when certain economic and/or demographic measures or 
hurdles are met; benefit reductions when certain economic and/or demographic 
measures or hurdles are met; the use of government subsidies as loans when 
deviations are within a specified range and are considered temporary. 
 Development of more advanced techniques to enhance the stochastic modeling of 
system outcomes within certain contribution rate and benefit replacement rate 
ranges. 
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 Investigation of living expenses and life style among retirees, and compared to 
contributors, to provide guidance of what type of indexing of pensions may be 
most appropriate. 
 Investigation of the utility functions of contributors and pensioners, and to the 
extent possible, quantification of those functions, to be better able to assess the 
equity of proposed adjustments. 
 Development of a conceptual model for analysis that does not rely on steady-state 
assumptions. 
 Greater analysis of empirical data leading to a better understanding of the 
economic interactions and interrelationships among variables such as: GDP 
growth, rate of salary and wage growth, rate of consumer price index growth, rate 
of productivity; GDP growth, return on common stock, return on long bonds, 
equity risk premium; GDP growth, interest rate levels, demographic profile. 
 Analysis to see if an actuarial principle could be developed to justify a calculation 
of the type done in Canada to determine a steady-state contribution rate. 
 
 
9.4   Chapter Conclusion 
 
This thesis developed a terminology for classifying ABM.  On examination of four 
countries’ ABM, none was found to be robust.  This may be largely because the 
definition of robustness requires the ABM to achieve both financial and equitable balance 
over a seventy-five year horizon, regardless of the demographics or economics or 
however remote the likelihood of occurrence of the demographic or economic stress may 
be.  Nonetheless, this is an important point that may be overlooked (example, Settergren, 
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